Filed: Apr. 13, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: PUBLISH IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 97-3270 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ 04/13/99 THOMAS K. KAHN D.C. Docket No. 96-247-CIV-OC-10A CLERK KAREN ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (April 13, 1999) Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and KEITH*, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: _ * Honora
Summary: PUBLISH IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 97-3270 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ 04/13/99 THOMAS K. KAHN D.C. Docket No. 96-247-CIV-OC-10A CLERK KAREN ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (April 13, 1999) Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and KEITH*, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: _ * Honorab..
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PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 97-3270 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________________ 04/13/99
THOMAS K. KAHN
D.C. Docket No. 96-247-CIV-OC-10A CLERK
KAREN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________________________________________________
(April 13, 1999)
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and KEITH*, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
________________________________
*
Honorable Damon J. Keith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
This case requires us to determine whether two separate vehicles traveling in tandem and
causing a single automobile accident constitutes one or two “occurrences” for purposes of
insurance policy indemnification for the victim. Because we find no definitive Florida precedent
for this insurance policy language interpretation issue, we certify the question to the Supreme
Court of Florida.
I. FACTS
On December 7, 1996, appellant Karen Anderson was a passenger in a Mazda Miata
convertible automobile traveling southbound in the left lane of Interstate 75. A tractor-trailer
rig, comprised of a 1987 white tractor and a 1986 Great Dane commercial trailer, was also
traveling southbound in the left lane. The Miata pulled into the right lane in order to pass the
tractor-trailer rig, but while passing, the rig moved into the right lane. To avoid a collision, the
Miata swerved off the highway and overturned. Anderson sustained severe injuries.
Craig Bishop owned both the tractor and trailer, and insured both through Auto-Owner$s
Insurance Company (Auto-Owner$s), under the same policy. Auto-Owner$s, pursuant to its
contractual duty to defend Bishop, entered into settlement negotiations with Anderson. The
negotiations reached an impasse when the parties disagreed as to the interpretation of portions of
the insurance policy language. The limiting language in dispute reads as follows:
The limit of liability stated in the Declarations is the most we will pay for all
damages, including damages for expenses, care and loss of services and loss of
use as a result of any one occurrence. Charging premiums under this policy for
more than one automobile does not increase the limit of our liability as stated for
each occurrence.
(Emphasis added).
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Anderson filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida,
seeking a declaratory judgment that would award her the policy limit for both insured vehicles
(the tractor and the trailer). Auto-Owner$s removed the action to federal district court in October
of 1996. Ultimately, Auto-Owner$s settled the claim against Bishop, paying Anderson $750,000
in uncontested policy proceeds, and agreeing to litigate and resolve Anderson$s claimed
entitlement to a second $750,000 policy payout, in a separate action.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pursuant to a case management report filed with the district court, both parties agreed
that because the sole issue required resolution as a matter of law, the court should render its
decision through summary judgment. According to the district court, the issue before it
presented a question of first impression in Florida.
The district court granted Anderson$s motion for summary judgment, determining that
although the rig was responsible for causing one accident, the rig was essentially two
“automobiles,” the tractor and the trailer. Thus, the policy limit of $750,000 was available to
Anderson for each of the insured automobiles. The district court found that it was reasonable to
interpret the above-cited policy language to mean that when two separate vehicles are involved
in one single accident, two occurrences exist. The district court further found that if Auto-
Owner$s intended to treat the two separately covered vehicles as a single-covered vehicle when
operated in tandem, it could have drafted the policy to achieve that result. Therefore, the district
court awarded Anderson $1,500,000 for her injuries.
III. DISCUSSION
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In construing an insurance contract, it is well-settled in Florida that “a court must first
examine the natural and plain meaning of a policy$s language.” Key v. Allstate Ins. Co., 90 F.3d
1546, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1996). A court should read an insurance policy as a whole, and
endeavor to give each provision its full meaning and operative effect. Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of
Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
986 F.2d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir. 1993). Where the existence or
nonexistence of coverage is clear from the unambiguous terms of the policy, the court must give
those terms the effect their plain meaning dictates. See
Key, 90 F.3d at 1549.
