Filed: Mar. 10, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 10, 2014 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT WESTERN HERITAGE BANK, f/k/a Mesilla Valley Bank; JERRY W. BELL, III; LUCINDA LOVELESS, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. No. 13-2077 FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00630-MV-WPL) (D. N.M.) Defendant - Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. In this diversity action arising out of a denial
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 10, 2014 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT WESTERN HERITAGE BANK, f/k/a Mesilla Valley Bank; JERRY W. BELL, III; LUCINDA LOVELESS, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. No. 13-2077 FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00630-MV-WPL) (D. N.M.) Defendant - Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. In this diversity action arising out of a denial ..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 10, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
WESTERN HERITAGE BANK, f/k/a
Mesilla Valley Bank; JERRY W.
BELL, III; LUCINDA LOVELESS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 13-2077
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00630-MV-WPL)
(D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
In this diversity action arising out of a denial of insurance coverage,
Western Heritage Bank (“WHB”) and two of its employees (collectively, “WHB
parties”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant
Federal Insurance Company (“FIC”). They argue the district court erred in
concluding FIC had no duty to defend the bank, or its employees, in an action
which had been brought against them in state court. FIC opposes the policy
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
interpretation of the WHB parties and also contends the district court’s judgment
can be affirmed on the alternative grounds that WHB colluded with the plaintiffs
in the underlying state action both in their settlement and determination of
damages. The WHB parties have also filed a motion to certify a question to the
New Mexico Supreme Court.
We deny the motion to certify and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The instant action was brought by Western Heritage Bank and two of its
employees, Jerry Bell and Lucinda Loveless, against FIC. The WHB parties filed
a declaratory judgment action asking the court to rule that FIC owed them a duty
to defend and indemnify for damages in an underlying Texas state court action
brought by Hawkins Boulevard, LLC (“Hawkins”). The WHB parties also
brought claims for bad faith and breach of the duties to investigate, defend,
indemnify, and settle within the policy limits; a claim under the New Mexico
Unfair Insurance Practices Act; and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Hawkins filed its suit against Mesilla Valley Bank (“Mesilla”), WHB’s
predecessor in interest, on January 24, 2008, in Texas state court. R. Vol. IV at
626; R. Vol. V at 656 (Original Hawkins Petition). Hawkins amended the petition
several times, adding Loveless, Bell, and the Bank’s attorneys as defendants. R.
Vol. V at 663 (Second Amended Petition); id. at 686 (Third Amended Petition);
id. at 703 (Fourth Amended Petition). The Fourth Amended Petition named as
2
defendants only Mesilla, n/k/a WHB, and Jo Ann Miller. Id. at 703. The factual
allegations in each petition are basically the same, but the most detailed petition
is the Third Amended Petition. 1 The defendants named in the Third Amended
Petition were Mesilla, n/k/a WHB; current and former Bank officials: Jo Ann
Miller, Joe H. Morales, Jerry Bell, Lucinda Loveless; and the Bank’s outside
counsel, Victor M. Firth and his firm, Firth Johnson Martinez.
Id. at 686. 2
Hawkins’ main allegation was that Mesilla, Morales, Loveless, Bell, Firth, and
Firth’s firm, prepared and executed on Hawkins’ property “fraudulent Deeds of
Trust purporting to encumber a non-existent ‘Ground Lease’ and all
improvements to the Property with a security interest in favor of the Bank.”
Id. at
687-88.
The Hawkins lawsuit arose out of the business relationship between Mesilla
and Lujo Corporation and Lujo Investments, Ltd. (“Lujo”). In August 2004, Lujo
used a loan from Mesilla to renovate Hawkins’ property in El Paso, Texas, for use
as an El Pollo Loco restaurant. Hawkins’ petition alleged that its lease with Lujo
1
The duty to defend is determined by looking to “the facts actually known”
by the insurer “at the time of demand.” Valley Imp. Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Corp., 129 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Am. Gen. Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co.,
799 P.2d 1113, 1116 (N.M. 1990)). Therefore,
although the Fourth Amended Petition was the operative document at the time the
Hawkins suit settled, the WHB parties filed their claims for defense based on the
prior petitions. Because the Third Amended Petition has the most detailed facts,
it is used to describe Hawkins’ allegations against the WHB parties.
