Filed: Aug. 04, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 1 of 17 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-10503 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00475-CDL JAMES FRANK REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WINN-DIXIE RALEIGH INC, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (August 4, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/201
Summary: Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 1 of 17 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-10503 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00475-CDL JAMES FRANK REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WINN-DIXIE RALEIGH INC, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (August 4, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015..
More
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 1 of 17
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10503
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00475-CDL
JAMES FRANK REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WINN-DIXIE RALEIGH INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(August 4, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 2 of 17
Plaintiff James Frank Reynolds appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Winn-Dixie Raleigh Inc. (“Winn-Dixie”) in his
employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the False Claims Act
(“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). On appeal, Reynolds argues that the district court
erred by finding that Reynolds failed to establish prima facie cases of gender
discrimination under Title VII and retaliation under the FCA. After review, we
affirm. 1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Reynolds’s Concerns About Possible False Claims
Plaintiff Reynolds worked as a pharmacist in a Winn-Dixie store in
Columbus, Georgia. Reynolds worked with Georgia Todd, a female pharmacist.
Todd was the pharmacist in charge, meaning she oversaw pharmacy operations and
personnel, but she did not discipline or terminate other pharmacists. Instead, the
pharmacy district manager, Chad Brabston, was the immediate supervisor for both
Plaintiff Reynolds and Todd.
1
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263,
1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 3 of 17
Plaintiff Reynolds became concerned about the way Todd handled some
pharmacy tasks, such as performing “partial fills” of prescriptions, billing for
medications purchased using Winn-Dixie’s prescription card, returning patients’
prescriptions to stock, and obtaining credit from vendors for medications already
billed. Plaintiff Reynolds told Todd and their pharmacy technician about his
concerns and warned Todd that her actions could result in a false claim. Reynolds,
however, did not report his concerns to anyone else. Plaintiff Reynolds did not file
a complaint or lawsuit with the government about any of his false-claims concerns
because he wanted to correct the problems internally.
A few weeks before the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Reynolds
reported to his supervisor Brabston that he had discovered some missing Xanax
pills. After conducting recounts and examining documents, Brabston and Todd
concluded some of the Xanax was double-counted, and there was no discrepancy.
B. Reynolds’s “Backdating” of a Prescription for Medicaid Coverage
On January 14, 2013, the sister of a pharmacy customer came to fill a
prescription for her brother, referred to as C.J. On December 30, 2012, C.J. had
undergone hip replacement surgery and was prescribed five post-operative
medications, including Lovenox injections and Furosemide tablets. The written
prescription for the five medications was dated January 14, 2013, and was signed
3
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 4 of 17
by a nurse practitioner at C.J.’s post-operative rehabilitation center. C.J. was
discharged from the rehabilitation center on January 13, 2013.
Todd, rather than Plaintiff Reynolds, was on duty on January 14, 2013.
Todd entered the prescription, dated January 14, 2013, into the pharmacy’s
computer system and learned that C.J.’s Medicaid coverage had expired at the end
of December 2012. Because C.J.’s sister could not pay for the medications,
especially the most expensive medication Lovenox, she left without receiving
them. 2
The next day, Plaintiff Reynolds was the pharmacist on duty and received a
phone call from C.J.’s sister about the medications. C.J. was a long-term customer
of Plaintiff Reynolds. After investigating, Plaintiff Reynolds understood what
Todd had done (i.e., entered the January 14, 2013 date of the hard copy
prescription). But Reynolds thought that C.J.’s medications would be covered by
Medicaid and could be entered into the computer system with the surgery date of
December 30, 2012, because the doctor’s surgical plan for the hip surgery would
have included an order for post-op medications.
Plaintiff Reynolds made a notation by circling the surgery date of December
30, 2012 that appeared on the hospital label at the top of the written prescription
and writing the words “hip replacement” next to it, which he thought was
2
The retail cost of the Lovenox was apparently $494.34.
