Filed: Dec. 30, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-11837 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11837 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-02282-EAK-TBM SANDRA M. GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (December 30, 2013) Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Sandra Monique Gray appeals
Summary: Case: 13-11837 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11837 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-02282-EAK-TBM SANDRA M. GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (December 30, 2013) Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Sandra Monique Gray appeals t..
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Case: 13-11837 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11837
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-02282-EAK-TBM
SANDRA M. GRAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 30, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sandra Monique Gray appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits
Case: 13-11837 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 2 of 9
and supplemental security income. On appeal, Gray argues that the administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) erred by concluding that she did not suffer from a severe
cervical spine impairment and by omitting limitations from that impairment in the
RFC assessment, and also erred in weighing the medical opinion evidence. After
careful review, we affirm.
We review the ALJ’s decision in order to determine whether the ALJ
applied proper legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158
(11th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla” and is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion that a claimant is or is not entitled to benefits.
Id. We may not reweigh
the evidence and decide facts anew, and must defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence preponderates against it.
See Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). By contrast, we give
no deference to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, which are reviewed with “close
scrutiny.” Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th
Cir. 1994). An ALJ’s failure to apply the correct law or provide sufficient
reasoning so as to determine that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
requires reversal.
Id. However, even if the ALJ made a factual error or applied an
improper legal standard, we may conclude that such errors are harmless in the
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context of a particular case. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.
1983) (concluding that the ALJ erred in stating the claimant was closely
approaching advanced age and in considering the claimant’s prior job as an
assembler, contrary to the regulations, but holding that these errors were harmless).
First, we are unpersuaded by Gray’s claim that the ALJ erred in its
conclusions concerning Gray’s alleged severe cervical spine impairment. The
Commissioner uses a five-step, sequential evaluation process to determine whether
a claimant is disabled. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011). This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically
determinable impairment; (3) has an impairment, or combination thereof, that
meets or equals a Listing, and meets the duration requirement; (4) can perform her
past relevant work, in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) can
make an adjustment to other work, in light of her RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
------------
Step two is a threshold inquiry that “allows only claims based on the most
trivial impairments to be rejected.” McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031
(11th Cir. 1986). It thus “acts as a filter” to weed out claims where there are no
substantial impairments at all. Jamison v. Bowen,
814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir.
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1987). To show a “severe” impairment, a claimant must show “any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits [her] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see id.
§§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b) (defining the ability to perform basic work activities as
“the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” examples of which
including walking, standing, sitting, and responding appropriately to usual work
situations). “[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight
abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be
expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age,
education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler,
724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir.
1984); see
McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031 (describing the claimant’s burden to show a
severe impairment as “mild”). If any impairment or combination of impairments is
qualifies as “severe,” step two is satisfied and the claim advances to step three.
Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. Once a case advances beyond step two, the ALJ must
consider all impairments, severe or not, at step three and in assessing the RFC.
Bowen v. Heckler,
748 F.2d 629, 634-35 (11th Cir. 1984).
Where a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony
concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, “the claimant must satisfy two parts
of a three-part test showing: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and
(2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged
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pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be
expected to give rise” to the claimed symptoms. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). In weighing the evidence, credibility determinations
“are the province of the ALJ.” Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir.
2005). If the ALJ discredits the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ “must
articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so”; failure to do so “requires, as
a matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as true.”
Wilson, 284 F.2d at 1225.
Here, we need not consider whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion at step two -- that Gray’s cervical spine impairment was not a severe
impairment -- because even if there was error, it would be harmless. In assessing
Gray’s RFC, the ALJ found that Gray had severe impairments and that the step two
test was satisfied, and then specifically considered and discussed the symptoms
that Gray alleged stemmed from a cervical spine impairment elsewhere in the five-
step sequential process. See Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. The ALJ thus performed
the analysis that would have been required had he determined a cervical spine
impairment was severe at step two. See
id. The ALJ specifically discussed the
possible existence of osteomyelitis or bone infection, considered Gray’s
complaints that she claimed stemmed from a spinal condition -- extreme pain,
sleeplessness, numbness in limbs and fingers, cramps, spasms, difficulty
ambulating and sitting, trouble bending her neck, tingling, and tenderness on her
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left side -- and also discussed the objective medical evidence and medical opinion
testimony. Accordingly, even if the ALJ erred at step two, any error was harmless.
To the extent that Gray argues the RFC assessment did not take into account
her limitations in manipulation that stemmed from a cervical spine impairment, the
ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. As a preliminary
matter, Gray appears to only argue that her RFC would be “more accurate[]” if a
severe cervical spine impairment had been determined at step two. However, Dr.
