This appeal arises out of a dispute between Century Indemnity Company ("Century") and Global Reinsurance Corporation of America ("Global") over the extent to which Global is obligated to reinsure Century pursuant to certain reinsurance certificates. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lorna G. Schofield, J.) held that the dollar amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" section of the certificates unambiguously caps the amount that Global can be obligated to pay Century for both "losses" and "expenses" combined. Century contends that Global is obligated to pay expenses in addition to the amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision and that, at a minimum, the district court erred in concluding that the certificates were unambiguous. Because this case presents an important question of New York law that the New York Court of Appeals has never directly addressed, we certify to the New York Court of Appeals the following question:
Between 1971 and 1980, Century issued nine reinsurance certificates with Global.
Beginning in 1988, thousands of lawsuits were filed against Caterpillar alleging bodily injury resulting from exposure to asbestos. A coverage dispute then arose between Century and Caterpillar, and both companies filed suit in Illinois seeking declaratory judgments concerning their obligations under the insurance policies. As a result of the Illinois litigation, Century became obligated to reimburse Caterpillar for defense expenses in addition to the indemnity limits of the policies. Global alleges that Century has already paid more than $60 million to Caterpillar and has agreed to pay an additional $30.5 million. Global further alleges that only about 10% of this amount represents what Century refers to as "loss," whereas about 90% represents what Century refers to as "expenses."
Century then sought reimbursement from Global for portions of its payments to Caterpillar pursuant to the reinsurance certificates. One of those certificates, which the parties call "Certificate X," provides in relevant part as follows:
Blanket General Liability, excluding Automobile Liability as original.
Item 2 —
The first $500,000. of liability as shown in Item #2 above.
Item 4 —
App'x at 88.
In Global's view, the amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" section caps the maximum amount that it can be obligated to pay for both loss and expenses combined. Thus, Global contends that the maximum amount that it can be required to pay under Certificate X is $250,000. Century contends that the amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision applies only to "loss" and that Global must pay all expenses that exceed that amount.
In the district court, Global moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that its interpretation of the certificates was correct. The district court granted Global's motion and held that the certificates unambiguously capped Global's liability for both losses and expenses. See Glob. Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Century Indem. Co., No. 13 Civ. 06577, 2014 WL 4054260, at *4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 1782206 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015). In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied primarily on this Court's decision in Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), which considered a similar reinsurance certificate. The Bellefonte court affirmed a judgment declaring that the reinsurers "were not obligated to pay ... any additional sums for defense costs over and above the limits on liability stated in the reinsurance certificates." Id. at 910. The district court also relied on this Court's decision in Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993), which applied Bellefonte to conclude that a reinsurer was "not liable for expenses beyond the stated liability limit in the [c]ertificate." Id. at 1071. Century timely appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Global.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm if "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
In Bellefonte, we considered a reinsurance certificate that provided as follows:
Aetna raised two arguments on appeal. First, Aetna argued that the third provision of the certificate contained a "follow the fortunes" clause and that the "`follow the fortunes doctrine' of reinsurance law obligates a reinsurer to indemnify a reinsured for all of the reinsured's defense expenses and costs, even when those expenses and costs bring the total amount to more than the explicit limitation on liability contained in ... [the] reinsurance certificate." Id. at 912.
We rejected both of Aetna's arguments. First, we held that "allowing the `follow the fortunes' clause to override the limitation on liability ... would strip the limitation clause and other conditions of all meaning." Id. The "`follow the fortunes' clauses in the certificates," we reasoned, "are structured so that they coexist with, rather than supplant, the liability cap." Id. "To construe the certificates otherwise," we held, "would effectively eliminate the limitation on the reinsurers' liability to the stated amounts." Id. (citation omitted).
These were the only two arguments that were addressed in Bellefonte. Significantly, although we described the amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision as an "explicit limitation on liability," id. at 912, we never explained why this was so.
In Unigard, we again confronted the issue of a reinsurer's liability for expenses. See 4 F.3d at 1070-71. There, the ceding insurer, North River, raised two arguments as to why the reinsurer, Unigard, was required to pay expenses that exceeded the "limits" of liability of the certificate.
As in Bellefonte, we again rejected the ceding insurer's arguments. Regarding the argument based on the "follow the form" clause, we noted that the clause stated that the liability of the reinsurers would be subject to the terms and conditions of the underlying policy "except as otherwise provided by th[e] [c]ertificate." Id. at 1070 (emphasis omitted). We held that the certificate "otherwise provide[d] for the policy limits" because another provision of the certificate, "like the certificate in Bellefonte, provide[d] that Unigard agreed to reinsure North River `in consideration of the payment of the reinsurance premium and subject to the terms, conditions, limits of liability, and [c]ertificate provisions set forth herein.'" Id. at 1071 (citation omitted). We noted that Bellefonte stated that "the limitation on liability provision capped the reinsurers' liability under the [c]ertificate" and that "[a]ll other contractual language must be construed in light of that cap." Id. at 1071 (quoting Bellefonte, 903 F.2d at 914). We also rejected as irrelevant Unigard's expectations or past practices, holding that "Bellefonte's gloss upon the written agreement is conclusive." Id.
