Filed: Apr. 01, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: ) for his prior state DUI convictions. Op. & Order, filed June 4, 2009). Mr. Holcomb then filed an application for a COA with this court.United States v. Tiger, 538 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. § 4A1.2.at his sentencing.above, this argument reflects a patent and important misunderstanding of Begay.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 1, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-2167
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:09-CV-00399-LH-RHS
and 2:01-CR-00218-LH-1)
PERCY HOLCOMB, (D.N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Percy Holcomb applies for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to
challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as
untimely. Mr. Holcomb also requests to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). For the reasons stated below, we deny Mr. Holcomb’s request for a
COA, deny his request to proceed IFP, and dismiss this matter.
*
This Order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. After examining the appellate record, this three-judge
panel determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
While incarcerated in Texas, Mr. Holcomb filed a pro se 1 motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico. Mr. Holcomb pleaded guilty
and was convicted of drug and firearms charges under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The presentence report recommended that Mr.
Holcomb receive at least one criminal history point under § 4A1.2 of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) for his prior state DUI convictions.
On July 9, 2002, the district court entered judgment on his conviction, and Mr.
Holcomb did not appeal.
Mr. Holcomb filed his § 2255 motion nearly seven years later, on April 20,
2009, arguing that his sentence should be reduced as a consequence of an
intervening change in the law and that his counsel had provided him with
constitutionally ineffective assistance by not anticipating this change in the law.
Mr. Holcomb contended that Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
128 S. Ct.
1581 (2008), recognized a new right, and thus, the district court should resentence
him without assessing any criminal history points for his prior state DUI
convictions.
The district court disagreed and dismissed his motion, holding that his
1
Because Mr. Holcomb proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his
filings, including his application for a COA. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497
F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
2
motion was untimely filed. Mr. Holcomb argued that his motion was timely
under the accrual provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); however, the district court
pointed out that “[t]he Begay ruling provides no basis for relief from Defendant’s
sentence. . . . Defendant was charged and convicted under [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c),
while the Begay opinion analyzes the terms of [18 U.S.C.] § 924(e).” R. at 29
(Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. & Order, filed June 4, 2009). The district court also held
that “the Begay opinion contains no language making the decision retroactive.”
Id. Therefore, the district court concluded that “[b]ecause Defendant’s
allegations do not implicate a ‘right [that] has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,’
the motion is untimely and will be dismissed.”
Id. (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). The district court also issued
an order denying Mr. Holcomb’s request for a COA because it found Mr.
Holcomb had failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional
right. Mr. Holcomb then filed an application for a COA with this court.
II. Analysis
A defendant may not appeal the district court’s denial of a § 2255 petition
without first obtaining a COA from this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We in
turn may only issue a COA where “the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To overcome this
hurdle, Mr. Holcomb must show “that jurists of reason could disagree with the
3
district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); accord Allen v.
Zavaras,
568 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); Coppage v. McKune,
534 F.3d
1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008).
“If the application was denied on procedural grounds, the applicant faces a
double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show ‘that jurists of reason
would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.’” Coppage, 534 F.3d at 1281 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). “‘Each component of the § 2253(c)
showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose of
the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue
whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.”’ United States v.
Springfield,
337 F.3d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Slack, 529 U.S. at
485). Therefore, we have the discretion to proceed directly to the issue of
whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right. See
id. at 1177–78. Unless we grant a COA, we lack
jurisdiction to resolve the merits of a habeas appeal.
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342.
On appeal, Mr. Holcomb presses the same arguments he made in the district
court. Specifically, he claims a Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-
4
counsel violation based upon Begay and an error in the district court’s sentencing
computation. We proceed to the substantive question of whether either of Mr.
Holcomb’s claims make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.
Concluding that they do not, we deny Mr. Holcomb’s request for a COA and
dismiss this matter. 2
Because Mr. Holcomb’s COA application rests in part on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to determine if he can make a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, we must first undertake
an analysis of his claim in light of the familiar two-part test for ineffective
assistance outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under
Strickland, a petitioner must show, first, that counsel’s performance was
deficient—that the “representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” as measured by “prevailing professional norms.”
Id. at 687–88.
Second, the petitioner must establish prejudice—“that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694. We can review these two
components in any order and do not need to address both “if the defendant makes
2
We therefore need not (and do not) opine regarding the district
court’s procedural analysis and, more specifically, its conclusion that Mr.