2
Only Western Heritage Bank, Jerry Bell, and Lucinda Loveless are
plaintiffs-appellants in this appeal.
3
“contained express terms barring the use of the Lease and the improvements as
collateral.” Id. at 688. Hawkins contends that Mesilla’s attorney, Firth, and his
law firm were aware that the lease contained this restriction. In spite of this
knowledge, the attorney and firm “prepared a fraudulent Deed of Trust purporting
to encumber the ‘leasehold and other interests’ of LUJO in and to the Property
and also encumbering ‘all buildings and other improvements.’”
Id. at 690.
Ultimately, three such deeds were filed in the El Paso County records to secure
Mesilla’s liens.
Lujo vacated the Hawkins property in April 2007, but Mesilla’s Deeds and
liens were not released. Hawkins asked Mesilla to remove the encumbrances, but
Mesilla refused to do so unless it was paid hundreds of thousands of dollars. The
liens were ultimately released in October 2008. Hawkins alleged this delay
resulted in lost business opportunities for a long-term lease with a new tenant.
The Third Amended Petition brought claims for slander of title; tortious
interference with Hawkins’ Lease Agreement; tortious interference with expectant
contracts and business relations; fraudulent claim against real property; breach of
contract; and declaratory judgment.
Mesilla had purchased an insurance policy from FIC, No. 6801-4792, with
a policy period of September 22, 2005 to June 30, 2008. This policy included
several subparts with separate premiums. All parties agree that the Bankers
Professional Liability (“BPL”) section does not apply to this case. What the
4
parties contest and what has become the focus of this litigation is the coverage of
the Director and Officers Liability (“DOL”) section.
The DOL section has three insuring clauses. Insuring Clauses 1 and 2
concern claims against an Insured Person, which “means any natural person who
was, now is or shall become . . . a duly elected or appointed director, officer or
the in-house general counsel of any Organization chartered in the United States
of America. . . .” R. Vol. II at 177, 193. Insuring Clause 3 covers Loss that the
Organization becomes legally obligated to pay because of an Organization
Claim. Id. at 197. Organization Claim includes “a civil proceeding commenced
by the service of a complaint . . . against the Organization for a Wrongful Act,
including any appeal therefrom.”
Id. Organization means “those organizations
designated in ITEM 5 of the Declarations of this Coverage Section.”
Id. at 181.
ITEM 5 lists Mesilla Valley Bank, Inc.
Id. at 176. The DOL section has a list of
exclusions. For the purposes of this litigation, the exclusion that is at the center
of the parties’ dispute is 4.j., which excludes coverage “for Loss on account of
any Claim . . . based upon, arising from, or in consequence of the performing or
failure to perform Professional Services or Lending Services.”
Id. at 182, 184.
The District Court’s Ruling on Summary Judgment
Both the WHB parties and FIC filed motions for summary judgment. FIC
moved for summary judgment for two independent reasons: 1) the plain terms of
the DOL policy precluded coverage, and 2) the WHB parties colluded with
5
Hawkins in the settlement and damages phase of the Hawkins litigation. The
WHB parties moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the DOL
policy arguably covered the Hawkins suit, triggering FIC’s duty to defend.
The district court granted summary judgment to FIC on the basis that the
DOL policy did not cover the Hawkins lawsuit. R. Vol. VII at 1218. After
reciting the uncontroverted facts, the district court quoted the DOL general
coverage clause: FIC “shall pay, on behalf of each of the Insured Persons, Loss
for which the Insured Person is not indemnified by the Organization on account of
any Claim first made against the Insured Person, individually or otherwise during
the Policy Period . . . for a Wrongful Act . . . .” Id. at 1221. The court quoted the
definitions for “Claim,” “Insured Person,” “Loss,” and “Wrongful Act.”
