Filed: Oct. 22, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 22, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court CALVIN E. BARNETT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 18-7017 ( D.C. No. 6:17-CV-00264-RAW-SPS) JOE M. ALLBAUGH, ET AL., (E.D. Okla.) Defendants - Appellees. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _ The pro se plaintiff, Calvin Barnett, is an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. He sued prison offi
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 22, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court CALVIN E. BARNETT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 18-7017 ( D.C. No. 6:17-CV-00264-RAW-SPS) JOE M. ALLBAUGH, ET AL., (E.D. Okla.) Defendants - Appellees. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _ The pro se plaintiff, Calvin Barnett, is an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. He sued prison offic..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 22, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CALVIN E. BARNETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-7017
( D.C. No. 6:17-CV-00264-RAW-SPS)
JOE M. ALLBAUGH, ET AL., (E.D. Okla.)
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
The pro se plaintiff, Calvin Barnett, is an inmate at the Oklahoma
State Penitentiary. He sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
interfering with his constitutional right to court access. The district court
granted the prison officials’ motion to dismiss, and Mr. Barnett appeals.
We affirm.
*
Because oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of
the appeal, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Although pro se complaints are liberally construed, the district court
must still ensure compliance with federal pleading requirements. White v.
Colorado,
82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, a district court must
dismiss a pro se complaint when it lacks enough facts to state a claim
facially plausible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). The alleged facts are enough if they permit “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
For the claim alleged by Mr. Barnett, liability would exist only if Mr.
Barnett experienced an actual injury from the denial of court access. See
Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349-355 (1996) (explaining the injury
requirement). And the existence of an actual injury would exist only if Mr.
Barnett was “hindered” in his “efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim.”
Penrod v. Zavaras,
94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996).
The complaint includes allegations that the prison law library
supervisor interfered with mail and delayed court documents, but Mr.
Barnett does not suggest any resulting hindrance to his efforts to pursue a
claim. See Gee v. Pacheco,
627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a complaint was insufficient to allege an actual injury when the
plaintiff alleged that prison authorities had “engaged in confiscating,
reviewing, and hindering access to his legal files,” “hinder[ed] his
communications with a jailhouse lawyer,” and “interfer[ed] with his legal
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mail”). This omission leaves the complaint without enough facts for a
plausible claim under § 1983. See Cosco v. Uphoff,
195 F.3d 1221, 1224
(10th Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal of a § 1983 claim involving an
alleged denial of court access because the plaintiffs had not set forth any
“evidence to indicate that [the defendants] hindered [the plaintiffs’] efforts
to pursue a legal claim”).
In addition, Mr. Barnett contends that the district court displayed
bias by failing to permit an evidentiary hearing on the motions to dismiss
and to appoint counsel. But the court had no obligation to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on these motions. See Slaughter v. City of Maplewood,
731 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that the district court need not
conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to appoint counsel if the court
believes that the hearing would be unnecessary); Peck v. Hoff,
660 F.2d
371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (stating that a full-blown evidentiary
hearing is unnecessary to rule on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Thus, we reject Mr. Barnett’s contention of bias based on the failure to
permit an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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