Filed: Sep. 01, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 1 of 21 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-13198 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00228-RBD-KRS JENNIFER R. ARNOLD ROGERS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA, a Municipal corporation, RUDY RODRIGUEZ, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, JABIEL M. HERNANDEZ, in his individual capacity, Defendant. Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 2 of 21 _
Summary: Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 1 of 21 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-13198 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00228-RBD-KRS JENNIFER R. ARNOLD ROGERS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA, a Municipal corporation, RUDY RODRIGUEZ, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, JABIEL M. HERNANDEZ, in his individual capacity, Defendant. Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 2 of 21 _ ..
More
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 1 of 21
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13198
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00228-RBD-KRS
JENNIFER R. ARNOLD ROGERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA,
a Municipal corporation,
RUDY RODRIGUEZ,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees,
JABIEL M. HERNANDEZ,
in his individual capacity,
Defendant.
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 2 of 21
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 1, 2016)
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises out of attorney Jennifer Arnold-Rogers’s arrest by Orlando
police officer Rudy Rodriguez. Arnold-Rogers sued Rodriguez and the City of
Orlando under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the arrest violated her constitutional
rights. She claims that Rodriguez violated her Fourth Amendment rights in two
ways when he arrested her: (1) without probable cause and (2) inside her home
without a warrant. She also contends that the City should be held liable for the
unconstitutional arrest because Rodriguez acted pursuant to a City policy or
custom.
With respect to Arnold-Rogers’s claim that Rodriguez violated her
constitutional rights by arresting her without probable cause, the district court
granted summary judgment to Rodriguez because the undisputed evidence showed
there was probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers. The district court also granted
summary judgment in favor of the City because Arnold-Rodriguez failed to show
2
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 3 of 21
that the City had a policy or custom of making warrantless arrests inside citizens’
homes. On appeal, Arnold-Rogers argues that the district court should not have
granted summary judgment on these claims. Because there was probable cause for
the arrest and because there was no evidence that the City had adopted a policy or
custom of conducting warrantless arrests inside homes, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Rodriguez on the probable cause claim and
to the City on the municipal liability claim.
Arnold-Rogers’s claim that Rodriguez violated her constitutional rights by
arresting her inside her home without a warrant went to trial, where the jury found
that the arrest occurred outside of Arnold-Rogers’s home. The district court
entered judgment in favor of Rodriguez. On appeal, Arnold-Rogers contends that
she is entitled to a new trial because the district court: made erroneous evidentiary
rulings, should have allowed her to reopen her case to cross-examine Rodriguez,
and gave an erroneous jury instruction. Because we conclude that Arnold-Rogers
is not entitled to a new trial, we affirm the district court on this claim as well.
3
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 4 of 21
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Arrest
Rodriguez and another officer, Jabiel Hernandez, responded to a 911 call
placed by Berghuis’s wife, Jessica Wood.1 Berghuis and Wood told the officers
that while Wood was driving with Berghuis as a passenger, they encountered
Arnold-Rogers in her car. Berghuis and Wood reported that Arnold-Rogers
bumped her car into Wood’s vehicle. When Berghuis exited the vehicle to check
for damage, Arnold-Rogers also came out of her vehicle and pushed Berghuis
several times.
The officers then questioned Arnold-Rogers at her apartment. She denied
touching Berghuis. Hernandez described Arnold-Rogers as belligerent and
intoxicated during the conversation. After the officers reported to Berghuis that
Arnold-Rogers denied anything had happened, he decided to press charges.
The officers then had Berghuis and Wood prepare sworn statements
describing the incident in more detail. In his statement, Berghuis explained that
Wood was driving when they came upon Arnold-Rogers’s car stopped in a parking
lot. After Wood drove around the car, Arnold-Rogers nudged Wood’s car with her
1
Because Arnold-Rogers appeals the district court’s summary judgment rulings that
(1) Rodriguez was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Arnold-Rogers’s claim that he
arrested her without probable cause and (2) the City was entitled to summary judgment, we view
the evidence related to those claims in the light most favorable to Arnold-Rogers, the non-
movant. See Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 110 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015). We note that
the material facts regarding these claims are not in dispute.
4
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 5 of 21
vehicle. At that point, Berghuis and Arnold-Rogers exited their vehicles. Arnold-
Rogers then shoved Berghuis while yelling obscenities at him. When Berghuis
tried to return to Wood’s car, Arnold-Rogers followed him. Once Berghuis was
sitting in the car, Arnold-Rogers blocked the car door, reached into the car, and
pushed Berghuis two more times. 2
After taking the written statements, the officers returned to Arnold-Rogers’s
apartment. Rodriguez claims that he asked—but never ordered—Arnold-Rogers to
come outside, and she voluntarily complied. When Arnold-Rogers came outside,
Berghuis identified her for the officers. Rodriguez then arrested her for burglary
and battery.