Id. The
district court then quoted Exclusion 4.j. and the policy’s definition of “Lending
Services.”
Id. at 1221-22. Although the district court agreed with WHB that the
duty to defend under New Mexico law is broader than the duty to indemnify, the
court held that Exclusion 4.j. clearly excluded the Hawkins lawsuit from
coverage.
Id. at 1224. The court stated:
[The WHB parties] fail to acknowledge that the Hawkins
Complaints allege that Hawkins’ damages resulted both
from the Bank’s fraudulent recording of the liens and its
subsequent refusal to remove them, and the allegations
in the Complaints establish that both actions arose from,
or were in consequence of, the Bank’s and its Officers
performance, and failure to properly perform, Lending
Services. The Plaintiffs point to no other facts causing
Hawkins’ injury and damages that do not fall within
6
Exclusion 4.j.
Id. at 1224-25 (emphasis in original).
The district court also evaluated the WHB parties’ arguments that refusing
to release the liens was an independent intervening cause that resulted in part of
the Hawkins lawsuit being based on non-Lending Services. Id. at 1225. The
court noted that “arising from” is broadly construed under New Mexico insurance
law.
Id. “Exclusion 4.j.’s broad language does not require a lending activity to
be the direct cause of injuries - it requires only that the ‘claim [be] . . . based
upon, arising from, or in consequence of the performing or failure to perform . . .
Lending Services.’”
Id. at 1226. Thus, according to the district court’s ruling,
the “intervening cause” argument was “misplaced” because it was the placement
of the liens and subsequent refusal to remove them “in the course of, and as a
direct result of, the Bank’s lending services and activities,” that formed the basis
of the Hawkins lawsuit.
Id. The court held that “[a]s a matter of law, Hawkins’
claims arose from, and in consequence of, the Plaintiffs’ lending services and
activities, and the D&O Section Exclusion 4.j expressly precludes coverage on
those claims.”
Id.
The district court did not mention the WHB parties’ argument that the
definition of “Professional Services” adds back two categories (legal services and
post control actions) because they are exceptions to Exclusion 4.j. The district
court did not analyze whether these exceptions to the exclusion made the policy
7
ambiguous, as WHB argued, but instead the court stated that “contrary to the
Plaintiffs’ bald assertions, there are no material questions of fact regarding
causation or whether the exclusion applies, nor is there any ambiguity in the
meaning of Exclusion 4.j.” Id. As a result of these rulings, it was unnecessary
for the court to reach FIC’s collusion argument.
II. ANALYSIS
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court. . . . We view all facts and evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727
F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment should be granted when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A. Does Exclusion 4.j. Have Any Exceptions?
The WHB parties’ first argument is that Exclusion 4.j. has three carve-outs
that add back coverage. “In diversity cases, the substantive law of the forum state
governs the analysis of the underlying claims . . . but federal law controls the
ultimate, procedural question whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.”
Haberman v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006). The
forum state’s substantive laws include choice of law rules. Elliot v. Turner
Const. Co.,
381 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court assumed New
Mexico’s law governs the interpretation of the contract, and the parties have not
8
raised any arguments to the contrary. Unlike jurisdictional issues, choice of law
need not be raised sua sponte. See Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 405
F.3d 821, 831 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005). As a result, we also will apply New Mexico
law in interpreting the insurance contract at issue.
Under New Mexico law, “[i]t is well settled that, absent a statute to the
contrary, ‘insurance contracts are construed by the same principles which govern
the interpretation of all contracts.’” Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970,
976 (N.M. 1997) (quoting 2 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on
Insurance 3D § 21:1 (1996)). The court’s “primary objective” in interpreting a
contract “is to give effect to the intent of the parties.” Benz v. Town Center
Land, LLC,
314 P.3d 688, 694 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Hansen v. Ford
Motor Co.,
900 P.2d 952, 960 (N.M. 1995)). “[T]he interpretation of terms
within an insurance policy is ‘a matter of law about which the court has the final
word.’” United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
285 P.3d 644, 647 (N.M.
2012).
