Filed: Aug. 01, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-1-2008 Calhoun v. Young Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3629 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Calhoun v. Young" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 737. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/737 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United S
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-1-2008 Calhoun v. Young Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3629 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Calhoun v. Young" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 737. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/737 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United St..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-1-2008
Calhoun v. Young
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3629
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Calhoun v. Young" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 737.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/737
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3629
___________
JAMES LEE CALHOUN,
Appellant
v.
KEVIN YOUNG, Individually and in his capacity as Assistant
Deputy Defender of Ocean County, NJ;
FRANCISCO GONZALEZ, Individually and in his capacity as Deputy
Public Defender of Ocean County, NJ;
YVONNE SMITH SEGARS, Individually and in her capacity as
Public Defender of New Jersey
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-03691)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 25, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 1, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
James Lee Calhoun filed this civil rights action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that three public defenders had violated his constitutional rights. The District
Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm the District Court’s order of
dismissal.
The parties are familiar with the facts and thus we will only briefly summarize
them here. Calhoun, who was incarcerated at the Monmouth County Correctional
Institution in Freehold, New Jersey, when he filed this suit, alleges that Kevin Young,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender of Ocean County, New Jersey, violated his rights by
discontinuing his representation after Calhoun refused to plead guilty.1 Calhoun further
alleges that Francisco Gonzalez, Deputy Public Defender of Ocean County, New Jersey,
and Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender of New Jersey, violated his constitutional
rights by not taking corrective action against Young, and conspiring to deprive indigent
criminal defendants of their constitutional rights by securing their convictions through
guilty pleas. Calhoun also contends that the State of New Jersey violated his
constitutional rights by “attempting” to charge him approximately $1,500 in expenses for
his court-appointed counsel.2
1
Calhoun’s state criminal trial proceedings appear to be ongoing.
2
The New Jersey Public Defender Act includes reimbursement and lien provisions.
See N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-16, 158A-17. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-16 provides that:
In all cases where it appears that the defendant has or reasonably expects to
2
For these putative constitutional violations, Calhoun seeks monetary damages and
an injunction against the State of New Jersey to stop it “from charging indigent criminal
defendants for court appointed counsel.” Calhoun also sought class action status for all
criminal defendants suffering losses of their constitutional rights due to the actions of
defendants. The District Court dismissed Calhoun’s complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Calhoun timely appealed.
In order to establish a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights claim, a claimant must show:
“(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Robb v. City of Philadelphia,
733 F.2d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).
Accordingly, Calhoun’s claims against Young regarding his ineffective representation
were properly dismissed because it is well established that a public defender performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant is not acting under color of state
law. See Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).3 Further, to the extent
have means to meet some part, though not all, of the cost of the services
rendered to him he shall be required to reimburse the office, either by a
single payment or in installments, in such amounts as he can reasonably be
expected to pay; but no default or failure in the making of any such payment
shall in any wise [sic] affect or reduce the rendering of the services to him.
3
Moreover, given that Calhoun appears to be awaiting trial in state criminal
proceedings, to the extent his complaint seeks injunctive relief for alleged present and
3
Calhoun is attempting to hold Gonzalez and Segars liable for Young’s actions on a
respondeat superior theory, he failed to present a federal claim. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 325
(“Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of
liability”).
Calhoun’s claims regarding an alleged conspiracy between Young and the other
two defendants were also properly dismissed because – even assuming arguendo that
Gonzalez and Segars could be considered state actors here – the allegations in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom fail to state a conspiracy claim.
See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991).
Finally, to the extent Calhoun sought monetary damages and injunctive relief from
the State of New Jersey for “attempting” to charge him and other indigent defendants for
the cost of the public defender services provided them, the complaint was properly
dismissed because a State is not a person for purposes of §1983. Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Even construing Calhoun’s pro se complaint
liberally and assuming arguendo that such relief would be available from Segars in her
individual and/or official capacities, this claim was nonetheless properly dismissed. In
the first instance, it appears that Calhoun has not suffered an injury, let alone a
continuing constitutional deprivations regarding his representation or the on-going
proceedings, the complaint seeks relief that a federal court should not provide. See
O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37
(1971)).
4
deprivation of a constitutional right, because he alleges only that there was an “attempt”
to charge him for the cost of his public defender. See also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40,
54 (1974) (upholding Oregon recoupment statute providing that an indigent convicted
person, who later becomes able to pay for his counsel, may be required to do so).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
5
