Filed: Oct. 01, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: 09-3762-cv Blanc v. Morpho UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1. W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “
Summary: 09-3762-cv Blanc v. Morpho UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1. W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ S..
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09-3762-cv
Blanc v. Morpho
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1.
W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 1 st day of October, two thousand and ten.
5
6 PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN,
7 GUIDO CALABRESI,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11
12
13 ELSON BLANC,
14
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 -v.- 09-3762-cv
18
19 SAGEM MORPO, INC., KEITH PARADISE,
20 KATHLEEN VETTER, ALLYSON THOMAS,
21
22 Defendants-Appellees.
23
24
25
1 FOR APPELLANT: ELSON BLANC, pro se, Valley Stream, NY.
2
3 FOR APPELLEE: ANDREW P. MARKS, GREGORY B. REILLY, III,
4 Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY.
5
6 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
7 Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.).
8
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
10 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
11 AFFIRMED.
12 Elson Blanc (“Appellant”) appeals from a judgment of
13 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
14 New York (Garaufis, J.), granting summary judgment to the
15 Appellees and dismissing his complaint in its entirety.
16 Appellant commenced this action pursuant to Title VII of the
17 Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights
18 Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. §
19 1981. He also alleged retaliation in violation of those
20 statutes. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
21 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
22 presented for review.
23 This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de
24 novo, and asks whether the district court properly concluded
25 that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and
26 the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
2
1 law. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202-03
2 (2d Cir. 1995). To that end, our Court is "required to
3 resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual
4 inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
5 judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft,
336 F.3d 128, 137
6 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet
7 "conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not
8 sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Davis v.
9 New York,
316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
10 In order to make out a prima facie case of
11 discrimination in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff has
12 the burden of establishing that: (1) he is a member of a
13 protected class; (2) he performed the job satisfactorily or
14 was qualified for the position; (3) an adverse employment
15 action took place; and (4) the action occurred under
16 circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
17 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802
18 (1973); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
118 F.3d 60,
19 63 (2d Cir. 1997). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
20 case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to
21 the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
22 reason for the adverse employment decision. See McDonnell
3
1 Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden then shifts back to
2 the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's
3 proffered reason is a pretext for an impermissible motive.
4 See
id. at 804-05.
5 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
6 Title VII, a plaintiff is required to show by a
7 preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff
8 participated in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew
9 of the protected activity; (3) the plaintiff experienced an
10 adverse employment action, as defined by the Supreme Court
11 in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S.
12 53, 68 (2006); and (4) a causal connection exists between
13 the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
14 See
Terry, 336 F.3d at 140-41. Once a plaintiff makes out a
15 prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the
16 defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
17 reason for the alleged retaliatory acts, at which point the
18 burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show circumstances
19 that would be sufficient "to permit a rational factfinder to
20 conclude that the employer's explanation is merely a pretext
21 for impermissible retaliation." See Cifra v. General Elec.
22 Co.,
252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001).
4
1 The same framework applies to discrimination and
2 retaliation claims brought pursuant to the New York State
3 Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, see
4 Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n.1 (2d Cir.
5 2000), and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Fincher v.
6 Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.,
604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d
7 Cir. 2010). Finally, claims brought pursuant to the New
8 York City Human Rights Law “must be reviewed independently
9 from and more liberally than their federal and state
10 counterparts.” See Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.,
11
582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
12 omitted).
13 Having conducted an independent and de novo review of
14 the record in light of these principles, we affirm the
15 district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons
16 stated by that court in its thorough and well-reasoned
17 memorandum opinion and order.
18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
19 court is hereby AFFIRMED.
20
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
23
24
5