4
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 5 of 17
sufficient. To be thorough, however, Reynolds also called the doctor’s office to
request that the hip surgeon send documentation for the Lovenox “that was written
in December from the surgical planning” that reflected the surgeon’s “order for all
incidentals required for the surgery.” 3 Reynolds did not believe his request was
improper because a prescription is made when the doctor orders it (i.e., back on
December 30, 2012), even if it is reduced to writing at a later date (i.e., on January
14, 2013). The surgeon’s office advised Reynolds that C.J. had a follow-up
appointment the next day, and the surgeon would give C.J. a new hard copy of a
prescription for Lovenox with a December 30, 2012 date.
Expecting the surgeon to provide the documentation, Reynolds re-entered
the prescription into the computer, using the December 30, 2012 date for only the
Lovenox and the Furosemide. This process adjudicated the claim through
Medicaid and generated labels for the medications. Reynolds filled some of the
medications in the prescription, including the Furosemide. The pharmacy,
however, did not have Lovenox in stock, so Reynolds ordered it for delivery the
following day. Plaintiff Reynolds placed the Lovenox label in an “owe” basket for
Todd to complete and dispense to C.J.’s sister the next day. Because Plaintiff
Reynolds was very busy, he did not have time to leave a note for Todd about what
had happened with C.J.’s prescription.
3
Reynolds explained that he was most concerned about the Lovenox because it was a
very expensive drug and also important for post-op recovery.
5
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 6 of 17
The next day, Todd was on duty when C.J.’s sister returned to pick up the
medications. Todd finished filling the prescription, including dispensing the
Lovenox, without examining the paperwork or obtaining the updated prescription,
and gave the medications to C.J.’s sister. Although Todd did not recall dispensing
the medication, she admitted that she may have given the medication thinking it
was part of an “owe,” and thus she would not have looked at the original
prescription. Afterward, however, Todd examined the paperwork and concluded
that Plaintiff Reynolds’s “backdating” of C.J.’s prescription in the computer
system to the surgery date in December 2012 was not acceptable pharmacy
practice and perhaps Medicaid fraud. For this reason, on January 18, Todd
reported Plaintiff Reynolds’s handling of C.J.’s medications to their supervisor
Brabston.
C. Reynolds’s Suspension and Investigation
Brabston, who is not a pharmacist, forwarded Todd’s report and supporting
documentation to Winn-Dixie officials John Fegan and B.J. Cobb, who were
pharmacists, and Bill Bandy, Brabston’s direct supervisor. Either Bandy or Cobb
instructed Brabston to suspend Plaintiff Reynolds and obtain a statement from him.
On January 24, Brabston met with Todd and Plaintiff Reynolds to gather the
facts, obtained Reynolds’s written statement, and informed Reynolds he was
suspended. During the meeting, Brabston asked Plaintiff Reynolds to handwrite a
6
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 7 of 17
statement simply admitting to backdating C.J.’s prescription by adjudicating it with
Medicaid using the December 30, 2012 date. Reynolds refused and instead
prepared a typewritten statement.
Reynolds’s typewritten statement explained what happened from Reynolds’s
perspective. Reynolds believed C.J.’s prescription “could legally have a service
date of December 2012, incident to the surgery.” Brabston forwarded Reynolds’s
statement to Fegan, Cobb, and Bandy, who were investigating the report. Brabston
also coached Todd about the need to double check a prescription started by another
pharmacist, but other than this warning, Todd was not disciplined for dispensing
C.J.’s medications.
While on suspension, Plaintiff Reynolds obtained a hard copy of the
“updated” prescription for Lovenox from C.J.’s hip surgeon with a December 30,
2012 date, which Reynolds forwarded to Todd. Todd gave the updated
prescription to Brabston, who forwarded the document to Cobb on January 28. In
addition, Plaintiff Reynolds complained to Brabston that he (Brabston) favored
Todd by paying more attention to her and failing to “develop [Reynolds] as a Winn
Dixie employee” by coming to observe and evaluate Reynolds at work.