The first step in interpreting policy terms is to look at the language of the
contested term itself, as well as other parts of the policy. Id. at 649. “Insurance
policy terms ‘cannot be analyzed in a vacuum,’ and a policy ‘must be construed in
its entirety, with each clause interpreted in relation to others contained therein.’”
Id. Exclusion 4.j. excludes coverage “for Loss on account of any Claim . . .
based upon, arising from, or in consequence of the performing or failure to
9
perform Professional Services or Lending Services.” R. Vol. II at 182, 184.
FIC emphasizes strongly that the term “arising from” indicates that this is a
“broad form exclusion” that “as a matter of law must be interpreted in a manner
that gives effect to the broad language of exclusion intentionally used.”
Appellee’s Br. at 19. But without knowing the definitions of “Professional
Services” and “Lending Services,” it cannot be determined whether the Hawkins
lawsuit falls under Exclusion 4.j.
FIC argues that the Hawkins lawsuit falls under the definition of “Lending
Services” because WHB “placed liens on the Hawkins leasehold to secure and/or
restructure Lujo’s credit, and it therefore is incontrovertible that the liens about
which Hawkins complained, and demanded release, ‘arose from’ and were ‘in
consequence of’ Lending Services provided by the Bank.” Appellee’s Br. at 18.
The policy defines Lending Services as “any act performed by an Insured for a
Lending Customer of the Organization in the course of extending or refusal to
extend credit or granting or refusal to grant a loan or any transaction in the nature
of a loan, including any act of restructure, termination, transfer, repossession or
foreclosure.” R. Vol. II at 180. If only this language is considered, WHB’s
actions in placing the liens and refusing to release them falls under Lending
Services. However, the definition section also states that “Lending Services
shall not include any Professional Service.” Id. Additionally, “Professional
Services” is listed in Exclusion 4.j., and as noted above, New Mexico law looks
10
to how clauses are understood when read together, as well as how the clauses are
understood when read in the context of the entire policy. See United Nuclear, 285
P.3d at 649. Therefore, when determining whether the Hawkins allegations in
fact “arise from” Lending Services, we must also consider the definition of
Professional Services.
Our analysis then should not end with the definition of Lending Services,
but should also include the definition of Professional Services, both because it is
mentioned in the definition of Lending Services and because it is the other part
of Exclusion 4.j. The DOL section defines Professional Services as:
Loan Servicing and only those services performed or
required to be performed by an Insured for or on behalf
of a Customer of an Insured:
a. for a fee, commission or other monetary
consideration;
b. where a fee, commission or other monetary
consideration would usually be received by the Insured
but for business or other reasons is waived by the
Insured; or
c. for other remuneration which inures to the benefit of
such Insured.
R. Vol. II at 181. Loan Servicing does not include “any act of restructure,
termination, transfer, repossession or foreclosure . . . .” Id. at 180. 3 Professional
3
“Loan Servicing means the servicing of any loan, lease or extension of
credit (whether consumer, commercial, mortgage banking or otherwise, but not
including financing for investment banking, or for leveraged management
buyouts). Loan Servicing includes the following servicing activities: record
keeping, billing and disbursements of principal or interest, receipt or payment of
insurance premiums and taxes, credit reported or statements of creditworthiness,
(continued...)
11
Services does not include: “(1) . . . the practice of law or the rendering of legal
services; (2) services performed by any entity which the Insured shall have
acquired ownership or control as security for a loan, lease or other extension of
credit; or (3) Lending Services.” Id. at 181. In the discussion that follows, we
will refer to the first exception as “legal services” and the second as “post-control
actions.”
