When a defendant seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the newly discovered evidence must meet a four-part test before a new trial is proper: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered and have been unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence must be material, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) the evidence must be such that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) the failure to learn of such evidence must be due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. United States v. Williams, 816 F.2d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir.1987); Bentley v. United States, 701 F.2d 897, 898 (11th Cir.1983). A motion for a new trial is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will only be reversed when the ruling is so clearly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 661 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984) (citing United States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.1979)). District courts, however, should exercise "great caution" when granting new trials based on newly discovered evidence. Johnson, 713 F.2d at 661; Mertz, 652 F.2d at 479.

The district judge erred in relying upon the affidavit and the statement appearing in the Orlando newspaper given by the jury foreman, when deciding if a new trial was appropriate in light of the newly discovered evidence that the United States was negotiating, during the prosecution of the appellees, similar arms sales to Iran as those sales for which the appellees were convicted.

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

(emphasis added). Rule 606(b) strikes a balance between protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial free from substantial juror misconduct, while protecting the legitimate interests of preventing the harassment of jurors, supporting the finality of verdicts, and preserving the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay people. Tanner v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2741, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1987); Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 1571, 94 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1987); United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1004 (5th Cir.1979). For that reason, rule 606(b) limits juror testimony to only the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was brought to bear upon any juror.

In the article that appeared in The Orlando Sentinel on November 15, 1986, the jury foreman is quoted as saying "My reaction is that I'd like to call the judge and say I want to change my vote. What we are dealing with is a double standard.... I think Cutter, to some extent, might be telling the truth. I now have a reasonable doubt he was guilty." The jury foreman subsequently reiterated this statement on the nationally televised program "Good Morning America." In an affidavit given in support of the appellees' motion for a new trial, the jury foreman further explained his earlier statements. The jury foreman stated that in deciding whether or not to convict St. Claire and Sjeklocha, he placed considerable weight on the testimony of Clyde G. Bryant, Jr., Chief of Support Services Division of the Department of State. The foreman further stated that his understanding of Bryant's testimony was that there had been no authorized shipments of arms to Iran by either the government or private individuals since November, 1979.

Clearly the information contained in the affidavit of the jury foreman and the statement attributed to the jury foreman that appeared in The Orlando Sentinel concerned "the effect of anything upon that ... juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to ... the verdict." Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). As the juror would be prohibited under the Federal Rules of Evidence from giving such testimony at a hearing on a motion by the appellees for a new trial, the trial court erred in considering the juror's affidavit and the newspaper statement attributed to the juror when deciding whether the appellees were entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.

In the district court's order of March 25, 1987, the court stated that the foreman's statement was "instrumental in the court's decision to grant a new trial." The district court improperly based its decision to grant a new trial on the statement of the jury foreman, a statement which impeached the jury's verdict. This court finds that the district court abused its discretion in granting the appellees a new trial. See Wiedemann v. Galiano, 722 F.2d 335 (7th Cir.1983). Although this court has serious concerns about whether the newly discovered evidence in this case would be sufficient to meet the four-part test required for a new trial, the court does not find it necessary to decide that issue at this time.

Accordingly, the district court is reversed and the order of March 25, 1987 is vacated. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

REVERSED, VACATED and REMANDED.