On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff Reynolds sent a “follow-up statement” to
Brabston further defending his actions. Reynolds pointed out that under Georgia
law, a pharmacy may use records of a doctor’s drug orders “transmitted by any
7
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 8 of 17
means of communication for purposes of validating the pharmacy record” and that
no fraud claim was “subject to criminal penalties without proof of intent to commit
fraud.” Reynolds further stated that “the publicly posted best practices from UW
Physicians regarding dates of service [was], ‘. . . if assigning the completion date
as the date for any service will cause problems for reimbursement, the start date
may be used instead.’” Brabston forwarded Plaintiff Reynolds’s follow-up
statement to Fegan, Cobb, and Bandy.
On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff Reynolds also sent an email directly to Fegan
and Cobb, requesting a peer review by a pharmacist because Brabston was not a
pharmacist. Reynolds attached both of his prior statements, again explained his
view of the situation, and expressed consternation that he was the only one
suspended when Todd was the pharmacist who ultimately dispensed the
medication to C.J.’s sister without collecting the updated December 30, 2012
prescription written by the hip surgeon.
D. Reynolds’s Termination
On January 28, 2013, Fegan, Cobb, Bandy, and Victoria Wellstead in Winn-
Dixie’s legal department made the joint decision to terminate Reynolds. The
reason for terminating Reynolds was his “backdating” of C.J.’s prescription in the
pharmacy’s computer system. In an email, Cobb instructed Brabston to explain to
Plaintiff Reynolds that Winn-Dixie “believe[d] that fraud was intended” because
8
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 9 of 17
the only medication filled using the December 30, 2012 surgery date was the
expensive Lovenox in the middle of the sequence of medications and that the other
medications were filled with the January 15, 2013 date. Cobb stated that he had
“discussed this with Medicaid and [Winn-Dixie is] responsible for reimbursing the
cost of this prescription due to this infraction.”
Brabston was not involved in the termination decision, except to inform
Plaintiff Reynolds of the outcome. Likewise, while Todd made the initial report to
Brabston, Todd was not involved in the decision to terminate Plaintiff Reynolds.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Gender Discrimination Under Title VII
When, as here, a Title VII plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim is
based on circumstantial evidence, courts apply the burden-shifting framework set
out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp.,
731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2013). Under this
framework, the plaintiff must first set out a prima facie case of disparate treatment
by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for
the position he held; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)
his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably.
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
644 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2011).
9
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 10 of 17
If the plaintiff presents evidence of a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264
(11th Cir. 2010). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination.
Id.
Here, the district court concluded that Reynolds failed to establish the fourth
prong of his prima facie case. Generally, when a plaintiff alleges discriminatory
discipline, the plaintiff must show that the employer disciplined the similarly
situated employee differently, and to be considered similarly situated, the
comparator employee must have been “‘involved in or accused of the same or
similar conduct.’”
Smith, 644 F.3d at 1326 n.17 (quoting Holifield v. Reno,
115
F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). This Court’s “same or similar conduct”
standard is high, requiring that “the quantity and quality of the comparator’s
misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers’
reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange
Cnty., Fla.,
447 F.3d 1319, 1323 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Maniccia v. Brown,
171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999)).
The district court correctly found that Todd was not a sufficient comparator
to establish the fourth prong of Reynolds’s prima facie case. First, Reynolds and
10
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 11 of 17
Todd did not engage in “nearly identical” misconduct. The evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to Reynolds, shows that Reynolds believed that Medicaid
would cover all incidentals related to surgery performed during the coverage
period. Based on this belief, Reynolds changed the date of C.J.’s prescription in
the pharmacy’s computer system from January 14, 2013 to December 30, 2012 to
ensure coverage. Once the Medicaid claim was adjudicated, Reynolds then printed
labels for the medications, ordered the out-of-stock medication, and left the task of
dispensing the medications to C.J.’s sister for Todd to complete the next day.
