Filed: Nov. 24, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 24 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk BARTLETT ELLIOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 04-2097 (D.C. No. CIV-04-119 DJS) JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (D. N.M.) Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argum
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 24 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk BARTLETT ELLIOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 04-2097 (D.C. No. CIV-04-119 DJS) JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (D. N.M.) Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argume..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 24 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BARTLETT ELLIOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-2097
(D.C. No. CIV-04-119 DJS)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Bartlett Elliott, proceeding pro se, 1
filed an action alleging that the
Social Security Administration wrongly changed his status from disabled to
retired when he turned sixty-five despite his continuing disability and that the
change in status disqualified him from receiving food stamps. Mr. Elliott sought
to have his disability status reinstated. The district court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because Mr. Elliott failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Elliott appeals, making the same
arguments. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing de novo, see Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick ,
241 F.3d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir.
2001), we affirm.
Federal courts have limited statutory power to review decisions of the
Social Security Commissioner and may review the Commissioner’s decisions only
as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405.
Id. § 405(h). See generally Bryan v. Office of
Personnel Mgmt. ,
165 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In order to bring a suit
against the government or one of its agencies, a plaintiff must have a substantive
right to the relief sought and an explicit Congressional consent authorizing such
relief. Consent is a prerequisite of jurisdiction, and the government’s consent
defines the terms and conditions upon which it may be sued[.]” (quotations and
1
Because Mr. Elliott is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his district
court and appellate court filings. Haines v. Kerner ,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon ,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
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citations omitted)). Section 405(g) limits judicial review to final decisions that are
made after a hearing. Indeed, a final decision made after a hearing is central to a
federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction under § 405(g). Weinberger v. Salfi ,
422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975).
Here, however, there was no such final decision made after a hearing. By
law, Mr. Elliott’s entitlement to disability benefits ended when he reached
retirement age. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(b)(2). When he
turned sixty-five in 1994, his disability benefits “automatically” became
retirement benefits by operation of law. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.310(c),
404.316(b)(2). The automatic change in benefits was without regard to his
continuing disability. In other words, this automatic change was not a final
decision of the Commissioner, but was the consequence of federal statutory law.
There is nothing for a court to review. The district court thus correctly concluded
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 2
2
We need not reach the court’s alternate conclusion that Mr. Elliott failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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