Filed: Jul. 23, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-23-2008 Gray v. Pagano Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3433 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Gray v. Pagano" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 810. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/810 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United Stat
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-23-2008 Gray v. Pagano Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3433 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Gray v. Pagano" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 810. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/810 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United State..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-23-2008
Gray v. Pagano
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3433
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Gray v. Pagano" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 810.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/810
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3433
___________
PATRICIA R. GRAY;
PATRICK M.K. GRAY,
Appellants
v.
GEORGE A. PAGANO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JUDGE, COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS, DELAWARE COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA; JOSEPH F. MCGINN,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF DELAWARE COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-2810)
District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 2, 2008
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(filed: July 23, 2008 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Patricia and Patrick Gray appeal from an order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint.
According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Thelma L. Gray, the mother-in-law of Plaintiff
Patricia R. Gray and the grandmother of Patrick Gray, executed a note on September 25,
1998, in the amount of $100,800, secured by a mortgage of $15,000 in favor of First
Union National Bank. On June 20, 2000, Thelma Gray conveyed the real property subject
to the mortgage to “Thelma Lee Gray, T. Barry Gray and Patricia R. Gray, Husband and
Wife.” On February 26, 2001, an action in mortgage foreclosure was commenced in the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County against the mortgage and a default judgment
was entered against them. Subsequent efforts to open the judgment and to transfer title to
the property to permit refinancing were unsuccessful.
On November 17, 2006, Court of Common Pleas Judge George A. Pagano entered
an order to remove Patrick and Patricia Gray from ownership of the property and a
sheriff’s sale was scheduled for July 20, 2007. Thereafter, the Grays filed a complaint in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania requesting a declaration that
Judge Pagano was not authorized to nullify transfer of title to them, together with an order
enjoining Sheriff McGinn from conducting the sheriff’s sale. The District Court
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court
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of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and dismissed the case against Judge
Pagano. The Court also dismissed the allegations against Sheriff McGinn, concluding
that they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We will affirm on
alternative grounds.
Under the doctrine of Younger abstention, federal courts are prevented from
enjoining pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.1 Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982). There are
three requirements which must be met before a federal court may properly invoke
Younger abstention: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2)
the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Schall v. Joyce,
885 F.2d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 1989). These requirements are met. First, the Grays have filed an appeal in the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania and, therefore, the case is ongoing. Cf. Taliaferro v.
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd.,
458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding Younger abstention
did not apply because the state courts had reviewed the zoning board’s ruling “extensively
and with finality.”) The third prong is met as Pennsylvania’s appellate courts are an
adequate forum for review of Plaintiffs’ federal due process claims.
1
Although not raised in the district court, abstention may be raised by this court sua
sponte. O’Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Even though the
question of Younger abstention was not raised by the parties on appeal, we may consider
it sua sponte.”).
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The second prong is also satisfied. In Schall, upon consideration of the second
prong of Younger, we held that, where the other elements of the test are met, neither
injunctive nor declaratory relief will be available “in cases in which the federal relief
would render the state court’s orders or judgments nugatory.” 885 F.2d at 108.
Plaintiffs’ complaint requests a declaration that would nullify Judge Pagano’s ruling that
transfer of title was improper. Any relief that could be granted by the district court would
directly impact Pennsylvania’s interest in protecting the authority of its judicial system, as
the relief would necessarily be predicated on a determination that Judge Pagano’s ruling
was wrongly decided. Were the district court to make this determination, it would in
essence be “substitut[ing] itself for the State’s appellate courts.” Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975).
[I]nterference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from
effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the
separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional
objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in
duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted ‘as reflecting
negatively upon the state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles.’
Id. at 604 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)). Thus, the state
proceeding implicates the important interest of preserving the authority of the state’s
judicial system.
Pursuant to Younger, the only basis for federal court interference is where one of
four exceptions are met: (1) irreparable injury is both great and immediate; (2) the state
law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions; (3) there is a
4
showing of bad faith or harassment; or (4) other unusual circumstances call for equitable
relief. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37,
46-54 (1971)). None of these exceptions are present and, therefore, Younger abstention
principles require the dismissal of the Grays’ due process challenge to the default
judgment entered against them.
To the extent that Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Judge Pagano violated the
Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“PUFTA”), this alleged violation is one
of state law, not federal law.2 Although Plaintiffs generally allege due process violations,
we do not construe the alleged misapplication of state law as violative of substantive
federal due process. The Constitution does not guarantee that the decision of state courts
shall be free from error, or require that pronouncements shall be consistent. Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). As explained by the Supreme Court in
Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982), “[w]e have long recognized that a ‘mere
error of state law’ is not a denial of due process . . . . If the contrary were true, then
‘every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to the federal courts]
as a federal constitutional question.’” (quoting Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728, 731
(1948)).
Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Sheriff McGinn and/or the sheriff’s department from
2
Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks “a declaratory ruling on whether the State Court order by
defendant Pagano violated the PUFTA in removing them from ownership of the real
property at 141 7th Ave., Folsom, PA 19033.” (Compl. ¶ 43.)
5
conducting a Sheriff Sale of 141 7th Avenue, Folsom, PA 19033, which was scheduled
for July 20, 2007. This claim is moot, as we are now eight months past the scheduled sale
of the property. Plaintiffs request no other form of relief against Sheriff McGinn and,
therefore, no case or controversy exists as the basis for invoking subject matter
jurisdiction under Article III of the Federal Constitution. See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484
F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The requirement that a case or controversy be actual
and ongoing extends throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings, including
appellate review”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Even if the claim were not
moot, it also appears that Sheriff McGinn’s action of putting the Grays’ property up for
sale is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Carswell v. Borough of
Homestead,
381 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2004) (A defendant may be shielded from liability
for civil damages if his actions did not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known) (citing Hope v.
Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002)).
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte grant
leave to amend the complaint. Leave to amend should be granted unless amendment is
futile or inequitable. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir.
2002). Amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed
motion to dismiss. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d
Cir. 1988). As previously explained, the claim against Sheriff McGinn is now moot and
6
protected by qualified immunity. The Grays’ remaining claims cannot be cured as they
are precluded from review by the Younger abstention doctrine.
For the stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the
complaint.
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