Todd, on the other hand, simply finished what Reynolds had started and
handed the medications to C.J.’s sister without realizing what Reynolds had done.
Arguably, Todd should have been more aware of the prescription, given that two
days earlier she had told C.J.’s sister that the medications were not covered by
Medicaid. Nonetheless, Todd’s dispensing medication for which coverage has
already been adjudicated (as evidenced by the printed labels) and Reynolds’s
changing the date of the prescription in the computer system to ensure coverage are
not the same conduct. Reynolds’s assertions that Todd was equally culpable are
unavailing. 4
4
In the district court, Reynolds alternatively argued that, even if Todd was not a proper
comparator, he could still prevail on his Title VII gender discrimination claim because he
presented “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a jury could infer
intentional discrimination. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. The district court rejected this
argument. On appeal, Reynolds does not advance this alternative “convincing mosaic” argument
11
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 12 of 17
Also unavailing is Reynolds’s argument that he, unlike Todd, did not
actually engage in any misconduct at all. The question is not whether Reynolds’s
conduct was in fact wrong, but whether Winn-Dixie in good faith believed that it
was wrong. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (stating that the “question is whether
her employers were dissatisfied with her for . . . non-discriminatory reasons, even
if mistakenly or unfairly so”); Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
939 F.2d 1466, 1470
(11th Cir. 1991) (limiting the inquiry to whether the employer believed the plaintiff
was guilty of misconduct and if so, whether that was the reason behind the
discharge and concluding that whether the employee actually engaged in the
misconduct is irrelevant). Accordingly, even if Winn-Dixie wrongly believed that
Reynolds’s handling of the prescription constituted misconduct, the district court
properly found that Reynolds did not satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie
case.5
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Winn-Dixie on Reynolds’s Title VII gender discrimination claim.
with respect to his Title VII gender discrimination claim. Thus, we do not address it. See
Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that issues not briefed before
this Court are deemed abandoned and are not addressed).
5
Because we affirm the district court’s ruling that Reynolds failed to establish a prima
facie case of gender discrimination, we need not address Reynolds’s argument that he presented
evidence that Winn-Dixie’s reason for terminating him was pretext.
12
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 13 of 17
B. Retaliation Under the FCA
The FCA’s whistleblower provision provides relief to an employee who was
“discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
discriminated against in the terms or conditions of employment because of lawful
acts done by the employee . . . in furtherance of an action under this section or
other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the FCA].” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1)
(emphasis added). 6 In other words, protection under this provision requires a
showing that the plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct and that the employer
retaliated against him “because of” that protected conduct. 7
The district court concluded that Reynolds’s evidence created a genuine
factual dispute as to whether he engaged in protected activity when he raised
concerns with Todd about possible false claims, 8 but Reynolds did not present
evidence showing a causal connection between his protected activity and his
termination. On appeal, the parties continue to dispute whether Reynolds’s
conversations with Todd constituted protected activity. We need not resolve this
6
On appeal, Reynolds does not challenge the district court’s granting of summary
judgment on his Title VII retaliation claim, and thus has abandoned it. See Holland, 677 F.3d at
1066. Reynolds does, however, still argue his FCA retaliation claim
7
We decline to address Reynolds’s argument, raised for the first time in this Court and
only in his reply brief, that the relevant statute is the Georgia False Claims Act rather than the
FCA. See Access Now, Inc. v. SW. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
8
The district court concluded, however, that Reynolds’s report to Brabston about the
missing Xanax was not protected activity under the FCA. Reynolds does not challenge this
ruling on appeal, and we do not address it further.
13
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 14 of 17
issue, however, because even assuming arguendo that Reynolds engaged in
protected conduct, we agree with the district court that Reynolds did not present
evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that Reynolds’s suspension and
termination were “because of” that protected activity.
