Filed: May 15, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Case: 16-11414 Date Filed: 05/15/2017 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 16-11414 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60272-WPD-2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ALEJANDRA ASTELLO-CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (May 15, 2017) Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Ca
Summary: Case: 16-11414 Date Filed: 05/15/2017 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 16-11414 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60272-WPD-2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ALEJANDRA ASTELLO-CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (May 15, 2017) Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Cas..
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Case: 16-11414 Date Filed: 05/15/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11414
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60272-WPD-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEJANDRA ASTELLO-CASTILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 15, 2017)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-11414 Date Filed: 05/15/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Alejandra Astello-Castillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing
methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. The district court sentenced her to 120
months imprisonment, and she appeals that sentence.
The presentence investigation report calculated Astello-Castillo’s total
offense level as 31, and it assigned Astello-Castillo three criminal history points:
one point for a previous conviction for driving under the influence, and two points
because she committed the conspiracy offense while on probation for driving under
the influence. The PSR also noted that Immigration and Customs Enforcement had
concluded that Astello-Castillo was in the United States illegally and would likely
be deported. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months, and it
noted that the statutory minimum for Astello-Castillo’s offense was 10 years
imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Astello-Castillo objected to the PSR’s calculation of her criminal history and
requested a downward variance based on “equitable considerations.” At the
sentence hearing the district court overruled her objection to the criminal history
calculation, accepted the PSR’s guidelines range calculation, and, after considering
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, concluded that a downward variance was
warranted. It sentenced her to the mandatory minimum of 120 months
imprisonment.
2
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Astello-Castillo first contends that her 10 year mandatory minimum
sentence, when considered with the deportation she faces upon completing that
sentence, violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Because she did not raise this argument in the district court we
review only for plain error. See United States v. Mozie,
752 F.3d 1271, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“While we usually review de novo an Eighth Amendment challenge to
a sentence, our review is limited to plain error when, as here, the defendant failed
to object on those grounds in the district court.”).
“In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a
narrow proportionality principle.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). That principle
“forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime,”
and we “give substantial deference to Congress in determining the types and limits
of punishments for certain crimes.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Further,
“[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 289–90,
103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009 (1983) (quotation marks and
emphasis omitted) (first alteration in original).
The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte conclude that —
because Astello-Castillo will likely be deported after she has served her
sentence — imposing the mandatory minimum sentence violated her Eighth
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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Deportation is
not a form of criminal punishment. See Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 365–
66,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“We have long recognized that deportation is a
particularly severe ‘penalty’; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.”)
(citation omitted); Cortez v. INS,
395 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1968)
(“[D]eportation is not punishment. It therefore cannot constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently
classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).
Further, the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment is not
grossly disproportionate to the facts of Astello-Castillo’s crime because she
handled a large amount of methamphetamine and brought children along while she
committed the offense. As a result, the district court did not plainly err in failing to
sentence Astello-Castillo to less than the statutory minimum.
Astello-Castillo also contends that § 4A1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (2015), which scored her criminal history, violated her Fifth
Amendment right to due process because its scoring rules resulted in an arbitrary
distinction between her prior offense and other misdemeanors that are not counted
in the criminal history calculation. Like her Eighth Amendment challenge, she did
not raise this argument to the district court and we review it only for plain error.
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Under § 4A1.1 of the guidelines, a defendant receives one criminal history
point for a previous conviction that resulted in a sentence of less than 60 days
imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c). An additional two points are awarded “if the
defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence,
including probation, parole, [or] supervised release.”
Id. § 4A1.1(d). At the time
she was charged with her drug conspiracy crime, Astello-Castillo was serving a
sentence of probation for driving under the influence. As a result, she had three
criminal history points: one for driving under the influence (which resulted in a
sentence of less than 60 days imprisonment), and two for committing the drug
conspiracy offense while on probation.
At the same time, § 4A1.2(c) of the guidelines lists certain petty offenses
and misdemeanors that are not counted in the criminal history calculation,
including reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident, when those
offenses had a sentence of probation for more than one year or imprisonment for at
least 30 days. The list of offenses that are not counted does not include driving
under the influence. Astello-Castillo argues that the scoring of her criminal history
resulted in an arbitrary distinction because other misdemeanor offenses listed in
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Case: 16-11414 Date Filed: 05/15/2017 Page: 6 of 6
§ 4A1.2(c) do not count as a criminal history point while her driving under the
influence offense did.1
The district court did not plainly err in failing to determine sua sponte that
§ 4A1.1’s scoring rules violated Astello-Castillo’s Fifth Amendment right to due
process. As an initial matter, it was not plain to the district court that application
of the scoring rules would result in arbitrary results because no binding precedent
has held that it does. And driving under the influence is a unique hazard, different
from the crimes listed in § 4A1.2(c), such as reckless driving and leaving the scene
of an accident. As a result, the district court did not plainly err in failing to
conclude that § 4A1.1’s criminal history scoring rules violated Astello-Castillo’s
Fifth Amendment right to due process. 2
AFFIRMED.
1
She contends that the scoring of her criminal history rendered her ineligible for safety-
valve relief. Section 5C1.2 of the guidelines, known as the “safety-valve” provision, “requires a
district court to sentence a defendant in certain drug-possession cases without regard to any
statutory minimum sentence if the defendant meets five criteria,” including that the defendant
have only one criminal history point.
2
Astello-Castillo also contends for the first time that the scoring rules are arbitrary
because, had she been more quickly sentenced for driving under the influence, her sentence of
probation would have been served by the time she committed the drug offense. That argument
lacks merit and fails under our plain error review.
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