Under the policy’s plain language, legal services and post-control actions
are exceptions to Exclusion 4.j. The definition of Professional Services sets out
three exceptions: legal services, post-control actions, and Lending Services.
Unless excluded by other language, these exclusions to the definition of
Professional Services are not part of Exclusion 4.j. Of course, Lending Services
is excluded by Exclusion 4.j. Although the first two exceptions (legal services
and post-control actions) could conceivably fit under the definition of Lending
Services, the structure of Exclusion 4.j. discourages this reading. If legal services
and post-control actions are merely subcategories of Lending Services, then it
would be unnecessary to list them separately from Lending Services. The policy
could have stated that Professional Services does not include the following kinds
3
(...continued)
determination of the depreciation amount of property (but not projections of or an
appraisal for residual or future value of property). Loan Servicing shall not
include any act of restructure, termination, transfer, repossession or foreclosure,
or any act arising out of the operation or control of any entity or property that the
Insured acquired as security or collateral for any loan, lease or extension of
credit.” Id.
12
of Lending Services: 1) legal services, 2) post-control actions, and 3) all others
under the policy definition of Lending Services. However, Exclusion 4.j. did not
do this. Instead, it listed them as if they were three separate categories.
FIC makes several arguments against this reading. FIC admits that the
definition of Professional Services is to be read into Exclusion 4.j., but argues
against reading in “the second part of the relevant definitional language, which
lists what things are ‘not’ included within Professional Services,” because FIC
believes the three listed items “merely narrow[] the definition of Professional
Services,” instead of “affirmatively provid[ing] coverage under the D&O Section
for the items listed.” Appellee’s Br. at 27. But the purpose of defining
Professional Services in the policy is to determine what Exclusion 4.j. excludes.
If X does not fall under the definition of Professional Services, then it is not
excluded by 4.j. If X otherwise meets the policy requirements, then it is covered.
When FIC argues that “[a]n exclusion cannot create coverage if coverage
did not exist in the first instance under the insuring agreement,” it is technically
correct. Appellee’s Br. at 28 n.7. What FIC misses is that the policy definition
of Professional Services takes legal services and post-control actions out of
Exclusion 4.j. Therefore, if they otherwise would be covered by the policy, then
they are covered because Exclusion 4.j. is not a bar. Cf. Greystone Const., Inc. v.
Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Exceptions
to exclusions [in commercial general liability insurance policies] narrow the
13
scope of the exclusion and, as a consequence, add back coverage. But it is the
initial broad grant of coverage, not the exception to the exclusion, that ultimately
creates (or does not create) the coverage sought.”) (quoting David Dekker et al.,
The Expansion of Insurance Coverage for Defective Construction, 28 Constr.
Law, Fall 2008, at 19-20).
Despite FIC’s protestations to the contrary, the text of Exclusion 4.j.
supports reading legal services and post-control actions as exceptions, which
means a loss stemming from either of those two that otherwise meets the policy’s
terms is covered. See, e.g., Erwin v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 371 P.2d 791,
794 (N.M. 1962) (“By every sound rule of construction, [an] instrument should be
interpreted . . . if possible to give a sensible meaning and effect to all its
provisions; and so as to avoid rendering portions of it contradictory and
inoperative, by giving effect to some clauses to the exclusion of others.”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted);
Benz, 314 P.3d at 695 (“We view the
contract as a harmonious whole, give meaning to every provision, and accord
each part of the contract its significance in light of other provisions.”) (quoting
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D Constr. Co.,
33 P.3d 651, 659 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2001)).
B. Does the Hawkins Lawsuit Cover an Exception to Exclusion 4.j.?
Having determined that Exclusion 4.j. contains two exceptions, our next
step is to analyze whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
14
any of the allegations or underlying facts in the Hawkins lawsuit constitute legal
services or post-control actions. However, the WHB parties have not presented
any arguments relating to how the policy covers claims against the individual
WHB employees under either the “legal services” or “post-control actions”
exceptions.
