This case requires determination of whether or not plaintiff-appellant Violeta Adams, who was discharged, had a property interest in her job as Director of Human Resources at Memorial Hospital and Manor (Memorial), a defendant-appellee, in Bainbridge, Georgia. By granting a directed-verdict motion of defendants-appellees, the trial judge found that Adams did not have a property interest in her continued employment in this position at Memorial. Following a jury verdict in favor of defendants-appellees as to the other claims raised, Adams' sole issue on appeal is the propriety of the district judge's directing the verdict. After a thorough review of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, we affirm.

Defendant-appellee Memorial is comprised of a hospital and adjoining nursing home, which are administered by defendant-appellee Bainbridge-Decatur County Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority). Plaintiff-appellant Adams has been employed by Memorial twice. From October, 1975 until September, 1976, she worked there as a part-time nurse. She left for a higher-paying job in a state hospital.1

In 1977, Adams was hired by the nursing department of Memorial as a full-time nurse. Shortly thereafter, Adams, who is a licensed, registered nurse and has a master's degree in nursing education, was promoted to the administrative position of In-Service Director. In this job, she conducted courses in intensive care, neonatal care, and infection control for the medical community; coordinated community activities, such as a blood-pressure clinic; served on the hospital and nursing home infection-control committee; oriented new employees; and assisted in Memorial accreditation, licensure and quality assurance.

Defendant-appellee Raymond Wright became Executive Director at Memorial in September, 1977, following his appointment by the Hospital Authority. Employed by a definite, written contract pursuant to the Hospital Authority bylaws, Wright directs the daily activities and policies of Memorial; supervises the department heads, who have delegated authority, including hiring and firing, for their respective departments; and retains ultimate authority for termination of employees. The Hospital Authority bylaws provide that Wright may be removed as Executive Director only for cause after a hearing and vote by the Hospital Authority membership.

In April, 1978, Wright made Adams Director of Continuing Education and Training. Her duties included orientation for new employees, in-service education for the nursing department and for other departments in management, fire and safety, and other duties assigned periodically. Adams also retained some of her previous responsibilities, such as hospital accreditation, quality assurance and community education. Her hourly wage increased as Director of Continuing Education and Training.

In a May 20, 1983 memorandum to all employees, Wright announced the creation of a human resources department, which encompassed continuing education, employee relations, public relations and publications. He advanced Adams to Director of Human Resources in charge of this new department and stated that she also would handle other special projects. In addition to Adams' former education, infection control, quality assurance, accreditation and licensure responsibilities, her promotion included the duties of custody and maintenance of the personnel files as well as public relations and patient education. As Director of Human Resources, Adams had assistance from department personnel, whom she supervised.

Since Adams assumed the job of the former personnel director, her responsibilities also involved recruiting, interviewing and screening job applicants, orienting new employees, preparing the pay-scale system, and ascertaining that department heads followed the proper procedure and documentation in discharging employees. As part of her orientation of new employees, Adams reviewed the Memorial Hospital and Manor Personnel Policy Handbook (Personnel Policy Handbook). The Personnel Policy Handbook, approved by the Hospital Authority in 1979, was effective while Adams was Director of Human Resources.

Relevant to this case is the grievance procedure outlined in the Personnel Policy Handbook. A dissatisfied employee has a three-step procedure of expressing a grievance to the immediate supervisor, first; to the responsible department head, second; and to the Executive Director, third.2 Depending on an employee's position, steps can be eliminated. For example, Adams, as a department head, would register her grievances directly with the Executive Director.

In 1983, Wright assigned Adams the project of revising the disciplinary procedures at Memorial. She formulated proposed disciplinary procedures on the concept of progressive discipline, essentially consisting of an oral warning, a written reprimand, probation, suspension and discharge. Adams and her assistants spent approximately a year collecting disciplinary procedures from various hospitals and submitting drafts and revisions to the department heads for approval.

Her last revision, dated July 27, 1984, describes progressive discipline, minor and major violations, involuntary terminations, appeals, criteria for proving just cause, and contains forms for disciplinary use, such as a notice of suspension. The final page of this revision is a receipt statement to be signed by employees signifying that they have read and understood the disciplinary procedures to be used at Memorial. Following distribution of this last revision of disciplinary-action procedures, Adams placed the signed receipts from employees in their personnel files, and she gave the disciplinary-action procedures to new employees during orientation, also obtaining receipt statements from them. Adams considered this latest revision to be the Memorial disciplinary-action manual.

