Filed: Dec. 03, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk SANDRA ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 03-1535 (D.C. No. 01-N-2493 (PAC)) ACADEMY SCHOOL DISTRICT 20, (D. Colo.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before LUCERO , McKAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determi
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk SANDRA ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 03-1535 (D.C. No. 01-N-2493 (PAC)) ACADEMY SCHOOL DISTRICT 20, (D. Colo.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before LUCERO , McKAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determin..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 3 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SANDRA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-1535
(D.C. No. 01-N-2493 (PAC))
ACADEMY SCHOOL DISTRICT 20, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Sandra Anderson appeals the dismissal of her discrimination lawsuit against
her former employer, Academy School District No. 20 (“ASD”). We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I.
According to the allegations in her amended complaint, Anderson, a black
female, worked for ASD’s special education department from 1986 to 2000. For
her first thirteen years, her job performance was consistently rated as satisfactory
or better. This changed, however, after she filed a complaint against her
supervisor in October 1999. One month later, she received her first unsatisfactory
review. Her conflict with her supervisor intensified for nearly a year, culminating
in termination of her employment.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Anderson filed a lawsuit alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
seeking damages and injunctive relief. She claimed that ASD discriminated
against her on the basis of race and retaliated against her for engaging in activity
protected by Title VII.
The district court granted summary judgment to ASD on Anderson’s claim
for punitive damages, and the remainder of the case went to trial. By this point,
Anderson’s original attorney had died and Anderson was proceeding pro se. 1 On
the second day of the trial, the court advised Anderson that she needed to present
evidence of protected activity and damages and cautioned, “I’m not going to
1
Anderson had a replacement lawyer for a short period after her original
lawyer died, but he withdrew at her request.
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waste much more of this jury’s time. You’re just not proving your case.”
Appellee’s App. at 50. After this warning, Anderson called one more witness and
rested her case. ASD then moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court
granted this motion.
II.
Before addressing Anderson’s claims, we note that she is representing
herself in this appeal, as she did at trial. We therefore construe the arguments in
her briefs liberally. See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004).
We further note Anderson has not provided us with a transcript of the
proceedings in the district court. She asked the district court to have the trial
proceedings transcribed at government expense, but the court refused, finding that
Anderson “has not shown the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument . . .
in support of the issues raised on appeal.” R. Vol. II, tab 85 (order of January 27,
2004). Before this court, Anderson has renewed her request for a free transcript;
we deny this request for the same reasons as the district court. We nevertheless
possess portions of the trial transcript, which ASD has submitted in its appellate
appendix.
The appellant bears the burden of providing this court with the materials
necessary to establish that error occurred in the district court. See Tesh v. United
States Postal Serv., 349 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2003); see also 10th Cir. R.
-3-
10.3(B) (“When the party asserting an issue fails to provide a record sufficient for
considering that issue, the court may decline to consider it.”). Thus, while we
have examined the existing record thoroughly to glean as much information as
possible about the events at trial, any gaps in this information must redound to
Anderson’s disadvantage.
III.
Anderson’s first claim on appeal is that the entry of judgment as a matter of
law deprived her of her right to trial by jury. She further contends that the district
court erred in denying her the opportunity to make a closing argument to the jury,
which we construe as another facet of the same claim.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully
heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); see
also Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2004). If
this standard is satisfied, then the entry of judgment as a matter of law does not
contravene the Seventh Amendment guarantee of trial by jury. See Weisgram v.
Marley Co.,
528 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2000); cf. Shannon v. Graves,
257 F.3d 1164,
1167 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Seventh Amendment is not violated by proper entry
of summary judgment, because such a ruling means that no triable issue exists to
be submitted to a jury.”).
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We review de novo the district court’s decision granting judgment as a
matter of law. See Lifewise, 374 F.3d at 923. In considering whether this ruling
was proper, we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Riske v. King Soopers,
366 F.3d 1085, 1087 (10th Cir.
2004). Thus, we must examine the record before us, construing all evidence in
favor of Anderson, in order to determine whether Anderson presented sufficient
evidence of race discrimination or unlawful retaliation.
A. Race Discrimination
A plaintiff seeking to prove race discrimination may do so by presenting
direct evidence of discriminatory motivation, such as statements by a supervisor
reflecting racial bias. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). Alternatively, the plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). If, however, the plaintiff does not present direct evidence
of discrimination and does not offer enough evidence for the jury to find that all
elements of the prima facie case have been established, then the defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, Anderson did not offer any direct evidence of racial bias, and she
therefore could not prevail at trial unless she established a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. To establish this prima facie case, she was required to prove
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that “(1) [she] was a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified and
satisfactorily performing [her] job; and (3) [she] was terminated under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Salguero v. City of
Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court found that
Anderson presented ample evidence of the first two elements–that is, enough
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Anderson is black and that she
performed satisfactorily in her job. The court determined, however, that the
circumstances of Anderson’s termination did not give rise to an inference of
discrimination; instead, the evidence suggested that Anderson was treated
differently from other employees due to a personality conflict with her supervisor.
We find nothing in the limited record before us to refute this conclusion. We
therefore affirm the entry of judgment as a matter of law on Anderson’s race
discrimination claim.
B. Retaliation
Title VII forbids an employer from retaliating against an employee who
engages in certain protected activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A retaliation
claim, like a discrimination claim, may be supported by direct evidence or by a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. See Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d
1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2004). The latter approach is more common, because it is
rare for a supervisor to openly express retaliatory motives. See Foster v.
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Alliedsignal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2002). This was true here;
so far as the record reveals, Anderson did not offer direct evidence of retaliation,
but instead attempted to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.
A prima facie case of retaliation has three elements: “(1) the plaintiff
engaged in protected opposition or participated in a Title VII proceeding; (2) the
employer acted adversely subsequent to or contemporaneous with employee
activity; and (3) there is causal connection between plaintiff’s activity and the
employer’s action.” Mattioda v. White, 323 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 2003).
The district court determined that Anderson failed to present evidence of
protected activity. We agree.
The basis for Anderson’s retaliation claim was her supervisor’s alleged
reaction to a formal complaint that Anderson filed in October 1999. In that
complaint, Anderson characterized the nature of her grievance as “Harassment/
Discrimination.” Appellee’s App. at 34. In the ensuing statement of facts,
however, Anderson presented a lengthy history of misconduct by her supervisor
without even alleging racial bias, let alone trying to show that such bias was the
motivation for the mistreatment that Anderson experienced. If she had included
an allegation of mistreatment based on her race, this could amount to protected
activity even if the allegation ultimately proved to be meritless. See Petersen v.
Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that good-faith
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allegation of discrimination will support ensuing retaliation claim regardless of
whether discrimination actually occurred). But a vague reference to
discrimination and harassment without any indication that this misconduct was
motivated by race (or another category protected by Title VII) does not constitute
protected activity and will not support a retaliation claim. See id. In other words,
even if Anderson’s supervisor did retaliate against her for filing a complaint, the
complaint was not protected activity under Title VII; consequently, the
supervisor’s retaliation was not unlawful under Title VII. Accordingly, we affirm
the entry of judgment as a matter of law on Anderson’s retaliation claim.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court properly
granted ASD’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In light of this
conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the second claim that Anderson
has raised (which challenges the district court’s ruling exempting a witness from
its sequestration order). Moreover, because we affirm the judgment in favor of
ASD, we deny as moot ASD’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff-Appellant’s
Reply Brief. Finally, we grant Anderson’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and, as noted above, we deny Anderson’s motion for preparation of a
transcript at government expense.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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