Filed: Jul. 23, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 13-4538 Liu v. Lynch BIA Wright, IJ A201 157 812 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATI
Summary: 13-4538 Liu v. Lynch BIA Wright, IJ A201 157 812 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATIO..
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13-4538
Liu v. Lynch
BIA
Wright, IJ
A201 157 812
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 23rd day of July, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
REENA RAGGI,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
YUE SHENG LIU,
Petitioner,
v. 13-4538
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,*
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General; Anthony C. Payne, Senior
*
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted
for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent.
Litigation Counsel; Yedidya Cohen,
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Yue Sheng Liu, a native and citizen of China, seeks
review of the November 6, 2013 decision of the BIA affirming
the November 15, 2012 decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”), denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). See In re Yue Sheng Liu, No. A201 157 812 (B.I.A.
Nov. 6, 2013), aff’g A201 157 812 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Nov.
15, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have
considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards
of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513
(2d Cir. 2009). An applicant may establish eligibility for
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asylum and withholding of removal based on past persecution
on account of a protected ground (race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1),
1208.16(b)(1). “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that
does not include every sort of treatment our society regards
as offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere
harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
433 F.3d
332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006).
In this case, the agency reasonably concluded that Liu
did not meet his burden of establishing past persecution or
a well-founded fear of future persecution. As to past
persecution, Liu alleged that Chinese authorities demolished
his family’s home during “reconstruction” of the
neighborhood, beat and subsequently detained him for one
night after he complained about and sought compensation for
the demolition, and raided a Christian house church meeting
he attended. The agency reasonably determined that, even in
the aggregate, Liu’s account was insufficient to constitute
persecution, particularly given that he did not allege any
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specific economic or physical harm as a result of these
incidents. See Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 72; Matter of
T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170-73 (B.I.A. 2007) (explaining
that, for economic harm to constitute persecution, it must
be sufficiently “severe” to “constitute a threat to an
individual’s life or freedom”); Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder,
632
F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding “no error” in BIA’s
conclusion that alien failed to establish persecution
because, “prior to his arrest and detention by local police,
he suffered only minor bruising from an altercation with
family planning officials, which required no formal medical
attention and had no lasting effect” (emphasis in
original)). Moreover, the agency reasonably determined that
Liu presented no evidence that his political opinion or
religion was a central reason for his asserted harm. See
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1); Yueqing Zhang v.
Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005).
To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution,
an applicant must show that he subjectively fears
persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable.
See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.
2004). An applicant need not “provide evidence that there
is a reasonable possibility he or she would be singled out
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individually for persecution if . . . [t]he applicant
establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or
her country of nationality . . . of persecution of a group
of persons similarly situated to the applicant.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
Here, the agency did not err in concluding that Liu
failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution. As the IJ found, Liu did not show that police
in China are looking for him, see Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,
528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008), and he acknowledged that
his aunt continues to practice Christianity unharmed in
China, see Melgar de Torres v. Reno,
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d
Cir. 1999). Moreover, the IJ acknowledged that the Chinese
government targets Christians who publicly proselytize, but
reasonably found that Liu’s testimony indicated that he was
not likely publicly to proselytize in China. Furthermore,
the agency noted that the U.S. Department of State
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, as well as
other record country conditions evidence, indicates that at
least 50 to 70 million individuals practice Christianity in
unregistered churches in China and that authorities in some
areas of China, including Liu’s, do not interfere with such
individuals’ religious practices. This evidence did not
5
compel a finding that Liu’s fear of being singled out for
persecution is objectively reasonable, or that there is a
pattern or practice of persecution against similarly
situated practitioners. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d
110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where agency
considered background materials and rejected
pattern-or-practice claim); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546
F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that agency is not
compelled to resolve record conflicts in applicant’s favor
so long as substantial evidence raises doubt that
authorities will single out applicant for persecution and
agency does not overlook contrary evidence).
Accordingly, the agency did not err in denying asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief, because it
reasonably found that Liu failed to demonstrate past
persecution or torture, or a well-founded fear of future
persecution. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d
Cir. 2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, Liu’s
pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is
DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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