Filed: Mar. 18, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-18-2008 THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-4715 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1430. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1430 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-18-2008 THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-4715 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1430. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1430 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the ..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-18-2008
THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-4715
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"THE Ins Co v. Charles Boyer" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1430.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1430
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4715
T.H.E. INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
CHARLES BOYER CHILDRENS TRUST
d/b/a BOYER’S WESTWOOD LANES,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-01652)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 4, 2008
Before: MCKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges,
and IRENAS,* District Judge
Opinion filed: March 18, 2008
OPINION
*
Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation.
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
T.H.E. Insurance Company1 (“T.H.E.”) sought a declaratory judgment that the
insurance policy it issued to Charles Boyer Children’s Trust, doing business as Boyer’s
Westwood Lanes (“Westwood”), did not cover water damage to Westwood’s bowling
alley. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted
T.H.E.’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Westwood contends that an
exclusion within its insurance policy for damage caused by “surface water” should not
apply to its claim. We affirm the District Court’s decision.
A series of unfortunate events led to a great mass of water and mud collecting at
Westwood’s door. On the night of July 11, 2004, a rainstorm hit Pottsville, Pennsylvania.
A 36-inch sewer pipe within an embankment ruptured. The embankment was located
near the bowling alley, but at a higher elevation. Water from the broken sewer pipe
eventually collapsed the embankment. The debris from the collapse diverted the flow of
rainwater downward along the surface of a slope, eventually pooling in a low area next to
the bowling alley. T.H.E. asserts that water overflowing from the bowling alley’s east
parking lot and a grassy area between the lot and the building also accumulated in the
same low area, but Westwood disputes that this parking-lot-area water contributed to the
1
As far as we can tell, the initials “T.H.E.” do not stand for anything. Its name
appears to be a marketing tool to assert a singular ability to offer specialty insurance to
the amusement and entertainment industries. Of course, using initials also leads people to
write “the” in capital letters, providing emphasis whenever anyone discusses the company
by name. See T.H.E. Insurance Company, http://www.theinsco.com/index.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).
2
damage here. Either way, the water and mud rose to a level of over four feet before
bursting through the bowling alley’s door. Westwood alleges that the damage totaled $2
million.
Westwood filed an insurance claim with T.H.E. for its losses. T.H.E. rejected
coverage and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Westwood’s policy
did not cover the damage to the bowling alley. Westwood counterclaimed, alleging
entitlement to coverage, bad faith, and fraud. The District Court had diversity jurisdiction
over T.H.E.’s complaint2 and applied Pennsylvania law. After discovery, cross-motions
for summary judgment and oral argument, the District Court granted T.H.E.’s motion for
summary judgment.
We have jurisdiction over Westwood’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, we
interpret an insurance contract’s language de novo, as it is a question of law, and we
construe ambiguities in favor of the insured. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers,
938 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 2007).
Westwood’s insurance policy with T.H.E. covered “Risks of Direct Physical
Loss,” subject to a list of exclusions and limitations. T.H.E. conceded in the District
Court that it had issued Westwood an “all-risk” policy as our Court has used the term.
See Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 74–76 (3d Cir. 1989).
2
T.H.E. is a Louisiana corporation and Westwood is a Pennsylvania corporation.
3
Thus, Westwood’s counterclaim should succeed “unless the policy contains a specific
provision expressly excluding the loss from coverage.” Id. at 75 (quoting 13A Couch
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 48:141, at 139 (1982)). But the policy has a “lead-in
clause” to the list of exclusions: “We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or
indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any
other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” This
expansive lead-in clause limits the usefulness to Westwood of the “all-risk” nature of the
policy and our principle of construing ambiguities in favor of coverage.
One of the exclusions was for water-damage, which includes “surface water” in its
list of non-covered causes of damage. Westwood contends on appeal that the District
Court erred by including water from the broken sewer pipe in its definition of surface
water, as the sewer pipe was sub-surface. It argues for a definition of surface water that
only includes the water from the east parking lot area. It also presented expert testimony
that water from that area “did not contribute significantly” to the damage to its bowling
alley. Therefore, Westwood argues, a factual dispute remains about whether surface
water caused the damage.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has defined “surface waters” to include
“accumulated waters which flowed under a defective door during a heavy rainstorm” and
“ ‘waters on the surface of the ground, usually created by rain or snow, which are of a
casual or vagrant character, following no definite course and having no substantial or
permanent existence.’ ” Richman v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 94 A.2d 164, 166 (Pa. Super.
4
Ct. 1953) (quoting Fenmode, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 6 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Mich.
1942)). We have held, in construing Pennsylvania law, that rainwater, once it hit the
ground, “ceased to be rain and, properly characterized, was by then surface water.” Al
Berman, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
216 F.2d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 1954).
The damage here stemmed from water that first hit the surface as rain, then entered
a sewer pipe, and finally became surface water a second time as it flowed down a slope
after the pipe ruptured. Thus, we agree with the District Court’s legal determination that
both the water from the broken sewer pipe and any water from the east parking lot
constituted surface water. We also agree that no disputed issue of material fact remains
as to whether surface water caused the loss. Thus, the damage to the bowling alley
resulted from an excluded cause under the policy.3
Citing the principle that under an all-risk policy “all losses . . . are covered except
for those specifically excluded,” Westwood argues that the surface water exclusion is
ambiguous rather than specific. Spece v. Erie Ins. Group, 850 A.2d 679, 683 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004). But, unlike the more convoluted insurance-policy exclusions in Spece, the
term “surface water” has a clear definition under Pennsylvania and Third Circuit law
construing Pennsylvania law. Absent ambiguity and given an applicable exclusion,
Westwood cannot benefit from the all-risk nature of its policy from T.H.E.
3
Because we affirm the District Court’s holding that the surface water exclusion
applies, we need not reach the earth movement or sump-overflow exclusions in
Westwood’s insurance policy.
5
For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
T.H.E.
6
