Filed: Jul. 30, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 12-4536 Huang v. Holder BIA Poczter, IJ A200 927 655 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO
Summary: 12-4536 Huang v. Holder BIA Poczter, IJ A200 927 655 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOT..
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12-4536
Huang v. Holder
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A200 927 655
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 30th day of July, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 JUN YING HUANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 12-4536
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Ning Ye, Flushing, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior
27 Litigation Counsel; Shahrzad Baghai,
28 Trial Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Jun Ying Huang, a native and citizen of
6 China, seeks review of an October 18, 2012, decision of the
7 BIA affirming an April 15, 2011, decision of an Immigration
8 Judge (“IJ”), denying Huang’s application for asylum and
9 withholding of removal. In re Junying Huang, No. A200 927
10 655 (B.I.A. Oct. 18, 2012), aff’g No. A200 927 655 (Immig.
11 Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 15, 2011). We assume the parties’
12 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
13 in this case.
14 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
15 IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v.
16 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
17 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
18 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513
19 (2d Cir. 2009).
20 Because Huang did not allege past persecution, she was
21 required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
22 persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To meet her
23 burden, Huang had to “make some showing that authorities in
2
1 [her] country of nationality are either aware of [her]
2 activities or likely to become aware of [her] activities.”
3 Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
4 The agency reasonably found that Huang did not meet this
5 standard.
6 There is no evidence that authorities in China are
7 aware of Huang’s practice of Christianity in this country,
8 and she testified that, in China, she intended to worship at
9 home, conceding that persecution was unlikely if she
10 practiced in this manner. Relying on cases from other
11 circuits, Huang contends that restricting her religious
12 practice, itself, constitutes persecution. We need not
13 address this issue because, as the agency concluded, Huang
14 has not demonstrated that her fear of attending an
15 unregistered church is objectively reasonable in her home
16 province.
17 The agency reasonably determined that China’s treatment
18 of unregistered churches varies by region, and Huang points
19 to no evidence addressing the treatment of unregistered
20 churches in her home region of China. See Jian Xing Huang
21 v. INS,
421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that a
22 fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid
23 support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”).
3
1 Huang contends that the agency should have considered
2 whether she would face persecution in China as a whole, but
3 she does not allege that, if returned to China, she will go
4 somewhere other than her home province. Moreover, in light
5 of the regional variations in the treatment of unregistered
6 churches, the agency’s requirement that she show a
7 likelihood of persecution in her home region was reasonable.
8 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149-50, 159-60,
9 165 (2d Cir. 2008).
10 Insofar as Huang argues that, out of fear of
11 persecution, she will refrain from proselytizing to the
12 public in China, the agency found that she had not
13 demonstrated that she wished to proselytize in China.
14 Although Huang contests this conclusion, she concedes that
15 her testimony on the issue was inconsistent. Accordingly,
16 the agency’s determination that she presented insufficient
17 evidence that she would be proselytize to the public is
18 supported by substantial evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales,
19
480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two
20 permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
21 between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citation
22 omitted)).
4
1 Because Huang failed to demonstrate that her fear of
2 future persecution was objectively reasonable, the agency
3 did not err in denying asylum and withholding of removal.
4 See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43.
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED.
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
9
10
5
