Filed: Jun. 25, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-15664 Date Filed: 06/25/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-15664 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:97-cr-00233-SCB-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ANTHONY MORELAND, a.k.a. Tony, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (June 25, 2014) Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 13-15664 Date Filed:
Summary: Case: 13-15664 Date Filed: 06/25/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-15664 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:97-cr-00233-SCB-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ANTHONY MORELAND, a.k.a. Tony, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (June 25, 2014) Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 13-15664 Date Filed: ..
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Case: 13-15664 Date Filed: 06/25/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15664
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:97-cr-00233-SCB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY MORELAND,
a.k.a. Tony,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 25, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-15664 Date Filed: 06/25/2014 Page: 2 of 6
On December 18, 2003, Anthony Moreland pursuant to a plea agreement
tendered a plea of guilty to Count One of a two-count indictment, distribution of 5
grams or more of crack cocaine in or on or within 100 feet of a public or private
youth center on November 12, 1996, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
860(a). The presentence report (“PSI”) prepared by the District Court’s Probation
Office determined the offense level for the crime under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1 and
2D1.2. Because the offense involved the sale of 87.72 ounces of crack cocaine, the
PSI fixed the base offense level at 32, under U.S.S.G. 2D.1, added 2 levels, under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a), because the offense occurred near a protected area, for total
offense level of 34, then adjusted that level downward, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
and (b) to 31, for acceptance of responsibility. PSI at ¶ 28. Coupled with a
criminal history category VI, level 31 yielded a Guidelines sentence range of 188
to 235 months imprisonment.
Id. at ¶ 82.
On March 23, 2004, the District Court adjudicated Moreland guilty of the
offense, adopted the PSI’s Guidelines range, found that Moreland was a career
offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1,1 and, noting that his career offender status did not
affect the Guidelines range calculation under §§ 2D1.1 and 2D1.2, Doc. 71, at 55,
1
Moreland had two convictions for a crime of violence in Sarasota County, Florida,
manslaughter in 1978 and robbery in 1983.
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sentenced Moreland to a prison term of 188 months, at the low end of the
Guidelines range.
Id., at 58-59, 61. Moreland did not appeal his sentence.
On October 17, 2008, Moreland, proceeding pro se, moved the District
Court to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) based on Amendment
706 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a retroactive amendment that reduced the drug-
quantity thresholds and base offense levels for certain crack offenses. Moreland
acknowledged that he was a career offender, but argued that he had been sentenced
not as a career offender but pursuant to a Guidelines range fixed by U.S.S.G. §§
21D1.1 and 2D1.2 for his drug offense and that the court should adjust the
Guidelines range based on those two sections and reduce his sentence under
Amendment 706. The District Court, stating, “[h]ad the Defendant been sentenced
after the effective date of the amendment to the crack cocaine guideline, the
amendment would have had no effect on his sentence,” Doc. 64, at 3, concluded
that Amendment 706 did not affect Moreland’s sentence because he was a career
offender and denied his § 3582(c) motion.
Moreland, having obtained counsel, appealed the District Court’s decision.
United States v. Moreland, 355 Fed. Appx. 376,
2009 WL 4598278 (C.A. 11
(Fla.)). He presented the same arguments he presented to the District Court.
Id. at
1-2. In response, we stated that the District Court’s first task, under the two-step
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process followed in ruling on a § 3582(c) motion, was to “determine Moreland's
new base offense level under § 2D1.1(c) [the Drug Quantity Table], and then
compare it to his career offender base offense level under § 4B1.1(b) to determine
which was higher.
Id. at 2. We then said this, concluding that Amendment 706
provided Moreland no relief:
Amendment 706 reduced Moreland's drug quantity base offense level
from 34 to 32. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706. Nevertheless,
because 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a) carry a statutory maximum
sentence of 80 years' imprisonment, Moreland's base offense level
under § 4B1.1(b) remained at 34. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B),
860(a); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Therefore, Amendment 706 did not have
the effect of reducing Moreland's sentencing range. This approach is
consistent with the policy statement in § 1B1.10(b)(1), which directs
the court to “determine the amended guideline range that would have
been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) ... had been in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(b)(1). As a result, the district court did not err in denying
Moreland's § 3582(c)(2) motion, and we affirm the district court's
denial of the motion
Id. at 2-3. In short, we held that Moreland’s criminal offender status under § 4B1.1
controlled the District Court’s disposition of his § 3582(c) motion for sentence
reduction.
On June 6, 2013, Morehead again moved the District Court pro se to reduce
his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c), this time based on Amendment 750, a second
retroactive amendment to U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) that reduced the drug-quantity
thresholds and base offense levels for certain crack offenses. And once again the
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District Court denied his motion, concluding that his career offender status
precluded Amendment 750, like Amendment 706, from lowering the Guidelines
range in his case. Now, having obtained counsel, he appeals that decision.
In his first § 3582(c) proceeding, Moreland litigated the question of whether
he was sentenced as a career offender and thus precluded from § 3582(c) relief.
He did not prevail, so now the question is whether the doctrine of issue preclusion
has settled the career offender issue once and for all for Moreland.
Issue preclusion “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential
to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the context of a
different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 892,
128 S. Ct.
2161, 2171,
171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) (quoting New Hampshire v.
Maine,
532 U.S. 742, 748–49,
121 S. Ct. 1808,
149 L. Ed. 2d 968
(2001)). This serves “the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the
burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps.,
327
F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 326,
99 S. Ct. 645, 649,
58 L. Ed. 2d 552
(1979)). We apply issue preclusion when (1) the issue at stake is
identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue in
the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in
that action; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
earlier proceeding. See CSX
Transp., 327 F.3d at 1317.
Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC,
702 F.3d 1312, 1318
(11th Cir. 2012). It seems clear to us that all four factors are present here. As
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such, the question is settled: Moreland was sentenced as a career offender and thus
is not entitled to § 3582(c) relief.
Moreland nonetheless argues that, even if he remains a career offender,
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. __,
131 S. Ct. 2685,
180 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2011),
abrogated our holding in United States v. Moore,
541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008),
that a career offender is not eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief. We disagree. In
United States v. Lawson,
686 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2012), we held that
Freeman did not overrule or abrogate our holding in Moore. As Lawson remains
good law, we are bound to follow it. See United States v. Kaley,
579 F.3d 1246,
1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that we are bound by the holding of a prior opinion
unless that holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme
Court).
AFFIRMED.
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