Filed: Sep. 23, 2003
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-23-2003 Shabazz v. Nagy Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 02-4261 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Shabazz v. Nagy" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 260. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/260 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United St
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-23-2003 Shabazz v. Nagy Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 02-4261 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Shabazz v. Nagy" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 260. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/260 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United Sta..
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Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-23-2003
Shabazz v. Nagy
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 02-4261
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003
Recommended Citation
"Shabazz v. Nagy" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 260.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/260
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 02-4261
*FAHEEMAH SHABAZZ,
Appellant
v.
STEPHEN NAGY, P.O., Badge No. 3241; RONNIE BRODIE, Badge No. 9110;
THOMAS LEDERER, Det.; WILLIAM CIERRA, Det.; J & W INSURANCE AGENCY,
d/b/a EAGLE PEAK BUSINESS SERVICES; WANDS DENISE PATE, Individually
and as Agent, Servant, Employee, and Owner of J & W Insurance Agency, d/b/a Eagle
Peak Business Services
*(Amended in accordance with Clerk's Order dated 1/7/03)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 01-cv-05396)
District Court: Honorable John P. Fullam, Sr.
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 15, 2003
Before: McKEE, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 23, 2003)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Faheemah Shabazz appeals an order from the district court granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we need not reiterate the facts except insofar
as may be helpful to our brief discussion. On November 9, 1999, Faheemah Shabazz was
stopped by Officer Stephen Nagy while driving her mother’s recently purchased
automobile. Officer Nagy stopped Shabazz because the temporary license plate or “tag”
on the car she was driving had expired. After executing a routine check of the expired
tag, Officer Nagy was informed that the car had been stolen. Consequently, he arrested
Shabazz for operating a vehicle with a stolen tag. When arrested, Shabazz was wearing a
khimar, or head-scarf, in keeping with her Islamic beliefs.
However, police made Shabazz remove the khimar so that her picture could be
taken. This was required for everyone detained in police custody. However, out of
respect for her wishes, no males were present when her khimar was removed for the
picture. While being held overnight in a cell at police headquarters, Shabazz was
required to remove the khimar for safety purposes. Accordingly, despite the precautions
police had taken when Shabazz was photographed, male officers saw her without her
khimar. This was a violation of her religious principles.
After further police investigation, it became clear that a mistake had been made
and Shabazz was innocent of driving a car with a stolen tag. Once police learned of the
error, Shabazz was released from custody. Thereafter, she filed the instant suit against
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the arresting officers and various police personnel, as well as the licensing agency whose
negligence purportedly caused the error. 1
The district court granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and this appeal followed.2
II.
As noted, Shabazz argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the
police lacked probable cause to arrest her, and her post-arrest detention was
unconstitutional. W e consider each claim separately.
At the outset we note that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). An issue is genuine if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Facts are material when
disputes over the facts might affect the outcome of a case.
Id. Thus, a “mere scintilla”
1
Shabazz obtained a default judgment against the agency.
2
Our inquiry is whether summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants. A
district court’s grant of summary judgment is subject to plenary review. See Ditri v.
Caldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc. 954 F.2d 869, 871 (3d Cir. 1992); Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
3
of evidence is not enough for the plaintiff to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 252. We must therefore decide “whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.”
Id.
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
The Fourth Amendment requires that an arresting officer have probable cause to
make an arrest. See Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995).
“[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and the circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.”
Id.
As noted above, Shabazz was stopped because the automobile she was driving had
an expired temporary license-tag. The initial stop was therefore clearly justified. After a
routine check, Officer Nagy obtained what then appeared to be reliable information that
the tag was stolen. Based on this information, he arrested Shabazz for operating a vehicle
with a stolen tag. That arrest was, therefore, clearly based upon probable cause, and
plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is patently frivolous.
B. Vicarious liability
Lieutenant Lederer did not personally remove the khimar. Shabazz argues that
Lederer is liable because he was “directly responsible for the post-arrest interview,
investigation and evaluation of Plaintiff’s arrest, and . . . for determining whether she
4
should be detained.” Br. at 19 (italics in original). Yet, Shabazz concedes that Lederer
was not directly involved in her arrest. Id. She nevertheless claims that she is entitled to
recover against Lederer because of his “negligent and callously indifferent actions,”
id.,
following her arrest. However, that allegation is not supported by the uncontested facts
on this record. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that the evidence here did not
support any theory that would allow Shabazz to recover against Lederer.
“[U]nder our cases, ‘[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs’ to be liable.” Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis
added). Allegations of personal involvement sufficient to attach liability under § 1983
“must be made with appropriate particularity.”
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Shabazz has not
come forward with sufficient evidence to meet that standard.3 Accordingly, summary
judgment was proper.
C. Post Arrest Detention
Finally, Shabazz argues that summary judgment was inappropriate on her claim
that her post arrest detention violated her constitutional rights. A reasonable jury clearly
3
Shabazz’s brief states that “pursuant to written policy, the City of Philadelphia Police
Department ordered the removal of all headgear while photographs were being taken . . .
.” However, she never raised the issue of the City’s policy in the district court, and there
is nothing here to even suggest Lederer is a policy maker. Thus, even if Shabazz had
properly preserved the issue of the City’s policy, it would not support a finding of liability
against a Lieutenant in the police department.
5
could conclude that Lederer and Officer Brodie did not conduct an error free
investigation. However, an error free investigation is not constitutionally required of
officials charged with maintaining the custody of the accused. Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
Shabazz’s allegations regarding shoddy police work do not rise to the level of a §
1983 claim against Lederer or Brodie. “The Constitution does not guarantee that only the
guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every
defendant acquitted -- indeed, for every suspect released.” Id. at 145. A reasonable jury
could not find that Shabazz’s post arrest detention violated her constitutionally protected
rights. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment.
III.
For all the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment.
6
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/Theodore A. McKee
Circuit Judge
7
