Filed: Jun. 11, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 11, 2013 Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court DONNIE RAY VENTRIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 12-3310 (D.C. No. 5:11-CV-03013-SAC) STATE OF KANSAS; JACK (D. Kan.) DANIELS, Montgomery County Sheriff; RON ROOKS, Montgomery County Detective; ROBERT W. DIERKS, Montgomery County Detective; RON WADE, Montgomery County Detective; STEVE FRYBACK, Montgomery County Officer; F. WILLIAM CULLIN, Montgomery
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 11, 2013 Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court DONNIE RAY VENTRIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 12-3310 (D.C. No. 5:11-CV-03013-SAC) STATE OF KANSAS; JACK (D. Kan.) DANIELS, Montgomery County Sheriff; RON ROOKS, Montgomery County Detective; ROBERT W. DIERKS, Montgomery County Detective; RON WADE, Montgomery County Detective; STEVE FRYBACK, Montgomery County Officer; F. WILLIAM CULLIN, Montgomery C..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 11, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DONNIE RAY VENTRIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 12-3310
(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-03013-SAC)
STATE OF KANSAS; JACK (D. Kan.)
DANIELS, Montgomery County
Sheriff; RON ROOKS, Montgomery
County Detective; ROBERT W.
DIERKS, Montgomery County
Detective; RON WADE, Montgomery
County Detective; STEVE FRYBACK,
Montgomery County Officer; F.
WILLIAM CULLIN, Montgomery
County Attorney,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Donnie Ray Ventris, a state inmate proceeding pro se,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint. Ventris v. Kansas, No. 11-3013-SAC,
2012 WL 4933324 (D. Kan.
Oct. 16, 2012). The district court also denied reconsideration. Ventris v. Kansas,
No. 11-3013-SAC,
2012 WL 5354587 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2012).
He alleges various constitutional violations arising during his Kansas state
court criminal proceedings for burglary and aggravated robbery. He named as
Defendants the County Attorney, the Sheriff, various detectives associated with
the investigation, and at least one law enforcement officer. The district court first
dismissed Counts II–V of his complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S.
477 (1994). Ventris v. Kansas, No. 11-3013-SAC,
2011 WL 4436618, at *1–2
(Sept. 22, 2011). It later dismissed Count I as precluded by the statute of
limitations. Ventris,
2012 WL 4933324, at *2–7. Exercising our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm for substantially the same reasons given by the
district court.
Heck bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action which necessarily challenge
the validity of a conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence is
invalidated or called into
question. 512 U.S. at 486–87. Mr. Ventris claims that
he is incarcerated for crimes he did not commit, that known perjured testimony
was introduced at his trial, that evidence was manufactured and withheld from
him, and that the state failed to retry him within ninety days. R. 102–04; Aplt.
Br. 2–3. All of these claims challenge the validity of his conviction, which has
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not been invalidated or questioned, and they are therefore barred by
Heck. 512
U.S. at 486–87.
Mr. Ventris’s remaining claim—that the State improperly placed an
informant in his jail cell before trial—is barred by the statute of limitations.
Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a); Brown v.
Unified Sch. Dist. 501,
465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006). The accrual date,
however, is a question of federal law. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
Claims arising out of police actions towards criminal suspects generally accrue
when the actions occur, and claims alleging denial of a fair trial are presumed to
accrue at the time the trial concludes. Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd.,
925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Ventris was convicted in 2004 and his
conviction was affirmed in 2006 despite his arguments of allegedly improper
informant testimony and an otherwise unfair trial. R. 170–72. He failed to file
this suit until January 12, 2011.
Id. at 3. Contrary to Mr. Ventris’s arguments,
nothing tolled the period during this delay. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
515(a). This claim is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
AFFIRMED. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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