[DO NOT PUBLISH]


             IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                   FILED
                     FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                       ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                                         SEPTEMBER 28, 2009
                             No. 09-12930                 THOMAS K. KAHN
                         Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
                       ________________________

                 D. C. Docket No. 91-00301-CR-T-17-MAP

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


                                                               Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  versus

MARLON MCNEALY,

                                                         Defendant-Appellant.


                       ________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Middle District of Florida
                     _________________________

                           (September 28, 2009)



Before BIRCH, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
      Marlon McNealy appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a

reduced sentence, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendments 505

and 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. McNealy was originally sentenced pursuant

to a statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment.      McNealy appealed his

convictions and sentences and this Court affirmed. United States v. Brazel, 

, 1164 (11th Cir. 1997).

      McNealy asserts the district court erred by denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion

because the mandatory minimum, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, was inapplicable.

He contends that, because his prior offenses were juvenile offenses, § 851 should

not have applied to give him a mandatory life sentence. Citing Harris v. United

States, 

, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), McNealy asserts the applicability of

a § 851 notice is jurisdictional and can be raised at anytime, including a

§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding.

      We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under

§ 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion and its conclusions regarding the scope of its

legal authority de novo. United States v. Williams, 

, 1338-39 (11th

Cir. 2008). A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a

defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a Guidelines




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range that has been lowered subsequently by the Sentencing Commission. 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

      Because a sentencing adjustment pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) does not

constitute a de novo resentencing, “all original sentencing determinations remain

unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range that has been amended

since the original sentencing.” United States v. Bravo, 

, 781 (11th

Cir. 2000). Indeed, § 3582(c)(2) does not give the district court “jurisdiction to

consider extraneous resentencing issues.” 

In Harris, we held that a

defendant could raise a jurisdictional challenge to the application of § 851 in a 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate even though he failed to object at trial or on direct

.

      Because McNealy’s sentence was based upon the applicable statutory

mandatory minimum of life imprisonment rather than his original Guidelines

range, he was ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction based upon Amendment 706

or Amendment 505. See 

(“[A] defendant whose

original sentencing range was based on something other than § 2D1.1[, such as the

application of a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment,] is precluded

from receiving a sentence reduction, since the amendment[s] would not lower his

applicable guidelines range.”). McNealy is attempting to challenge an extraneous



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sentencing issue, namely, the application of § 851, which led to his mandatory life

sentence. However, the correct avenue for challenging original sentencing

determinations is either on direct appeal or in a § 2255 motion to vacate.

McNealy’s reliance on Harris is inapposite because Harris involved a § 2255

motion to vacate which allows for jurisdictional challenges, whereas § 3582(c)(2)

is limited to determining whether a defendant was sentenced based on a Guidelines

range that has been amended since his original sentencing. See 

. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of McNealy’s

§ 3582(c)(2) motion.

      AFFIRMED.




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