Wright, however, testified that the so-called disciplinary-action manual, compiled by Adams, "[a]bsolutely" was not an official document of Memorial since it was "[n]ot even approved at the lowest department head level" because of ambiguities that never were corrected. R3-266. Furthermore, Adams admitted that the disciplinary manual was not formally adopted by the Hospital Authority. R2-190. Wright gave Adams authority for compiling the revisions for Memorial disciplinary action, but not for approval, which was the responsibility of the department heads, the Executive Director and the Hospital Authority. Wright was unaware that Adams had distributed the disciplinary document, that she was using it in orientation, that employees were required to sign a receipt statement, and that the forms were being utilized in disciplining employees. When Wright learned that copies of this document were throughout Memorial, he had them removed.

Before Wright became aware of Adams' distribution and use of the final revision of the disciplinary-action procedures for Memorial, he was informed of complaints, regarding Adams' performance as Director of Human Resources, from department heads and the medical staff. Generally, these complaints were that Adams was interfering in the department heads' hiring and firing of their personnel and affecting morale at Memorial.3 Wright talked with Adams on several occasions concerning complaints that he had received from department heads regarding their difficulty in working with her. Consequently, he did not give her a pay raise in 1984. R3-292.

By the summer of 1986, the complaints of Adams' interference with department heads had escalated, and Wright began considering the reorganization of the human resources department. Basically, the complaints to Wright were that Adams was involving herself too much in the selection of prospective employees and in the operation of the various departments rather than acting as a support person.4 In addition to complaints that Adams was interfering with the selection of nurses in the screening process, Cynthia Vickers, Director of Nursing, brought to Wright's attention two incidents disruptive to the operation of the nursing department.

First, during the summer of 1986, Vickers gave some nurses a raise and not others. Vickers reported to Wright that Adams had taken credit for the raises obtained by some nurses and that she had blamed Vickers for the failure of other nurses to receive raises. Wright considered this creation of dissension among the nursing staff sufficient to demonstrate Adams' interference in the operation of the nursing department. R3-299-300. Second, Vickers was coordinating the opening of an intensive care unit and asked Adams for training for the nurses. Because Adams did not schedule this training, the intensive care unit opened in October, 1986, without the requested nurse training. Wright found Adams not only dilatory in arranging training requested by department heads, but also arbitrary in setting priorities. R3-304-05. On September 12, 1986, Vickers submitted her letter of resignation to Wright. In response to Wright's questioning as to the cause for her departure, she explained that she had obtained another job and that her continual problem with Adams' attempting to run her department "was one of the major reasons." R3-387-88. Considering a good director of nurses "the backbone of the hospital," Wright offered Vickers a raise to keep her, but he was unsuccessful. R3-313-14, 349.

Wright called a meeting with Adams and Vickers on September 29, 1986. He addressed Vickers' specific complaints and advised Adams that it was her responsibility to support the department heads. On September 30, 1986, after further consideration of Adams' undermining effect at Memorial, Wright relieved her of her position as Director of Human Resources because of her inability to work with the department heads and medical staff, and he requested that she move into another office. Adams was to work on special projects, as she had done from 1983 to 1986, and to report to Wright directly.5 He informed the Hospital Authority and the department heads that she no longer was the Director of Human Resources. Wright reorganized the human resources department by reassigning Adams' responsibilities to other department heads.

Wright did not view his reassignment of Adams as a disciplinary action, but rather an attempt to "salvage" her usefulness to Memorial. R3-332. Her salary and benefits remained the same. Wright as well as members of the medical staff recognized Adams' capabilities in such areas as accreditation and quality assurance, but they were cognizant of her difficulties in working with Memorial personnel.6

Wright assigned Adams the project of obtaining information on "paid time off," an employee benefit that he wanted to implement at Memorial. R2-107; R3-341-42. She collected this information from various hospitals and presented it to Wright. Also in October, 1986, Wright asked Adams to attend a two-day, personnel seminar in Atlanta. She went to this seminar and reported the acquired information to Wright.

In October, 1986, Adams questioned Wright as to her responsibilities at Memorial. On October 7, 1986, Wright presented to Adams for her signature a memorandum, which recounted her interpersonal problems at Memorial and specified that she was relieved of her responsibilities as Director of Human Resources on September 30, 1986.7 Adams refused to sign the memorandum, which was placed in her personnel file.

Adams was so upset by losing her position as Director of Human Resources that she had to take sick leave during October, 1986.8 On October 29, 1986, Adams wrote Wright a letter demanding reinstatement in her previous position; communication of her reinstatement to Memorial department heads, medical staff and the Hospital Authority; and compensation for emotional and physical distress, resulting from her perceived unjustified demotion. She requested a response by 4:30 P.M., October 30, 1986, and, unless fully reinstated, a hearing before the Hospital Authority in accordance with the Personnel Policy Handbook.

