Filed: Dec. 03, 2020
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
18-1823
Liu v. Barr
BIA
Douchy, IJ
A205 804 265
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 3rd day of December, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 JINLONG LIU,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-1823
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
26 Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Andrew
28 B. Insenga, Trial Attorney, Office
29 of Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Jinlong Liu, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 25, 2018,
7 decision of the BIA affirming a July 6, 2017, decision of an
8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of
9 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
10 (“CAT”). In re Jinlong Liu, No. A205 804 265 (B.I.A. May 25,
11 2018), aff’g No. A205 804 265 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 6,
12 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
13 underlying facts and procedural history.
14 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
15 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
16 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The
17 applicable standards of review are well established. See
18 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 332
19 (2d Cir. 2013). The agency did not err in concluding that
20 Liu failed to satisfy his burden of proving a well-founded
21 fear of future persecution in China on account of his practice
22 of Christianity.
23 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish
2
1 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear
2 of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Hongsheng
3 Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008). To do so,
4 an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that
5 he would be singled out for persecution or that the country
6 of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly
7 situated individuals. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii);
8 Hongsheng
Leng, 528 F.3d at 142. “[A]n alien must make some
9 showing that authorities in his country of nationality are
10 either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of
11 his activities.” Hongsheng
Leng, 528 F.3d at 143.
12 As an initial matter, we find no merit to Liu’s arguments
13 that the IJ applied an incorrect burden of proof,
14 mischaracterized his claim, and ignored his fear that he will
15 be persecuted for proselytizing in China. The IJ explicitly
16 set forth the correct well-founded fear standard and
17 recognized that Liu’s claim was based on his assertion that
18 he would proselytize as well as attend an underground church
19 in China.
20 The agency did not err in finding that Liu failed to
21 establish a well-founded fear of persecution because he did
22 not demonstrate that Chinese officials are aware or likely to
23 become aware of his religious activities. At his hearing,
3
1 Liu admitted that Chinese officials do not know about his
2 religious practice. As to whether Chinese officials are
3 likely to discover his religious activities, Liu testified
4 that that he would attend an unregistered Christian church in
5 China and spread the gospel, and he speculated that
6 nonbelievers would report him to government officials. Liu
7 did not testify that he knew anyone who had such an
8 experience, and he admitted that he did not know of anyone by
9 name who had been persecuted in his hometown. Further, the
10 agency reasonably declined to credit Liu’s mother’s unsworn
11 letter because the letter was written by an interested witness
12 who was not available for cross-examination. See Y.C., 741
13 F.3d at 334. Regardless, the letter claimed that unnamed
14 Christians were detained and beaten but provided no details
15 from which to conclude that Liu’s religious practice would
16 likely be discovered. And, as the IJ noted, the State
17 Department’s International Religious Freedom Report provides
18 that there are 68 million Christians in China and that
19 approximately 45 million of them practice in unregistered
20 churches. Given Liu’s purely speculative testimony that
21 officials will likely discover his religious practice and the
22 fact that there are tens of millions of Christians practicing
23 in unregistered churches in China, Liu did not demonstrate
4
1 that Chinese officials are likely to discover his religious
2 practice as required to state an objectively reasonable fear
3 of being singled out for persecution. See Hongsheng Leng,
4 528 F.3d at 143; see also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421
5 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support
6 in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at
7 best.”).
8 The agency also did not err in determining that Liu
9 failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of
10 similarly situated individuals. The IJ acknowledged that the
11 country conditions evidence demonstrated that Chinese
12 government officials restrict religious activities and
13 harass, detain, and sentence religious practitioners in some
14 areas of China. As the IJ noted, however, the country
15 conditions evidence also provides that Christians practice
16 their religion without government interference in some areas
17 of the country. The IJ also reasonably relied on the fact
18 that none of the evidence mentions any incidents of harm
19 befalling Christians in Liu’s home province of Fujian. See
20 Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 143, 149 (2d Cir.
21 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s requirement that an
22 applicant demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution
23 specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts vary
5
1 according to locality). Given that restrictions on Christian
2 activities varied by region, the agency did not err in
3 determining that Liu failed to demonstrate “systemic or
4 pervasive” persecution of similarly situated Christians
5 sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of
6 persecution. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005);
7 see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
8 Accordingly, the agency did not err in concluding that
9 Liu failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at
11 142–43. That finding was dispositive of asylum, withholding
12 of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
13 on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d
14 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
16 DENIED.
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe
19 Clerk of Court
6