Arnold-Rogers recounts her arrest differently. She claims that when the
officers returned for a second time, Rodriguez ordered her to come out of her
home. When she refused, Rodriguez reached inside, grabbed her arm, and yanked
her outside. Arnold-Rogers claims Rodriguez then slammed her into a banister
before placing her under arrest. Although the parties disagree about whether
Arnold-Rogers voluntarily left her home or whether Rodriguez entered her home to
arrest her, they agree that Officer Rodriguez made a warrantless arrest.
Arnold-Rogers spent the night in jail. The next day, at her initial
appearance, the state court judge dismissed the burglary charge for lack of
2
Wood’s statement set forth a similar description of the incident.
5
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 6 of 21
probable cause. Arnold-Rogers then posted bond and was released from jail. The
State Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute the battery charge.
B. Procedural History
Arnold-Rogers sued Rodriguez and the City in state court.3 She brought
federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rodriguez and the City alleging
Rodriguez violated her Fourth Amendment rights when he arrested her. She also
brought state law claims against Rodriguez for false arrest and malicious
prosecution as well as a state law claim against the City for false arrest.4 The
defendants removed this case based on federal question jurisdiction.
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. With respect
to the § 1983 claim, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity
because he had probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers for battery and burglary.
The City contended it was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim
because there was no constitutional violation, but even if there was a constitutional
3
Arnold-Rogers originally brought claims against Hernandez, the other officer present
when she was arrested, as well. But she voluntarily dismissed the claims against Hernandez.
4
Arnold-Rogers also brought a claim against Rodriguez for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that she had failed
to come forward with evidence showing Rodriguez’s conduct was outrageous. Arnold-Rogers
presents no argument on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
this claim.
6
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 7 of 21
violation Arnold-Rogers failed to establish that Rodriguez had acted pursuant to a
policy or custom of the City. 5
Arnold-Rogers opposed the summary judgment motion. With respect to the
§ 1983 claim, she put forth two theories of how Rodriguez had violated her Fourth
Amendment rights: (1) by arresting her without probable cause and (2) by entering
her home to make a warrantless arrest when Arnold-Rogers had not consented and
there were no exigent circumstances. She argued that the City was not entitled to
summary judgment because Rodriguez had arrested her pursuant to a City policy
or custom of arresting individuals in their homes without warrants absent exigent
circumstances or consent.6
The district court granted Rodriguez’s motion in part and the City’s motion
in full. The court explained that as a matter of the law, Rodriguez had probable
cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers for burglary based on Wood and Berghuis’s
statements that Arnold-Rogers had reached into the car and pushed Berghuis
several times all while blocking the car door so that Berghuis could not close it.7
But the court concluded there was a disputed issue of material fact about whether
5
The defendants also argued they were entitled to summary judgment on the false arrest
and malicious prosecution state law claims because Rodriguez had probable cause for the arrest.
6
Arnold-Rogers also asserted that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment
on the state law claims for the same reasons.
7
Under Florida law, the crime of burglary is defined to include “[e]ntering . . . a
conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the . . . defendant is licensed or
invited to enter.” Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b)(1). A motor vehicle is a conveyance. Id.
§ 820.011(3).
7
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 8 of 21
Rodriguez had entered Arnold-Rogers’s home to make the arrest. Because it was
clearly established that an individual has a right to be free from a warrantless arrest
in her home absent consent or exigent circumstances, the court denied Rodriguez
qualified immunity on Arnold-Rogers’s warrantless arrest theory. Accordingly,
the district court granted summary judgment to Rodriguez on the § 1983 claim
with respect to the probable cause theory but not the warrantless arrest theory.
The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the § 1983 claim
because, even if there was a constitutional violation, Arnold-Rogers had failed to
show that the constitutional violation occurred pursuant to a City policy or custom.
The court granted summary judgment on the state law false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims because Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers.
The case proceeded to trial to determine whether Rodriguez had entered
Arnold-Rogers’s home and forcibly removed her. After a two-day trial, the jury
found in favor of Rodriguez. The district court then entered final judgments in
favor of the defendants. This is Arnold-Rogers’s appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Several standards of review govern this appeal. First, we review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hamilton v. Southland Christian
Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). We must “draw all inferences
and review[] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Id.
