Filed: Oct. 03, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-1838 Lin v. Lynch BIA Hom, IJ A70 908 073 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “
Summary: 15-1838 Lin v. Lynch BIA Hom, IJ A70 908 073 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “S..
More
15-1838
Lin v. Lynch
BIA
Hom, IJ
A70 908 073
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 3rd day of October, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 XUE YING LIN, AKA WING MUI TSEUNG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-1838
17 NAC
18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Shelley
27 R. Goad, Assistant Director; Russell
28 J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation
29 Counsel, Office of Immigration
30 Litigation, United States
31 Department of Justice, Washington,
32 D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
4 DENIED.
5 Petitioner Xue Ying Lin, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 14, 2015,
7 decision of the BIA, affirming a September 27, 2013, decision
8 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for
9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xue Ying Lin, No. A70 908 073
11 (B.I.A. May 14, 2015), aff’g No. A70 908 073 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.
12 City Sept. 27, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
13 the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
14 We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. Xue
15 Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.
16 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
17 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng
18 v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Lin’s sole
19 challenge on appeal is to the agency’s determination that she
20 failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution based on her
21 prospective practice of Christianity in China.
22 “An asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future
23 persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she
2
1 ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if
2 returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or
3 practice in [the] . . . country of nationality . . . of
4 persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the
5 applicant’ and establishing his or her ‘own inclusion in, and
6 identification with, such group.’” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d
7 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)).
8 I. Pattern or Practice
9
10 The agency reasonably concluded that Lin failed to
11 establish a pattern or practice of persecution of
12 similarly-situated individuals. To establish a pattern or
13 practice of persecution against a particular group, an
14 applicant must demonstrate that the harm to that group is
15 “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741
16 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey,
508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d
17 Cir. 2007). The agency correctly concluded that Lin did not
18 establish “systemic or pervasive” persecution of house-church
19 Christians like herself because the country conditions evidence
20 showed that small house churches, such as the one Lin testified
21 she would attend, “do not generally encounter problems.” See
22 Santoso v. Holder,
580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
23 agency’s finding of no pattern or practice of persecution of
24 Catholics in Indonesia where evidence showed that religious
3
1 violence was not nationwide and that Catholics are generally
2 free to practice their faith). That finding is supported by
3 the country conditions evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t
4 of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that
5 the weight accorded to an applicant’s evidence “lies largely
6 within the discretion of the IJ”) (internal quotation marks
7 omitted). The State Department’s 2012 International Religious
8 Freedom Report (“IRF Report”), for example, states that family
9 and friends have the right to meet at home for worship, including
10 prayer and Bible study, without registering with the
11 government.
12 II. Individualized Risk of Persecution
13
14 The agency also did not err in finding that Lin failed to
15 show a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out
16 individually for persecution. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421
17 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (observing that, absent “solid
18 support in the record,” a fear of persecution is “speculative
19 at best”). While the IRF Report and the State Department’s 2012
20 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China note
21 detentions of a house-church pastors and harassment of large
22 house-church congregations, the agency reasonably found that
23 this evidence did not support a well-founded fear of persecution
4
1 for Lin because she was not a religious leader and would be
2 attending a small underground church.
3 Lin argues that the agency ignored the most significant
4 reason she fears persecution in China: her history of run-ins
5 with Chinese authorities from her past pro-democracy
6 activities. She contends that this personal history takes her
7 outside the rubric of a typical house-church Christian, but that
8 is beside the point. Lin did not claim that she would engage
9 in pro-democracy activities in China and she did not argue that
10 she had a well-founded fear of persecution based on her past
11 pro-democracy activities before the BIA. Further, Lin
12 testified that she had never been arrested or even detained by
13 authorities. Even if Lin’s prior run-ins result in her
14 prospective underground church attendance being discovered, as
15 set forth above, the agency reasonably concluded that the
16 country conditions evidence did not show a reasonable risk of
17 persecution for engaging in that religious activity.
18 Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Lin had
19 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, and
20 as a result failed to meet her burden for asylum and withholding
21 of removal. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178
22 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that an alien who fails to establish
23 her entitlement to asylum “necessarily fails to establish h[er]
5
1 entitlement to withholding of removal” because withholding of
2 removal entails a higher burden of proof).
3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
4 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
5 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
6 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
7 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
8 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
9 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
10 34.1(b).
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