As noted, the district court in this case held that, under Bellefonte and Unigard, Global's "total liability for both loss and expenses is capped at the dollar amount stated in the `Reinsurance Accepted' section of each [c]ertificate." Global, 2014 WL 4054260, at *5. The court concluded that the relevant language in the certificates at issue in this case was "nearly identical to the language" in Bellefonte. Id. The court rejected Century's argument that Bellefonte
Century now argues, with the support of four large reinsurance brokers, that Bellefonte and Unigard were wrongly decided. See Appellant's Br. at 13, 20; Brief for Aon Benfield U.S.; Guy Carpenter & Co., LLC; JLT Re (N. Am.) Inc.; and Willis Re Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 15-17 (hereinafter "Brief for Reinsurance Brokers") (noting that "Bellefonte and its progeny have been roundly criticized in the insurance industry"). Their argument is not without force. In particular, we find it difficult to understand the Bellefonte court's conclusion that the reinsurance certificate in that case unambiguously capped the reinsurer's liability for both loss and expenses. Looking only to the language of the certificate, we think it is not entirely clear what exactly the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision in Bellefonte meant. Evidence of industry custom and practice might have shed light on this question, but the Bellefonte court did not consider any such evidence in its decision, although it is unclear if any was presented.
The purpose of reinsurance is to enable the reinsured to "spread its risk of loss among one or more reinsurers." Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 96 N.Y.2d 583, 587, 734 N.Y.S.2d 531, 760 N.E.2d 319 (2001). If the amount stated in the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision is an absolute cap on the reinsurer's liability for both loss and expense, then Century's payments of defense costs could be entirely unreinsured. This seems to be in tension with the purpose of reinsurance. Further, Century and amici note that the premium Global received was "commensurate with its share of policy risk." Appellant's Br. at 10; see also Brief for Reinsurance Brokers at 8. Thus, under Certificate X, Global "received 50% of the net (risk) premium" because it "reinsured a 50% part of the [underlying policy] risk." Appellant's Br. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interpreting the "Reinsurance Accepted" provision as a cap for both losses and expenses, as we did in Bellefonte, could permit Global to receive 50% of the premium while taking on less than 50% of the risk.
Amici warn that continuing to follow Bellefonte could have "disastrous economic consequences" for the insurance industry. Brief for Reinsurance Brokers at 16. They contend that "potentially massive exposures to insurance companies throughout the industry would be unexpectedly unreinsured[,]" thereby, in amici's view, "create a gaping hole in reinsurance for many companies, and potentially threaten some with insolvency." Brief for Reinsurance Brokers at 16.
We find these arguments worthy of reflection. But there are other considerations as well. For example, the principle of stare decisis counsels against overruling a precedent of this Court, especially in cases involving contract rights, where "considerations favoring stare decisis are at their acme." Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2410, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015) (italics and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, reinsurers may have relied on this Court's opinions in Bellefonte and Unigard in estimating their exposure and in setting appropriate loss reserves. If the interpretive rule set out in those opinions were to shift, such reinsurers would be exposed to unexpected claims beyond their current reserves. Granted, the ceding insurers who are now being
Ultimately, as we noted in Unigard, "[t]he efficiency of the reinsurance industry would not be enhanced by giving different meanings to identical standard provisions depending upon idiosyncratic factors in particular lawsuits." 4 F.3d at 1071. Our intention, therefore, is to seek the New York Court of Appeals as to whether a consistent rule of construction specifically applicable to reinsurance contracts exists; we express no view as to whether such a rule is advisable or what that rule should be. The interpretation of the certificates at issue here is a question of New York law that the New York Court of Appeals has a greater interest and greater expertise in deciding than do we. Accordingly, we conclude that it is prudent to seek the views of the New York Court of Appeals on this important question.
We may certify a question to the New York Court of Appeals where "determinative questions of New York law are involved ... for which no controlling precedent of the Court of Appeals exists." See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 22, § 500.27(a). Global contends that the Court of Appeals' decision in Excess Insurance Co. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., 3 N.Y.3d 577, 789 N.Y.S.2d 461, 822 N.E.2d 768 (2004) controls this case. We disagree.
In Excess, the Court of Appeals considered whether a reinsurer was obligated to pay expenses that exceeded the limit provided for in the reinsurance policy.
Although Excess does not directly control this case, the decision of the Court
For the foregoing reasons and pursuant to New York Court of Appeals Rule 500.27 and Local Rule 27.2 of this Court, we certify the following question to the New York Court of Appeals:
In certifying this question, we do not bind the Court of Appeals to the particular question stated. The Court of Appeals may modify the question as it sees fit and, should it choose, may direct the parties to address other questions it deems relevant. This panel will resume its consideration of this appeal after the disposition of this certification by the Court of Appeals.
It is hereby
Id. at 1055.