Wright responded to Adams in a letter dated October 30, 1986. Therein, he stated that he would not grant her demands, which indicated that she could not continue to work under him as Memorial Executive Director, and that her employment was terminated.9 He gave her two weeks notice, making her termination effective November 13, 1986, and referred her to Chapters VII and VIII of the Personnel Policy Handbook.10

Chapter VII of the Personnel Policy Handbook provides in pertinent part the following regarding a personnel decision by the Executive Director:

Because the full responsibility for the operation of the institution has been delegated to the Executive Director, any decision rendered in a problem situation by the Executive Director, must be regarded as final and binding; except employees may appeal such a decision, if they wish, by submitting a written request for a review addressed to the Chairman of the Hospital Authority in care of the Hospital.

Arrangements for an interview with representatives of the Hospital Authority will be arranged with the employee within 10 days of receipt of the written request for a review.

Memorial Hospital and Manor Personnel Policy Handbook, Grievance Procedure, ch. VII, Sec. 7.1. Chapter VIII, concerning termination of employment, states regarding involuntary termination: "Ordinarily, an employee will not be discharged without having previously been made aware of his failure to perform satisfactorily and given the opportunity to improve his performance." Id. at ch. VIII, Sec. 8.2. The listed acts or conditions giving cause for immediate discharge without notice and accrued benefits are inapplicable to Adams.11

Rather than following the explicit procedure stated in the authorized Personnel Policy Handbook, Adams admitted that she never wrote the Hospital Authority to request a review of Wright's decision regarding her reassignment.12 R2-166. She also conceded that she has never had a written contract of employment with Memorial and that no one had informed her that she had a specific position for a fixed period of time. R2-188; R3-224. Furthermore, she admitted that she had no expectation that she would remain employed at Memorial and that she was no different from any of the nursing personnel, who were capable of leaving if they so desired or of being terminated by Memorial. R3-224-25. While she was aware of other Memorial personnel having been terminated, Adams conceded that she did not know of any Memorial employee who received a hearing before the Hospital Administration. R3-225, 227-28.

Following her termination, Adams' attorneys wrote the chairman of the Hospital Authority on November 3, 1986, and requested a hearing within ten days from receipt of the letter. Adams based this request on the disciplinary manual that she compiled and on the grievance procedure in the Personnel Policy Handbook. R2-146-47. The attorney, representing the Hospital Authority, replied in a letter dated November 5, 1986, that the applicable Personnel Policy Handbook does not provide a hearing for a termination. Furthermore, he advised that Adams' position as Director of Human Resources had been discontinued and that her responsibilities had been assumed by other department heads.13 Therefore, her former position no longer existed.

Alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1983 by the Hospital Authority, its members, Memorial, and Wright, both individually and in his capacity as Memorial Executive Director, plaintiff-appellant commenced this action in the Middle District of Georgia on December 22, 1986.14 At the close of plaintiff's case, defendants made five directed-verdict motions, one of which was to direct the verdict as to Adams' lack of a property interest entitling her to continued employment at Memorial.15 Plaintiff also made a directed-verdict motion that Memorial employees could not be removed except for cause and that Adams was not given a hearing regarding her demotion and termination. The trial judge reserved ruling on these motions, and defendants presented their case.

Before closing arguments, however, the judge decided to grant defendants' directed-verdict motion regarding Adams' not possessing a property interest in her continued employment at Memorial. Based upon the testimony, evidence and applicable law, the district judge concluded that Adams did not have a property interest in her continued Memorial employment because she was an at-will employee. All other motions for directed verdict were denied. Following a jury verdict in favor of defendants-appellees, the only issue on appeal is the appropriateness of the trial judge's directing the verdict.16

The appellate standard of review for a directed verdict in this circuit is sufficiency of the evidence. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1989); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc)17; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). This determination is made by evaluating all of the evidence, together with logical inferences, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.1988); Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 374.18 A directed-verdict motion should be granted when "there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80, 64 S. Ct. 232, 234-35, 88 L. Ed. 239, 243 (1943); Price, 856 F.2d at 1505.

B. Determination of a Property Interest in Continued Employment

The acquisition of a Fourteenth Amendment property interest with accompanying procedural due process requires more than a unilateral expectation; there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 561 (1972); see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 580 (1972). "The existence of a legitimate claim of entitlement to a property interest in continued employment is to be determined in accordance with state law." Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d 591, 597 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1976)). In Georgia, a property interest in public employment exists whenever a public employee can be terminated only for cause.19 Crowell v. City of Eastman, 859 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir.1988); Barnett v. Housing Auth., 707 F.2d 1571, 1576 (11th Cir.1983); Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir.1980); Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 551-55, 212 S.E.2d 359, 362-64 (1975).