8
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 9 of 21
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Second, “[w]e review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But “we will not overturn an evidentiary ruling
unless the moving party establishes a substantial prejudicial effect.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). To satisfy this standard, the moving party must
“demonstrat[e] that the error probably had a substantial influence on the party’s
verdict.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third, we review a district court’s ruling on a motion to reopen evidence for
abuse of discretion. See Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 607 (11th Cir.
1987).
Fourth, we review jury instructions “de novo to determine whether they
misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.”
Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the instructions accurately reflect the law,
“the district court has wide discretion as to the instructions’ style and wording.”
Id. We can grant a new trial based on jury instructions only if “we are left with a
substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its
9
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 10 of 21
deliberations.” Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1196
(11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court’s Partial Grant of Summary Judgment to Rodriguez
Regarding the Existence of Probable Cause
Arnold-Rogers argues that the district court erred when it granted summary
judgment to Rodriguez on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to Arnold-
Rogers’s § 1983 claim that Rodriguez violated her Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting her without probable cause. Because Berghuis and Wood’s statements
would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that Arnold-Rogers had
committed the offense of battery, Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest her.
Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment. 8
8
The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that Rodriguez had
probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers for burglary without addressing whether there was
probable cause to arrest her for battery. Nonetheless we may affirm if Rodriguez had probable
cause to arrest for battery because “we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even
if not relied on by the district court.” Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Financing Admin., 291 F.3d
775, 778 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Importantly, if Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Arnold-
Rogers for battery, he was authorized to make a full custodial arrest and there was no
constitutional violation. See
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1196 (“When an officer lawfully arrests an
individual for the commission of a crime, no matter how minor the offense, the officer is entitled
under controlling Supreme Court precedent to effectuate a full custodial arrest.”); United States
v. Saunders,
476 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1973) (“When an officer makes an arrest, which is properly
supported by probable cause to arrest for a certain offense, neither his subjective reliance on an
offense for which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense
vitiates the arrest.”).
Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to close of business on September 30,
1981 are binding on this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
10
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 11 of 21
“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person
who, under color of any statute of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)
(alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But qualified immunity
“offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual
capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard
v. Wilson,
311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government
officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability
or harassing litigation . . . .” Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, a government official first must prove
that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful act occurred. Id. Then, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel.
Holloman v. Harland,
370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). There is no dispute
here that Rodriguez was acting within his discretionary authority when he arrested
11
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 12 of 21
Arnold-Rogers. Accordingly, we must consider whether Rodriguez violated
Arnold-Rogers’s Fourth Amendment rights when he arrested her.
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] warrantless arrest is constitutionally
valid only when there is probable cause to arrest.” Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d
1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003). An officer has probable cause to arrest “if the facts
and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has
reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe,
under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense.” Williamson v. Mills,
65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir.
1995). 9 Probable cause does not require the same “standard of conclusiveness and
probability as the facts necessary to support a conviction.”
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195
(internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether probable cause exists,
arresting officers “are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve
issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a sufficient
basis for believing that an offense has been committed.” Dahl v. Holley,
312 F.3d
1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Rankin v. Evans,
133 F.3d 1425, 1441 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“Generally, an officer is entitled to rely on a victim’s criminal
complaint as support for probable cause.”)
9
Arnold-Rogers argues that an officer can rely on a victim’s statement only when “there
are no circumstances that raise doubts on the victim’s veracity.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. We
disagree. We have made clear that in assessing probable cause an officer may rely on evidence
that is “reasonably trustworthy.” Williamson, 65 F.3d at 158.
12
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 13 of 21
“To receive qualified immunity protection, an officer need not have actual
probable cause but only arguable probable cause.” Holmes, 321 F.3d at 1079
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists where
reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge
as the Defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.”
Lee,
284 F.3d at 1195 (alteration in original).
Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers for battery based on
the information he knew at the time of the arrest. Although Arnold-Rogers denied
touching Berghuis, Berghuis and Wood provided Rodriguez with sworn statements
that Arnold-Rogers shoved Berghuis multiple times. Keeping in mind that officers
are not required to resolve credibility issues in deciding whether probable cause
exists, under the totality of the circumstances there was a sufficient basis for a
prudent person to believe that Arnold-Rogers had committed a battery. See Fla.
Stat § 784.03 (“The offense of battery occurs when a person . . . [a]ctually and
intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other . . . .”).
Arnold-Rogers nonetheless contends that Rodriguez should not have relied
on Berghuis’s and Wood’s statements to establish probable cause. She contends
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Rodriguez should not have relied on
their statements to support probable cause because (1) they delayed reporting the
incident to police; (2) there was no physical evidence, like paint scratches or dents,
13
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 14 of 21
to corroborate their claim that Arnold-Rogers hit Wood’s vehicle with her car;
(3) Arnold-Rogers, who was a lawyer, denied touching Berghuis; and (4) Berghuis
had previously been arrested.