Nor have they explained how they meet the “legal services” exception for
the claims against the bank. They merely state that the Hawkins lawsuit included
claims “for the wrongful acts of [the bank’s] attorneys, while rendering legal
services,” and the attorneys’ negligence was then “imputed to the Bank” under
agency law. Appellants’ Br. at 14, 43. WHB argues that “[w]hether the Bank
performed legal services through its agents by failing to release the liens is a
question of fact,” and that “FIC agrees that the Legal Services exception does not
require that the Legal Services be performed by the Bank.” Id. at 43, 44.
Although the question of whether the alleged wrongful acts of WHB fall
within the “legal services” exception is fact intensive, the WHB parties are still
obligated on appeal to present more than conclusory statements about how they
meet this exception and Insuring Clause 3. They have presented no argument as
to what constitutes the “practice of law” or “legal services.” They have not
provided support for their contention that the Hawkins petition alleged wrongful
acts that were based on the “practice of law.” Although the Hawkins suit
involves actions taken by an attorney, the mere recording of liens and subsequent
15
refusal to release them would not inherently require a license to practice law.
Further, Insuring Clause 3 requires a claim against the organization for a
wrongful act, and the definition of wrongful act requires that the error, act,
omission, etc. be “attempted, or allegedly committed or attempted” by the
organization. R. Vol. II at 197, 199. The WHB parties rely on the attorney’s
recording and failure to release the liens as the bank’s “wrongful act,” but without
explaining how there are facts to support this argument. Without any developed
argument as to how some of the allegations in the Hawkins complaint are covered
under Insuring Clause 3, the WHB parties’ assertion that they meet the “legal
services” exception to Exclusion 4.j. is without any factual support and is
therefore waived. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129,
1137 n.7 (10th Cir. 2010) (“‘[I]ssues adverted to’ but ‘unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.’”) (quoting Murrell v.
Shalala,
43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)).
The WHB parties also argue that the Hawkins lawsuit covers the second
exception for post-control actions because the allegations concern what the Bank
did after it foreclosed on the loan. According to the WHB parties, there is a
disputed issue of fact for this exception:
Assuming the second carve-out required ownership or
control of the LUJO security, FIC should have defended
if the Hawkins complaint was unclear on that issue of
fact. Plaintiffs need not at this stage respond to FIC’s
factual coverage argument, which is evidence of
16
questionable coverage and a duty to defend. However,
Plaintiffs’ refer to the Bank Demand Letter, which
states: “The Franchise personalty and equipment in the
Hawkins location were foreclosed upon...and were
made available for WKS to continue to operate the
LUJO franchise and leasehold estate.”
Appellants’ Br. at 44-45 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The
WHB parties further contend that because the bank “repossessed the personal
property and foreclosed on the loan equipment pursuant to Article IV of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the actions by the Bank were services performed by
an entity over which the Bank acquired ownership or control.” Id. at 45
(emphasis added). The WHB parties’ next statement reveals why their argument
is without merit, however: “Because the Bank was conducting post-control
actions over the collateral, the Claims against the Bank are re-included into
coverage.”
Id.
The “post-control actions” exception to Exclusion 4.j. does not refer to
actions taken by the insured, in this case WHB, but instead to actions that
constitute “services performed by any entity” that the bank owns or controls. R.
Vol. II at 181. Therefore, to survive summary judgment, there must be factual
support for the assertion that the bank took control of an “entity,” and the “entity”
then performed a “service.” There are no allegations here to support that theory.
The Hawkins suit is clearly outside of this area of coverage, and thus there was no
duty to defend or indemnify.
17
Because the WHB parties have failed to explain how the Hawkins petition
could arguably fall within either exception to Exclusion 4.j., the remaining
arguments in this appeal are moot, including FIC’s collusion argument.
AFFIRMED. The WHB parties’ motion to certify is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
18
