Filed: Mar. 07, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-7-2007 Wilkins v. Bittenbender Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-2827 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 Recommended Citation "Wilkins v. Bittenbender" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1514. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1514 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions
Summary: Opinions of the United 2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-7-2007 Wilkins v. Bittenbender Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-2827 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 Recommended Citation "Wilkins v. Bittenbender" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1514. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1514 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions ..
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Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-7-2007
Wilkins v. Bittenbender
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-2827
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
Recommended Citation
"Wilkins v. Bittenbender" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1514.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1514
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
ALD-133 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2827
________________
LEONARD WILKINS,
Appellant
v.
MR. BITTENBENDER, Discipline Hearing Officer,
FCI Allenwood; N. CARPER, Correctional Officer,
FCI Allenwood; BRENDA COZZA-KOZICKI, Case Manager,
FCI Allenwood; KATHY COOL, UNICOR Factory Forewoman,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #1, Health Services Department,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #2, assigned to the mail room,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #3, assigned to the mail room,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #4, assigned to the mail room,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #5, assigned to the mail room,
FCI Allenwood; JOHN DOE #7, assigned to the mail room,
FCI Allenwood; JOE DUBASCUS, Associate Warden of UNICOR,
FCI Allenwood; MR. FARLEY, DHO Officer, FCI Allenwood;
MR. HENNIGER, Correctional Officer, FCI Allenwood; VIOLA
HURSCH, Counselor, FCI Allenwood; J. LYONS, Lt., FCI Allenwood;
JOSEPH MCCLUSKY, Legal Advisor, FCI Allenwood; MR. SHEPARD, Lt.,
FCI Allenwood; STEVE TELFELSKI, UNICOR Factory Foreman, FCI
Allenwood; WARDEN S. A. YATES, Warden, FCI Allenwood;
JOHN DOE #6, assigned to the mail room, FCI Allenwood
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02397)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
February 23, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 7, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Leonard Wilkins appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. In his civil rights action, Wilkins alleges that
officials at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Institution (FCI-Allenwood) retaliated
against him for taking administrative action in response to a dispute with officials at the
facility’s UNICOR factory concerning Wilkins’ pay grade, position, and work
environment.1 In particular, Wilkins alleges that his First Amendment rights were
violated by the defendants’ retaliatory acts, and that he was denied due process when he
lost his prison job, when he was moved into the prison’s special housing unit, and during
his disciplinary hearings. Wilkins also alleges that the defendants violated his Equal
Protection rights and his Eighth Amendment rights, and that they conspired against him.
In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
1
Because we write for the parties, we do not set forth all of the facts of the case in
detail.
2
complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Wilkins filed a response in
opposition. The District Court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor; this
timely appeal followed.2 Because the appeal lacks arguable merit, we will dismiss it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II.
We agree substantially with the District Court’s analysis. We write here to
address Wilkins’ Due Process challenge to his disciplinary hearings and placement in
special housing. A prisoner cannot bring a constitutional tort suit which would challenge
the validity of his conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been
invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). However, only
claims which “necessarily implicate the fact or duration of” confinement are barred;
claims that “relate to the conditions of incarceration” are not subject to Heck’s favorable
termination requirement. Torres v. Fauver,
292 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002).
Wilkins’ complaint takes issue with three disciplinary hearings. At the first, the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concluded that Wilkins had committed the offense
of Unauthorized Use of Mail and sanctioned him by revoking his commissary and
telephone privileges for a year. Although not a part of the DHO’s sanction, Wilkins also
was placed in special housing (administrative detention) from January 27, 2003, when the
2
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d
141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002).
3
mail offense occurred, though December 16, 2003, the date of his eventual transfer to
FCI-Otisville. This was done in order to prevent contact between Wilkins and the
prisoner who informed the authorities that Wilkins had used that prisoner’s mailing
privileges. The second disciplinary hearing occurred as a result of Wilkins’ possession of
tobacco and matches, which are not authorized in special housing. Wilkins received a
sanction of disciplinary segregation for 15 days, a 90-day revocation of visitation
privileges, and a loss of 13 days of good conduct time. The third disciplinary hearing
resulted from Wilkins’ attempt to flush a lit cigarette down the toilet drain, for which he
received a sanction of disciplinary segregation for 21 days, a 180-day revocation of
visitation privileges, and a loss of 20 days of good conduct time. Because the loss of
good conduct time affects the duration of Wilkins’ confinement, Heck bars Wilkins’
challenge to the second and third disciplinary hearings. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997). The fact that Wilkins has not specifically requested relief
which would alter the term of his confinement is of no consequence. See
Torres, 292
F.3d at 147 (noting that the prisoner in Edwards did not seek restoration of the good time
credits he lost).
With regard to the first disciplinary hearing, Wilkins’ due process claim is
cognizable but does not have merit. Due process protection is not triggered unless there
is a deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d
523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003). Although the Supreme Court has found that the loss of good
4
time credits entitles prisoners to appropriate due process, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974), the question of whether a sanction implicates a liberty interest
is not answered by looking at good time credits alone. A liberty interest may also be
present where a punishment entails an “atypical and significant hardship.”
Mitchell, 318
F.3d at 532 (citation omitted). Courts are required to look into this possibility. See
id. at
533 n.6. In order to do so, a court should perform a fact-specific inquiry evaluating “the
duration of disciplinary confinement and the conditions of that confinement in relation to
other prison conditions.”
Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
Applying these criteria, we conclude that Wilkins has not shown that he had a
liberty interest at stake. His loss of commissary and telephone privileges certainly do not
qualify. Nor has he provided any evidence that the conditions during his stay in
administrative segregation involved atypical or significant hardship. In addition, this
Court has found that administrative detention for a longer period than that imposed upon
Wilkins and housing in a more restrictive type of detention than that imposed upon
Wilkins did not implicate the prisoner’s liberty interests. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 645, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months disciplinary confinement); Torres v.
Fauver,
292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen days and
administrative segregation for 120 days); Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703, 706-09 (3d
Cir. 1997) (fifteen months administrative detention).
We note that Wilkins’ failure to show a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due
5
process protections does not mean that he cannot sustain a retaliation claim concerning
the same hearings and sanctions. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir.
2000) (retaliation may be actionable even when the retaliatory action does not implicate a
liberty interest). However, for the reasons explained by the District Court, Wilkins fails
to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding this or any other claim.
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly granted the motion for
summary judgment. Because this appeal lacks merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28
U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
6
