Filed: May 16, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: 11-1369-cr United States v. MacDaniel UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY
Summary: 11-1369-cr United States v. MacDaniel UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ..
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11-1369-cr
United States v. MacDaniel
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 16th day of May, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 J. GARVAN MURTHA,
10 District Judge.*
11
12
13
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15
16 Appellee,
17
18 -v.- 11-1369-cr
19
20 HAROLD GEORGE MACDANIEL,
21
22 Defendant-Appellant.
23
24
25 FOR APPELLANT: LAWRENCE GERZOG, New York, NY.
26
27 FOR APPELLEE: DOUGLAS P. MORABITO, Assistant United
28 States Attorney (Robert M. Spector,
29 Assistant United States Attorney, on the
*
The Honorable J. Garvan Murtha, of the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by
designation.
1 brief), for David B. Fein, United States
2 Attorney for the District of Connecticut,
3 New Haven, CT.
4
5 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
6 District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.).
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
10 AFFIRMED.
11 Plaintiff-Appellant Harold George MacDaniel appeals
12 from a judgment of conviction entered in the United States
13 District Court for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny,
14 J.), following his guilty plea to one count of possession of
15 ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
16 § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced MacDaniel
17 principally to a term of 57 months’ imprisonment and three
18 years’ supervised release. We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
20 of the case.
21 MacDaniel challenges his three-year term of supervised
22 release as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
23 Our review of the reasonableness of a sentence is “akin to
24 review for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
25 Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26-27 (2d Cir. 2006). Because
26 MacDaniel failed to assert any objection to his term of
2
1 supervised release to the district court, his challenge on
2 appeal is subject to review for plain error. See United
3 States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208-11 (2d Cir. 2007).
4 MacDaniel contends that the district court failed to
5 consider the relevant statutory factors and state its
6 reasons for imposing the supervised release term. After a
7 thorough review of the record, we conclude that the district
8 court did not err, much less commit plain error, in imposing
9 a three-year term of supervised release. The term was
10 consistent with the period of supervised release authorized
11 by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2).
12 Nothing in the record overcomes the presumption that the
13 district court faithfully considered the applicable
14 statutory factors in imposing the term of supervised release
15 as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). See Fernandez,
443 F.3d
16 at 30.
17 There is no dispute that the district court considered
18 the statutory factors in determining MacDaniel’s
19 incarceration term. We find no reason to believe that those
20 factors were considered only in imposing the incarceration
21 aspect of MacDaniel’s sentence. Indeed, in imposing the
22 special conditions of supervised release—requiring MacDaniel
3
1 to receive substance abuse and mental health treatment and
2 to refrain from possessing a dangerous weapon—the district
3 court considered the particular facts of his offense
4 conduct, as well as his personal history and
5 characteristics. In the absence of record evidence
6 suggesting otherwise, we cannot conclude that the district
7 court considered the statutory factors only with respect to
8 the conditions of supervised release and not to the length
9 of the term of supervised release. See United States v.
10 Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2008).
11 Moreover, because the district court stated reasons for
12 the sentence when it imposed the incarceration term and set
13 the special conditions of supervised release, it adequately
14 articulated its basis for the supervised release term. See
15 id. The district court provided ample justification for
16 both the term length and special conditions of supervised
17 release by explicitly adopting the factual findings of the
18 presentence report (“PSR”) pertaining to MacDaniel’s offense
19 conduct, criminal record, and history of substance abuse and
20 mental health issues.
21 Finally, MacDaniel’s conclusory claim of substantive
22 unreasonableness is without merit. In considering the
4
1 substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we “take into
2 account the totality of the circumstances, giving due
3 deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion,
4 and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district
5 courts.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d
6 Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court adopted the
7 factual findings of the PSR without any objection from
8 MacDaniel. These findings fully support the district
9 court’s decision to impose a three-year term of supervised
10 release. Because the term of supervised release was “within
11 the range of permissible decisions,” we will not set it
12 aside as substantively unreasonable. United States v.
13 Rigas,
583 F.3d 108, 122 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
14 marks omitted).
15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
16 court is hereby AFFIRMED.
17
18 FOR THE COURT:
19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
20
21
5