An analogous Eleventh Circuit case is dispositive of Adams' employee status and of the result in this case. Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Memorial Hosp., 864 F.2d 117 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam).20 The plaintiffs in Wofford were in-house security guards, employed by the defendant county hospital. After the decision to hire an independent contractor to provide security services, the hospital notified these plaintiffs that they were terminated because their positions had been eliminated. When the Wofford plaintiffs were terminated, the hospital had in effect a personnel-policy manual, which listed classifications of separation, such as discharge, lack of ability and reduction in force. The personnel policy also contained a grievance procedure consisting of five steps, the last of which was requesting action by the hospital administrator if the grievance was not settled by the prior steps.21 None of the plaintiffs had written employment contracts, and they did not pursue their grievances through the final step provided by the policy.

The Wofford plaintiffs claimed that defendants had deprived them of a constitutionally protected property interest without due process of law.22 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. Sec. 34-7-1, the court found that an indefinite hiring in Georgia may be terminated at will by either party and that an employer is not liable for discharging an at-will employee with or without cause.23 Wofford, 864 F.2d at 119 (citing Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (per curiam)). Recognizing that the Georgia Supreme Court has held that a property interest arises when a public employee can be terminated only for cause, the court explained and distinguished cases where for-cause employment had been found.24

Wofford bolstered its analysis of Georgia law with a recent, Georgia appellate decision, holding that internally administered policies fail to transform an at-will employee into a contract employee and cannot support an action for wrongful discharge. Wofford, 864 F.2d at 119 (citing Garmon v. Health Group of Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga.App. 587, 359 S.E.2d 450 (1987)). Conceding that she did not have an employment contract with the subject hospital, the Garmon plaintiff contended that the internal policies were applicable and that noncompliance with these policies in her termination constituted wrongful discharge. Unpersuaded by the plaintiff's notice and knowledge of hospital policies and procedures regarding discipline and termination, allegedly not followed in her termination, the Garmon court concluded:

The internally administered policies which the nurse seeks to legally enforce go to the essence of the employment relationship and the employer's right in an at-will situation to terminate the employee with or without cause and regardless of motive. To accept her argument for legal enforcement of the subject policies would, for the purpose of her termination, de facto transform her from an at-will employee into one under contract to the hospital, in violation of OCGA Sec. 34-7-1.

Garmon, 183 Ga.App. at 589, 359 S.E.2d at 453 (citations omitted). Relying on Garmon, Wofford determined that its plaintiffs were at-will employees who could be terminated with or without cause, absent a discriminatory purpose, because the internal personnel manual of the defendant hospital did not give them legitimate claims of entitlement to continued employment. Wofford, 864 F.2d at 120. Wofford concluded that "in Georgia, an at-will employee typically does not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment sufficient to form a protectable property interest." Id. at 119.25

Applying the sufficiency-of-the-evidence review standard in this case, we find a complete absence of any evidence that could be used by a jury as the basis for finding that plaintiff-appellant had a property interest in her continued employment as Director of Human Resources at Memorial. Consequently, she was not entitled to procedural due process in her termination. Adams had no contract or agreement with Memorial for any fixed term of employment. As opposed to the delineated, for-cause employment of Wright as Executive Director, Adams admitted that she was subject to termination by Memorial, and described her job as having all the characteristics of at-will employment.

In this action, Adams has complained that Wright, who progressed her in responsibilities and pay for nine years at Memorial, violated her property interest in her job as Director of Human Resources and denied her due process in reassigning and terminating her. She admitted that Wright, as Executive Director, had the authority to determine her responsibilities at Memorial. Any Hospital Authority review, which is not defined specifically as a hearing in the Personnel Policy Handbook, was unavailing regarding Adams' reassignment. She failed to follow the official grievance procedure, of which she clearly was aware given her Memorial orientation responsibilities. This procedure required her to write a letter to the Hospital Authority following Wright's decision to reassign her, after addressing this matter with him. Since her former position had been discontinued when Wright delegated her duties as Director of Human Resources to other department heads, she could not be reinstated.

In accordance with the Personnel Policy Handbook regarding terminations, Wright informed Adams orally on several occasions and in writing on October 7, 1986, that her difficulty in working with Memorial personnel was a serious problem. Adams' interpersonal relations with Memorial employees did not improve. The evidence showed that the disciplinary manual, which Adams drafted and upon which she has relied for the due process allegedly denied her, was not approved by the department heads, Wright or the Hospital Authority. Therefore, she cannot derive a property interest in her continued Memorial employment with due process rights from this unofficial source, despite its use by Adams and some department heads, unknown to Wright.

Rather than demonstrating any discriminatory motivation, Adams' termination was because of her inability to work with other Memorial personnel. Under Georgia law, she was an at-will employee, terminable by her employer Memorial at any time with or without cause. As an at-will employee, she was not entitled to procedural due process in connection with her termination. The district judge properly directed the verdict as to plaintiff-appellant's lack of a property interest in her continued employment as Director of Human Resources at Memorial. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.