Filed: Dec. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2325 Hoo v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A099 072 761 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATI
Summary: 14-2325 Hoo v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A099 072 761 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATIO..
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14-2325
Hoo v. Lynch
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A099 072 761
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 2nd day of December, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 YUT CHIN HOO,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 14-2325
17 NAC
18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, New York, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Julie M.
27 Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel;
28 Imran R. Zaidi, Trial Attorney,
29 Office of Immigration Litigation,
30 United States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
4 DENIED.
5 Petitioner Yut Chin Hoo, a native and citizen of Malaysia,
6 seeks review of a June 2, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming
7 an August 20, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
8 denying Hoo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal,
9 and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In
10 re Yut Chin Hoo, No. A099 072 761 (B.I.A. Jun. 2, 2014), aff’g
11 No. A099 072 761 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 20, 2013). We assume
12 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
13 procedural history in this case.
14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
15 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
16 Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
17 quotation marks omitted). The applicable standards of review
18 are well established. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510,
19 513 (2d Cir. 2009). As Hoo failed to challenge the denial of
20 CAT relief before the BIA and this Court, her CAT claim is
21 waived. Karaj v. Gonzales,
462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2006);
22 Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
2
1 Although Hoo challenges the agency’s determination that her
2 asylum application is time barred, we need not consider this
3 claim because the agency also denied asylum and withholding of
4 removal on the merits, and the latter is dispositive. INS v.
5 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
6 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
7 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
8 Hoo seeks relief based on her conversion to Christianity
9 in the United States and belief that she will be persecuted if
10 she returns to Malaysia because she is a missionary and the
11 Malaysian government prohibits the conversion of Muslims. In
12 the absence of past persecution, there is no presumption of
13 future persecution. Hoo argues that she can demonstrate a
14 well-founded fear by showing that Malaysia has a pattern or
15 practice of persecuting those similarly situated to her. See
16 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
17 The BIA has provided that “a ‘pattern or practice’ of
18 persecution is one that is ‘systemic, pervasive, or
19 organized,’” and we have “deemed that standard ‘a reasonable
20 one’ while at the same time seeking clarification from the BIA
21 as to how the standard might be applied reliably.” Mufied v.
22 Mukasey,
508 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re A-M-,
3
1 23 I. & N. Dec. 737 (BIA 2005). When the agency’s determination
2 that an individual has not established a pattern or practice
3 of persecution is supported by background materials, the agency
4 has provided a “sufficient basis” for its conclusion. Santoso
5 v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).
6 Hoo primarily relies on the 2011 International Freedom
7 Report for Malaysia in arguing that she can establish a pattern
8 or practice of persecution of Christians who try to convert
9 Muslims. Specifically, she argues that this report
10 establishes that “Malaysian officials and the general populace
11 have demonstrated that they will enforce the laws against
12 apostasy and proselytization.” In support, she notes that
13 there was a raid on a Christian meeting on suspicion that the
14 Christians were preaching to Muslims, and there was a rally of
15 5,000 Muslims who supported restrictions on the proselytization
16 of Muslims. However, one raid on a Christian gathering and one
17 Muslim rally do not establish persecution that is “systemic,
18 pervasive, or organized.”
Mufied, 508 F.3d at 93. And the
19 report does not discuss how Christians are treated if they
20 attempt to convert Muslims. Thus, the BIA’s determination that
21 Hoo failed to show that there is a “pattern or practice of
4
1 persecution of Christian missionaries in Malaysia” is supported
2 by the record. Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112.
3 Because Hoo has not met the standard for asylum, she cannot
4 meet the standard for withholding of removal. See, e.g., Lecaj
5 v. Holder,
616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
8 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
9 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
10 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
11 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
12 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
13 34.1(b).
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