To establish the necessary causal connection under § 3730(h)(1), the
plaintiff must show that the employer was at least aware of the protected activity.
See U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v. Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that the plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint that she complained to
her employer about unlawful actions that would incur significant civil and criminal
liability were sufficient, if proven, “to support a reasonable conclusion that the
defendants were aware of the possibility of litigation under the False Claims Act”);
see also U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,
153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (stating that the “because of” language in § 3730(h)(1) requires the
employee to prove that the employer had knowledge of the protected activity and
was motivated to retaliate, at least in part, by the protected activity); Zahodnick v.
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
135 F.3d 911, 914 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff
must present evidence that the employer was aware of the protected activity to
show the requisite causal connection).
Here, Reynolds failed to establish causation because he did not present any
evidence that the decision makers—Cobb, Bandy, and Fegan—knew that Reynolds
14
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 15 of 17
had spoken to Todd about potential false claims. In fact, Reynolds admitted he
only talked with Todd and their pharmacy technician about his concerns.
Reynolds cannot avoid this result by relying upon a “cat’s paw” theory.
This Court has not yet applied the cat’s paw theory in an FCA retaliation case.
Furthermore, this Court has indicated that while the theory may be appropriate in
cases in which the plaintiff is required to prove only that the protected
characteristic was a motivating factor, such as in Title VII disparate treatment
claims, the theory is inappropriate when the statute requires “but-for” causation.
See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that
“cat’s paw” liability does not apply to Age Discrimination in Employment Act
retaliation claims). Nonetheless, even if we assume arguendo that the cat’s paw
theory applies to FCA retaliation claims, Reynolds did not present evidence to
support the theory in his case.
In other employment contexts, discriminatory animus may be imputed to a
neutral decision maker under a “cat’s paw” theory if: (1) a supervisor performed an
act motivated by animus that was intended to cause an adverse employment action;
and (2) the act was a proximate cause of the adverse employment action. See
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422,
131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). A
plaintiff may establish causation under this theory if the decision maker either
followed another supervisor’s biased recommendation without independently
15
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 16 of 17
investigating the complaint or conducted an independent investigation but relied on
facts provided by the biased supervisor. See id. at 420-21, 131 S. Ct. at 1193;
Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa,
186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
Reynolds contends that Todd may have had a retaliatory motive. In the
district court, however, Reynolds offered nothing but his own conjecture that Todd
was retaliating against him. Moreover, Reynolds did not present any evidence that
Todd had any input in the decision to suspend and then terminate him. To the
contrary, the undisputed evidence is that Todd played no role in the employment
decisions except to initially report Reynolds’s “backdating” of the prescription to
Brabston. Brabston then gathered the facts and documents, including multiple
statements from Reynolds. Brabston then forwarded the evidence to Cobb, Bandy,
and Fegan, who reviewed it and made their own decision. Furthermore, in his
statements, Reynolds admitted changing the January 14, 2013 date of C.J.’s
prescription in the computer system to December 30, 2012. Even if the decision
makers wrongly believed Reynolds’s conduct was either illegal or unprofessional,
Reynolds’s own admission to the conduct supports their independent determination
that Reynolds should be discharged.9
9
Reynolds also contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to compel
discovery related to his FCA claim. We conclude, however, that Reynolds waived this issue for
appellate purposes by responding to the summary judgment motion on the merits rather than
accepting the district court’s invitation to explain why he needed additional discovery as to his
FCA claim. In any event, there was no abuse of discretion because none of the evidence
16
Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 17 of 17
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Winn-Dixie on Reynolds’s Title VII gender discrimination and FCA
retaliation claims.
AFFIRMED.
Reynolds sought would have shown that the decision makers knew of Reynolds’s protected FCA
activities or that Todd manipulated the decision makers into terminating Reynolds.
17