If, however, the relevant policy language is susceptible to multiple reasonable
interpretations, one providing coverage and another denying it, the insurance policy is
ambiguous. Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1381. If an insurance policy is ambiguous, a court must
resolve the ambiguity against the drafter of the policy in favor of coverage. Golden Door
Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyd$s Underwriters Non-Marine Assoc.,
117 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th
Cir. 1997). Although courts must avoid “adding hidden meanings, terms, conditions, or
unexpressed intentions” to policy provisions, a court should find ambiguity if any real doubt
exists as to the proper construction of a policy provision when its terms are given their plain
meaning.
Key, 90 F.3d at 1549.
Auto-Owner$s argues vigorously that the district court erred in interpreting the insurance
policy as ambiguous and open to several reasonable interpretations. Auto-Owner$s claims that
its policy$s limiting language covers the type of accident at issue. Further, Auto-Owner$s argues
that the plain meaning of the policy language is simply that “one occurrence” is equal to one
accident, and maintains that the accident involving the Miata and the rig consisted of only one
occurrence. See Weimer v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 565 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
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(holding that the insurer of a dump-truck with an attached trailer was not liable to the injured
party for the dual amount of the policy limit due to express limiting language in the policy to that
effect).
Auto-Owner$s directs this court to a number of non-binding state court opinions that hold
where two or more related automobiles, insured through the same company, are involved in a
single accident the insured party is not entitled to recover the policy limit of each automobile
involved, but can only recover the policy limit of one automobile, or the policy limit of one
accident. See, e.g., Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985)
(holding that the insurer of three vehicles traveling in a convoy, whose citizens band (CB) radio
communications caused an accident and injuries, was not responsible for paying the policy limit
available on all three automobiles due to express limiting language in the policy); Suh v. Dennis,
614 A.2d 1367 (N.J. Super. 1992) (holding that the insurer of two automobiles was not liable to
the injured party for the policy amount on both cars because of express, limiting language in the
policy, where employees were racing the cars ultimately causing the accident).
Auto-Owner$s additionally claims that the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Anderson was erroneous because it failed to consider the insurance policy as a whole, giving
each provision an operative effect. See Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1381. Auto-Owner$s claims
that the district court failed to follow the principles of construction, failed to attribute the plain
and ordinary meanings to the undefined terms in the insurance policy and failed to consult the
dictionary for definitions of purportedly ambiguous terms. See Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v.
Adelberg,
698 So. 2d 828, 837 (Fla. 1997).
5
Anderson responds that Auto-Owner$s argument that the current common law trend in
this country--to disallow the recovery of two policy limits for two automobiles involved in one
accident--is unpersuasive. Anderson rebuts each of the cases Auto-Owner’s relies upon through
showing that the policy language contains very specific limiting provisions, unlike the language
in Auto-Owner$s policy. Each policy Auto -Owners referenced contained some form of the
following explicit language: “Regardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the accident .
. . the company$s liability is limited.” Anderson argues that Auto-Owner$s policy simply does
not contain the traditional limiting language that forecloses recovery.
Anderson additionally responds that the plain meaning interpretation of the policy
language clearly provides coverage in the amount of $750,000 for each of the two vehicles
involved in the accident, resulting in total coverage available to her of $1,500,000. Thus, the
issue of whether two separate vehicles involved in a single accident constitutes one or two
occurrences for purposes of insurance policy payout appears to be an unsettled question of
Florida law.
Accordingly, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 25.031, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.150, FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES:
This panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concludes that
this case involves an unanswered question of state law that is determinative of this appeal, and
we can find no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Therefore, we certify the following question of law based on the facts and procedural history
recited above, to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions.
Style of case: Karen Anderson, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 97-3270.
Movant: Auto-Owners Insurance Company. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.150(d).
Statement of Facts: We incorporate our statement of facts from above.
Question to be certified to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Whether the tractor-trailer rig should be treated as a single covered automobile,
under the policy language forming the basis of the present dispute, or whether the
single accident resulting in Anderson$s injuries constituted two occurrences
within the meaning of the policy.
The phrasing of this question is not intended to limit the Supreme Court in considering
the issue presented or the manner in which it gives its answer. See Dorse v. Armstrong World
Ind., Inc., 798 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1986). The entire record in this case and the briefs
of the parties will be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Florida for assistance in answering this
question.
QUESTION CERTIFIED.
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