First, Arnold-Rogers asserts that because Berghuis and Wood delayed
reporting the incident, their statements that she shoved Berghuis were
untrustworthy. But there is no evidence that Berghuis and Wood delayed reporting
the incident. Instead, the undisputed evidence reflects that after the incident Wood
immediately called the police.
Second, Arnold-Rogers argues that although Berghuis and Wood reported to
Rodriguez that she had hit Wood’s car, there were no paint scratches or dents on
either car. But Berghuis and Wood told the officers that Arnold-Rogers tapped
Wood’s vehicle; they never claimed that the collision left behind a paint scratch or
dent. Accordingly, we see no contradiction here.
Third, Arnold-Rogers claims that because she is a lawyer, after she denied
touching Berghuis Rodriguez should not have relied on Berghuis’s and Wood’s
statements. Underpinning this argument is the assumption that an attorney’s
account of an incident that contradicts the victim’s sworn statement always renders
the victim’s statement insufficiently trustworthy, even if another witness
corroborates the victim’s report. We have held that officers generally may rely on
a victim’s report to support probable cause, see Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1441, and
14
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 15 of 21
there is no basis to conclude otherwise simply because Arnold-Rogers is an
attorney.
Fourth, Arnold-Rogers argues that Rodriguez could not rely on Berghuis’s
statement because ten years before the incident Berghuis had been arrested for
battery. But she has failed to present any evidence showing that Rodriguez was
aware of Berghuis’s arrest. In any event, we cannot agree that a victim’s sworn
statement to law enforcement is not reasonably trustworthy simply because the
victim had been arrested in the past, especially when another witness corroborates
the victim’s statement.
Having considered Arnold-Rogers’s arguments, we conclude that no
reasonable jury could decide that Wood’s and Berghuis’s statements were not
reasonably trustworthy. Given the totality of the circumstances, Rodriguez had
probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers for battery and was authorized to make a
full custodial arrest. Accordingly, Rodriguez was entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Arnold-Rogers’s claim that he violated her Fourth Amendment
rights by arresting her without probable cause.10
10
Because Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Arnold-Rogers, we also conclude that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Rodriguez on Arnold-Rogers’s
state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. See Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d
572, 584 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “[u]nder Florida law, probable cause is an affirmative
defense to a claim for false arrest and lack of probable cause is an element that must be
established in a malicious prosecution case.”).
15
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 16 of 21
B. The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment to the City on
Arnold’s § 1983 Claim
Arnold also asserts that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment to the City on Arnold-Rogers’s § 1983 claim. Again, we discern no
error.
It is well established that the City “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under
§ 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s
injury.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the City “is not automatically liable under section
1983 even if it inadequately trained or supervised its police officers and those
officers violated [Arnold-Rogers’s] constitutional rights.” Gold v. City of Miami,
151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead, a municipality may be held liable
under § 1983 for failure to train under “limited circumstances.” City of Canton v.
Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). These limited circumstances occur “only where
the municipality inadequately trains or supervises its employees, this failure to
train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy causes the employees to
violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.”
Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350.
Rodriguez testified in his deposition that he was trained by the City to make
warrantless arrests even when the suspect was in his home and there were no
16
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 17 of 21
exigent circumstances. A reasonably jury could conclude that the City
inadequately trained Rodriguez regarding the proper procedures for warrantless
arrests because an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by making a warrantless
arrest of a person in his home absent exigent circumstances or consent. See Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980); McClish v. Nugent,
483 F.3d 1231,
1238 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . does not permit an officer to .
. . forcibly remove a citizen from his home [without a warrant] absent an exigency
or consent.”).
But for the City to be liable, Arnold-Rogers also had to show that the City
adopted a policy of failing to adequately train its officers. And Arnold-Rogers
made no such showing. On appeal, Arnold-Rogers relies on an Orlando Police
Department training bulletin as evidence of a City policy. She points out that the
manual instructed officers that in considering whether there were exigent
circumstances, which would permit an officer to arrest a person inside her home
without a warrant, officers may consider there was probable cause to believe the
suspect committed a crime. But Arnold-Rogers never raised this argument in the
district court, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue
not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be
considered by this court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 18 of 21
It is true that a plaintiff may prove a municipality had a policy of inadequate
training “by showing that the municipality’s failure to train evidenced a deliberate
indifference to the right of its inhabitants.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff establishes deliberate indifference by
showing that the municipality knew of its inadequate training yet “made a
deliberate choice not to take any action.”