Holcomb’s “allegations [concerning Begay] do not implicate a ‘right [that] has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.”’ R. at 29 (second alteration in original) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)).
5
an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.
Mr. Holcomb’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim necessarily fails on
both parts of the Strickland test. Mr. Holcomb’s argument reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of Begay’s holding and its impact on his sentencing. “In
Begay, the Court held that the New Mexico felony offense of DUI was not a
‘violent felony’ within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because ‘[i]t is simply too unlike the provision’s listed
example[s] for us to believe that Congress intended the provision to cover it.’”
United States v. Tiger, 538 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Begay,
128 S. Ct. 1584). Begay is inapposite to the question of
whether a defendant should receive one point for a state DUI under U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2. The resolution of this question ordinarily turns on whether the
particular state impaired-driving offense falls into the category of “[m]inor traffic
infractions,” which are not counted for purposes of computing a defendant’s
criminal history. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Walling,
974
F.2d 140, 142 (10th Cir. 1992). On this subject, the Sentencing Commission has
spoken clearly: “Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence
(and similar offenses by whatever name they are known) are counted. Such
offenses are not minor traffic infractions . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.5
(emphasis added).
Even assuming (as is likely) that under Begay Mr. Holcomb’s state DUI
6
convictions no longer qualify as violent felonies or crimes of violence, it does not
follow that Begay could be read as having the alchemizing effect of transforming
Mr. Holcomb’s prior state DUI convictions into minor traffic infractions—which
would not be countable under the Guidelines, nor constitute a possible basis for
criminal history points. To be sure, “the Court’s reasoning in Begay applies
equally to sentencing guidelines,” and, more specifically, we have held that
Begay’s reasoning does exclude state DUI offenses from the “crime of violence”
category under the career-offender enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See Tiger,
538 F.3d at 1298. However, Begay simply does not speak to the issue of whether
a state DUI offense is a “minor traffic infraction,” which would not be countable
under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. In other words, Begay has no bearing on the sentencing
issue that Mr. Holcomb advances here. Consequently, because Begay is
irrelevant, Mr. Holcomb’s counsel cannot be deemed constitutionally deficient for
failing to anticipate Begay’s application to Mr. Holcomb’s case, and Mr. Holcomb
could not have been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the principle of Begay
at his sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Holcomb has failed to make a substantial
showing of a denial of a constitutional right regarding his ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, and we cannot issue a COA for this claim.
Mr. Holcomb’s second argument arises outside of the constitutional
framework of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. He simply argues that
the district court miscalculated his sentence because, under Begay, “DUI’s are no
7
longer consider[ed] as ‘crime[s] of violence’ [and] thus should not be counted
within the § 4A1.2 of the guidelines.” Aplt. Br. at 3. For the reasons noted
above, this argument reflects a patent and important misunderstanding of Begay.
More fundamentally, however, the argument does not provide the basis for the
issuance of a COA because it constitutes no more than an assertion of non-
constitutional sentencing error. See United States v. Gordon, 172 F.3d 753, 754
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Petitions may be filed in district court alleging violations of
the Constitution or federal law. The claims may only be appealed, however, if
they involve the denial of constitutional rights. Applying the plain language of
§ 2253(c)(2), we may not issue a COA for Defendant’s nonconstitutional Rule 32
claims.” (third emphasis added) (citation omitted)); United States v. Harfst,
168
F.3d 398, 400 (10th Cir. 1999) (“At least facially, the two issues raised are both
nonconstitutional sentencing issues that . . . by themselves would not support
issuance of a certificate of appealability because they do not assert the denial of a
constitutional right.” (emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Shipp,
589 F.3d
1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (construing a prisoner’s “petition for a COA to raise
a due process challenge to the length of his sentence,” where the possible import
of a subsequent Supreme Court decision was that the prisoner was sentenced
above the statutory maximum for his offense of conviction). Consequently, Mr.
Holcomb cannot perforce make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. And we are not situated to issue a COA concerning this
8
claim.
Finally, Mr. Holcomb is not entitled to proceed IFP because he has failed to
identify ‘“the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts
in support of the issues raised on appeal.’” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115
F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting DeBardeleben v. Quinlan,
937 F.2d 502,
505 (10th Cir. 1991)).
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Holcomb’s request for a COA
and DISMISS this matter. We also DENY Mr. Holcomb’s motion to proceed
IFP.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
9
