Filed: Sep. 07, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-11581 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00355-UA-DNF ROBERT MCSPARIN, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant, versus BARBARA A. MCSPARIN, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (September 7, 2012) Before BARKETT, PRYOR
Summary: Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-11581 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00355-UA-DNF ROBERT MCSPARIN, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant, versus BARBARA A. MCSPARIN, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (September 7, 2012) Before BARKETT, PRYOR,..
More
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11581
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00355-UA-DNF
ROBERT MCSPARIN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BARBARA A. MCSPARIN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 7, 2012)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert McSparin, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his complaint
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 2 of 7
against his ex-wife, Barbara McSparin (“Barbara”), brought under 38 U.S.C.
§ 5301, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“FSPA”), 10
U.S.C. § 1408, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq., and state law. On appeal, McSparin challenges the district court’s
conclusion that his claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.
McSparin’s complaint alleged the following facts. McSparin, a completely
disabled veteran who was receiving disability benefits from the federal
government, filed a petition for divorce against Barbara in a Florida court in 2004.
The parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement, in which McSparin
agreed to pay permanent periodic alimony, and his veteran benefits were
considered in determining the amount of alimony. McSparin concluded that the
agreement violated federal and state law prohibiting the division of veterans’
disability benefits, and he filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the
alimony requirement, citing 38 U.S.C. § 5301. The trial court denied his motion,
reasoning that McSparin agreed to pay alimony, that the source of the alimony was
1
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
44 S. Ct. 149,
68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303,
75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983).
2
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 3 of 7
entirely up to him, and that the court did not violate “any Federal Law” in
enforcing the settlement agreement. Subsequently, McSparin filed a motion for
modification of alimony, again citing § 5301, but the trial court refused to grant
the relief he requested. McSparin appealed this decision to the Florida appellate
court, which affirmed without an opinion. He then appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal on December 15, 2010, with a
mandate that no motion for rehearing would be entertained.
In his federal complaint, filed on June 21, 2011, McSparin alleged that
Barbara and the Florida courts ignored federal and state law by considering his
disability benefits in determining the amount of alimony to be paid each month.
Specifically, he alleged a violation of 38 U.S.C. § 5301, the ADA, and a Florida
statute regarding the protection of disabled veterans. He also mentioned the
FSPA, but did not explicitly assert a claim for relief under that statute. McSparin
requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as various unspecified
damages, and he asked the district court to reverse the Florida court’s decision on
the amount of alimony he was required to pay.
Barbara filed an amended motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in
relevant part, that McSparin’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because he was asking the district court to review the state court decision and
3
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 4 of 7
overrule it. McSparin responded that his complaint did not ask the district court to
review the state court decision, but only sought relief from Barbara’s
discrimination and violation of federal laws. He also contended, among other
things, that the Florida courts ignored federal law.
The district court agreed with Barbara and granted her motion to dismiss,
finding that it lacked jurisdiction over McSparin’s federal claims under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court then declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claim. McSparin now appeals.2
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “lower federal courts are precluded from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”
Id. at 1268
2
In his notice of appeal, McSparin specified only the district court’s final dismissal
order, but in his brief to this Court, he also challenges several of the court’s prior orders denying
his motions for a default judgment against Barbara. Because McSparin did not mention these
orders in his notice of appeal, and nothing on the face of the notice indicates his intent to appeal
them, we lack jurisdiction to review those prior orders. See White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
664 F.3d 860, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that we lack jurisdiction to review district court
orders not specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal, “unless the overriding intent to appeal
these orders is readily apparent on the face of the notice” (quotation omitted)). Furthermore,
nowhere in his brief does McSparin challenge, or even mention, the district court’s refusal to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claim, and, therefore, he has abandoned the
issue. See Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that, while we read
pro se briefs liberally, a pro se litigant abandons issues that he fails to brief on appeal).
4
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 5 of 7
(quotation omitted). The Supreme Court explained that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284,
125 S. Ct.
1517, 1521-22,
161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005);
Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274. The
doctrine applies to federal claims raised in state court and to claims that are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment, but it does not apply to
claims that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise in the state
court proceedings. Casale v. Tillman,
558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). “A
claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court
judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues.”
Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
In this case, the district court did not err in finding that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction over McSparin’s lawsuit. It is undisputed that
McSparin lost in state court and that the final state court judgment occurred when
the Florida Supreme Court dismissed his appeal in December 2010, prior to his
filing the instant complaint in June 2011. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1279
(holding that, for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, the federal suit must
5
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 6 of 7
commence after all state appellate proceedings have ended). Furthermore, in his
complaint, McSparin claimed that the state courts injured him by refusing to grant
him the relief he requested with respect to his alimony payments, in violation of
federal and state law, and he invited the district court to review and reject the state
court judgments. In fact, McSparin specifically asked the district court to reverse
the Florida courts’ decision regarding the alimony payments. Thus, in the words
of Exxon Mobil, McSparin was a “state-court loser[] complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22.
Even if McSparin had failed to raise some of his current federal claims in
state court, this would not preclude the application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260. His claims were inextricably intertwined
with the state court judgment because, by raising them in the district court, he
essentially sought to nullify the state court decision regarding his alimony
payments, and nothing suggests that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to raise all
of his claims in state court. See
id. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred
McSparin’s federal claims, and the district court correctly dismissed them for lack
of jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil
Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22;
6
Case: 12-11581 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 Page: 7 of 7
Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274;
Casale, 558 F.3d at 1259-61 (concluding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claim that, in prior state court proceedings, the state court violated the
FSPA when it enforced a provision in his divorce decree requiring him to pay his
ex-wife half of his military retirement pay). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
7