Shriver opined that Gray’s very mild median mononeuropathy did not explain her
reported symptoms, and was in fact only expected to cause mild and intermittent
tingling in her hand depending on Gray’s activity and hand position. Further, two
physical RFC assessments concluded that Gray had no manipulative limitations.
The ALJ also concluded that Gray’s statements regarding her symptoms were not
credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC, considering her wide
variety of activities of daily living, which included housework, going to
community meetings, and attending to her personal care. See Moore, 405 F.3d at
1212 (explaining that the ALJ is entitled to make credibility findings).
Accordingly, the RFC assessment did take into account objectively determinable
manipulative limitations, and is otherwise supported by substantial evidence.
We also find no merit in Gray’s claim that the ALJ erred in weighing the
medical opinion evidence. In assessing medical evidence, the ALJ must “state
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with particularity the weight he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). The ALJ must
“accord considerable weight to [the claimant’s] treating physician’s opinion absent
good cause for not doing so.”
Id. at 279-80; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2) (providing that medical opinion treating sources are entitled to
controlling weight if well-supported by medically acceptable objective evidence
and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record). The
opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians, when contrary to the opinion of a
treating or examining physician, are entitled to little weight and do not, “taken
alone, constitute substantial evidence.” Broughton v. Heckler,
776 F.2d 960, 962
(11th Cir. 1985);
Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 280. “Of course, the ALJ may reject any
medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.”
Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at
280. Further, whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work is an issue reserved
to the Commissioner as an administrative finding, and a medical source opinion on
this issue is not a “medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
As the record shows here, the ALJ adequately explained the weight assigned
to different medical opinions and the reasoning behind his decisions. First, the
opinions of Dr. Stengel, Dr. Moukkadem, and Dr. Finn that Gray was unable to
work are not entitled to controlling weight because disability is an issue reserved to
the Commissioner as an administrative finding, and in any event the ALJ
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adequately explained why the doctors’ conclusions were entitled to little weight.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279. Dr. Stengel
opined that Gray’s spine looked good for her age, and also explained that his role
was only to evaluate whether surgical intervention was necessary and that
disability needed to be addressed by someone who was experienced and able to
determine whether she was truly able to go back to work. The ALJ thus gave little
weight to Dr. Stengel’s statements that Gray was temporarily unable to work due
to her cervical spine issues and pain management. The ALJ concluded that Dr.
Moukaddem’s opinion that Gray could not work due to pain and numbness was in
conflict with the record as a whole, which suggested that Gray was able to perform
a wide variety of activities of daily living. The ALJ also pointed out that Dr. Finn
did not note any of Gray’s specific restrictions to support his conclusion of
disability, especially given his uncertainty whether Gray had an infectious or
degenerative disc condition and his conclusion that despite unspecified limited
mobility in her cervical and lumbar spine she was neurologically intact and stable.
The ALJ thus adequately explained the weight he assigned to these opinions. See
Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279.
As for Gray’s arguments regarding the opinions of Dr. Shefsky and Dr.
Renny, Dr. Shefsky was an examining physician who concluded that Gray had a
full range of motion in her cervical and lumbar spine. See Broughton, 776 F.2d at
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962 (“[T]he opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to more weight
than the opinion of a non-examining physician.” (quotation omitted)). Although
Dr. Shefsky appears to have not had the benefit of reviewing MRI evidence, this
does not undermine the range of motion results of his physical examination, and
the ALJ only mentioned Dr. Shefsky’s examination for the purpose of showing that
physical examination did not reveal limitations in her back or in other areas where
she complained of symptoms. Dr. Shefsky’s opinion regarding Gray’s limitations
of motion in her cervical spine is not contrary to the record as a whole, given
Gray’s reports of being able to do household chores and attend social events.
Further, Dr. Renny’s physical RFC examination did not rely solely on Dr.
Shefsky’s report, but also reviewed MRI reports and the records of at least one
other doctor, and noted Gray’s allegations of cervical degenerative disc disease.
Dr. Renny’s opinion was also consistent with the evidence as a whole, given that
Dr. Shefsky concluded Gray had no limitations in the movement of her cervical
spine, Dr. Stengel described her cervical spine as typical for her age, and Gray
reported activities of daily living that included household chores, attending events,
shopping, and walking. See
id. (stating that the reports of nonexamining
physicians do not, if “taken alone,” constitute substantial evidence). Accordingly,
the ALJ did not err by giving significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Renny.
AFFIRMED.
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