Filed: Aug. 21, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2003 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk STEPHEN D. THORNTON, Petitioner-Appellant, No. 02-7130 v. (D.C. No. 01-CV-288-S) (E.D. Oklahoma) STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determ
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2003 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk STEPHEN D. THORNTON, Petitioner-Appellant, No. 02-7130 v. (D.C. No. 01-CV-288-S) (E.D. Oklahoma) STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determi..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 21 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEPHEN D. THORNTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 02-7130
v. (D.C. No. 01-CV-288-S)
(E.D. Oklahoma)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner seeks review of the denial of his petition for writ of habeas
corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As required by 28 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A), he requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which we
granted as to the issue of whether the officer’s unwarranted search was based on
exigent circumstances. 1
Petitioner was convicted in state court in Oklahoma of manufacturing
methamphetamine. Oklahoma police were contacted by an informant, whose
reliability was then unknown to them. The informant advised that petitioner had
asked for Vicks inhalers in order to make methamphetamine. The officers placed
a body wire on the informant and sent him with the inhalers to meet petitioner,
after which they monitored the wire while petitioner showed the informant how to
make the drug. As the officers were monitoring (and taping) the wire, they
learned that petitioner had created a finished product. The officers then entered
petitioner’s home, where they noticed a strong chemical smell. In the kitchen
they observed broken inhalers, methamphetamine in a Pyrex pie pan, a spoon,
syringe, and muriatic acid. This evidence was seized and used at petitioner’s
trial.
On direct appeal, with new counsel, petitioner alleged that his
constitutional rights were violated by the warrantless search of his home and
seizure of the above-mentioned evidence. He also contended that trial counsel was
1
Although he has also argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to challenge the search, petitioner did not seek a COA on
that claim. Consequently, we deem it waived.
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ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA) determined that the warrantless search was based on
exigent circumstances and that the tape recording of the events inside petitioner’s
home provided the independent corroboration needed to establish the informant’s
trustworthiness. The OCCA further held that any motion to suppress would have
been denied and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such
motion.
The district court found the OCCA’s decision on both issues to be
consistent with federal law and denied the habeas petition. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 2
Under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), when the state courts have adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the
merits, a federal court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state adjudication of the
claim (1) ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court . . . ,’ § 2254(d)(1); or (2) ‘resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of evidence presented in the state court proceeding,’
§ 2254(d)(2).
2
We need not consider the state’s argument, raised for the first time on
appeal, that Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 (1976), bars our consideration of
petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim.
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Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2003). In addition, we will
presume correct any state court factual finding, absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). It is petitioner’s obligation to
rebut that presumption. Darks v. Mullin ,
327 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003).
Under Supreme Court precedent, “police officers need either a warrant or
probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a
home.” Kirk v. Louisiana , 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002). Petitioner claims there
were no exigent circumstances because in the time it took to buy the inhalers,
wire the informant, and monitor the conversation inside petitioner’s home, police
could have obtained a warrant. He further contends that the OCCA failed to
quote any federal law in its summary opinion upholding his conviction. Pet’r
Reply Br. at 6.
Here the police did not have probable cause for a warrant when they were
approached by the unknown informant. Indeed, probable cause did not exist until
they had monitored the wire long enough to become aware that petitioner had
created a finished product. Prior to that time, the officers lacked sufficient
information and adequate opportunity to seek a warrant. According to
respondent, and not denied by petitioner, the officers then immediately gained
entry to the residence. The OCCA held: “The potential for easy destruction of the
evidence in this case provided the exigent circumstances needed to support the
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warrantless search.” Unpacking this statement, it consists of a factual finding that there
was a potential for easy destruction of the evidence, and a legal conclusion that this
constituted exigent circumstances. As to the factual finding, we have no basis for
questioning the state court’s conclusion – let alone the clear and convincing evidence
required to overcome the presumption in favor of finality of the state court judgment.
As to the legal conclusion, we cannot grant relief unless the OCCA’s conclusion
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has not
provided detailed guidance regarding the scope of exigent circumstances, but
cases recognize that the threat of imminent destruction of evidence, coupled with
probable cause, can justify a warrantless entry and search. See generally
Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (recognizing that “delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the
destruction of evidence.’”) (quoting Preston v. United States ,
376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964). There is no Supreme Court decision contrary to the OCCA’s holding in
this case.
Petitioner’s claim that the OCCA failed to quote federal law is also
unavailing. The cases cited by the OCCA clearly evince that court’s recognition
of the proper constitutional standards applicable to alleged Fourth Amendment
violations. We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to establish that the
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state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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02-7130, Thornton v. Oklahoma
EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting
I respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals acted contrary to established Supreme Court law and unreasonably
applied the facts of this case to established Supreme Court law in finding exigent
circumstances in this case. I believe that the police could have obtained a search
warrant based on the information they had before the informant ever entered the
house. In any event, the main evidence of exigent circumstances – that the
methamphetamine was about to become consumed – was not learned until after
the police had entered the house and observed the syringe, etc. Exigent
circumstances discovered as a result of an illegal search cannot be used to
validate the illegal search. The other alleged exigent circumstances – that
methamphetamine is explosive and cancer forming – is generic and would justify
warrantless searches every time methamphetamine is suspected. On the facts of
this case, I believe that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals acted contrary to
established Supreme Court law and unreasonably applied the facts to established
Supreme Court law.
For these reasons, I dissent.
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