Id. But Arnold-Rogers points to no
evidence showing that the City was aware of its inadequate training and chose to
take no action. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Arnold-Rogers
failed to show that her injury was caused by a policy or custom of the City.
C. Arnold-Rogers’s New Trial Arguments
After the district granted partial summary judgment, the case proceeded to
trial on Arnold-Rogers’s § 1983 claim that Rodriguez violated her Fourth
Amendment rights by arresting her inside her home without a warrant. Because
Rodriguez never asserted that there were exigent circumstances or that Arnold-
Rogers consented to him entering the home, the sole factual question at trial
regarding liability was whether Rodriguez had entered Arnold-Rogers’s home.
The jury concluded he had not entered her home and returned a verdict in favor of
Rodriguez. Although Arnold-Rogers never filed any post-trial motions in the
district court, she now contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the
district court erred (1) in several evidentiary rulings, (2) by refusing to allow her to
18
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 19 of 21
reopen her case, and (3) by instructing the jury that the court had determined there
was probable cause for her arrest.11
Arnold-Rogers argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district
court should not have admitted testimony that she had been drinking before her
arrest. Although Arnold-Rogers argues that her consumption of alcoholic
beverages was irrelevant to the case, we disagree. Evidence is relevant if it has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Evidence that Arnold-Rogers had been
drinking and may have been intoxicated was relevant because it could assist the
jury in assessing the accuracy of Arnold-Rogers’s memory of the incident. And
making such a credibility determination was particularly important in this case
because Arnold-Rogers and Rodriguez provided dramatically different accounts of
the circumstances during the arrest and where it occurred. Accordingly, we cannot
11
Rodriguez argues that Arnold-Rogers failed to preserve these issues for appeal because
she never filed a motion for a new trial in the district court. See Appellee’s Br. at 23. “That
argument might have merit if the issue [Arnold-Rogers] failed to raise . . . was a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1316
(11th Cir. 2003). Because Arnold-Rogers raised each of her challenges at trial and does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that she preserved the issues for appeal.
See
id.
19
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 20 of 21
say that the district court clearly abused its discretion when it admitted evidence
that Arnold-Rogers had been drinking before her arrest.12
Arnold-Rogers also contends she is entitled to a new trial because the district
court refused to allow her to reopen her case to give her a second opportunity to
cross examine Rodriguez after he presented his case. The district court refused to
reopen the case because Arnold-Rogers had already cross examined Rodriguez and
she failed to show that the second round of cross examination would rebut any
evidence from Rodriguez’s case. We cannot say that this was an abuse of
discretion.
Arnold-Rogers also asserts that she is entitled to a new trial because the
district court erred when it instructed the jury that the court had determined that
there was cause to arrest her. At trial, Arnold-Rogers objected to this instruction
and instead asked the court give an alternate instruction that it had been determined
that there was probable cause for the arrest. Arnold-Rogers’s argument appears to
12
Arnold-Rogers argues she is entitled to a new trial because the district court made two
other evidentiary errors. First, she contends the district court erred by admitting into evidence a
composite exhibit consisting of police records related to the arrest and the written statements
from Berghuis and Wood. But Arnold-Rogers offers no argument how the admission of the
exhibit prejudiced her and thus cannot show that she is entitled to a new trial. See Adams v.
Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014).
Second, she contends that the district court erred when it excluded evidence regarding
Rodriguez’s insurance coverage. Even assuming the district court should have allowed the jury
to hear testimony that Rodriguez had some insurance coverage, we cannot say that the exclusion
of this testimony, which related only to the issue of damages and not where Rodriguez arrested
Arnold-Rogers, was prejudicial. We cannot see how such evidence if admitted would have “had
a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict” that the arrest occurred outside Arnold-Rogers’s
home. Burchfield, 636 F.3d at 1333.
20
Case: 15-13198 Date Filed: 09/01/2016 Page: 21 of 21
be that the instruction was misleading because the jury should not have been
informed that the court made the determination there was probable cause. But this
instruction was appropriate because after Arnold-Rogers argued to the jury that
there was no probable cause for the arrest, the court needed to clarify for the jury
that probable cause was not at issue. We cannot see how the instruction that the
court made the probable cause determination creates any doubt—let alone a
substantial and ineradicable one—that the jury had been properly guided. See
Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1186. Accordingly, Arnold-Rogers is not entitled to a new
trial based on the jury instructions.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgments in favor
of Rodriguez and the City.
AFFIRMED.
21
