Filed: Jan. 30, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court DEWAYNE ANTOINE ANDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 17-3186 (D.C. No. 6:16-CV-01376-JTM-GEB) NAOMI ARNOLD; TRINIDAD (D. Kan.) BALDERAS, Defendants - Appellees. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _ Dewayne Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against Wichita police offic
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court DEWAYNE ANTOINE ANDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 17-3186 (D.C. No. 6:16-CV-01376-JTM-GEB) NAOMI ARNOLD; TRINIDAD (D. Kan.) BALDERAS, Defendants - Appellees. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _ Dewayne Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against Wichita police office..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DEWAYNE ANTOINE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 17-3186
(D.C. No. 6:16-CV-01376-JTM-GEB)
NAOMI ARNOLD; TRINIDAD (D. Kan.)
BALDERAS,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Dewayne Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against
Wichita police officers Naomi Arnold and Trinidad Balderas. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Anderson alleges that Arnold used excessive force against him following a
traffic accident. When Arnold arrived on the scene, she asked for Anderson’s license
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and insurance information. But when Anderson reached for his wallet, Arnold
brandished a taser and told him to remove his hand from his pocket. Anderson
thought the taser was a gun and said, “Don’t shoot.” Arnold threatened to tase
Anderson unless he turned around to face her. She then placed her hand on her gun.
After another officer arrived on scene, Anderson was handcuffed and placed in a
police car, where he remained for approximately thirty minutes before he was
escorted to an ambulance. Anderson claims that his treatment constituted
unnecessary use of force and that he was denied speedy access to medical treatment
for the injuries he incurred in the car accident.
II
“We review de novo the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
719
F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must
“plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Although “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations, citation, and brackets omitted).
We hold that the district court correctly dismissed Anderson’s complaint.
Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard
2
of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Anderson
does not claim that Arnold had any physical contact with him. Although Arnold
brandished a taser, she did not tase Anderson. Further, the neck injuries that
Anderson endured were caused by the traffic accident, not a police officer. These
facts do not suffice to state a claim of excessive force, as they do not indicate that
Anderson suffered an “actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or
emotional.” Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007).
III
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
3