Filed: Sep. 01, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: CLD-248 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-4193 _ TOMMIE H. TELFAIR; CATRINA R. GATLING, Associated Aggrieved, v. OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Agent(s) for the Government, and Defense Counselor(s) Tommie H. Telfair, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-2958) District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Summary: CLD-248 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-4193 _ TOMMIE H. TELFAIR; CATRINA R. GATLING, Associated Aggrieved, v. OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Agent(s) for the Government, and Defense Counselor(s) Tommie H. Telfair, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-2958) District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(..
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CLD-248 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4193
___________
TOMMIE H. TELFAIR; CATRINA R. GATLING, Associated Aggrieved,
v.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Agent(s) for the Government, and Defense
Counselor(s)
Tommie H. Telfair,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-2958)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 28, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 1, 2011 )
___________
OPINION
___________
1
PER CURIAM
Tommie Telfair appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey’s dismissal of his cause of action, the denial
of his motion for reconsideration, and the issuance of limitations on his right to file
documents and future civil actions in the District Court. For the reasons that follow, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s August 9, 2010 order. We will also summarily
affirm the October 10, 2010 order to the extent that it denies Telfair’s motion for
reconsideration, but we will vacate the filing restrictions and remand for further
proceedings on that issue.
I.
The procedural history of this case and the details of Appellant’s claims are well-
known to the parties and were thoroughly explained in the District Court’s opinion.
Accordingly, the claims need not be discussed at length. In short, Telfair was charged
and found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess and distribute 1 kilogram or
more of heroin, and distribution and possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or
more of heroin. (D.N.J. 08-cr-0757.) His apparent girlfriend, Catrina Gatling, was later
charged with one count of harboring a felon and making false statements to the DEA.1
Meanwhile, Telfair has filed several civil actions in the District of New Jersey, which
concern his and/or Gatling’s arrest and prosecution. (D.N.J. 08-cv-0731, 09-cv-2806, 10-
cv-0048.)
1
Gatling pleaded guilty to the charge of harboring a felon. We agree with the District
Court that there is no indication that Gatling is knowingly involved in this cause of
action.
2
In June 2010, Telfair commenced the civil action at issue by filing a largely
incoherent document entitled “Grievance Form,” purportedly under the District Court’s
Local Civil Rule 104.1, which listed himself as the “grievant” and Gatling as an
“associated grievant.” He listed the “Office of the U.S. Attorneys’ the Agent(s) for the
Government, and Defense Counselor(s)” as the “entities grieved of.” Telfair stated that
he, Gatling, and “their children” have suffered injury “as a result of Ms. Gatling being
used as collateral through Grievant(s) entire litigation(s),” and is “now being used as a
unilateral punishment for the grievant and/or where the government is trying to dissolve
Ms. Gatling’s litigation in order to escape further liability.” (emphasis omitted) He then
requests that Gatling’s prosecution be “enjoined or stayed.” The document appears to
make claims that Telfair’s defense counsel and the prosecutors ensured that he had an
unfair trial and violated his due process rights in several ways. Telfair thereafter filed a
nearly identical second grievance form.
On August 9, 2010, the District Court issued an order dismissing Telfair’s
grievance with prejudice, explaining that he lacked standing to pursue a grievance on
behalf of Gatling’s constitutional rights. It then concluded that no further investigation of
Telfair’s claims were warranted under Local Civil Rule 104.1(e)(2).
Within ten days, Telfair filed a voluminous motion for reconsideration of the
District Court’s order. He stated that he was actually “challeng[ing] his continued
detention,” and that his arguments on behalf of Gatling were “nevertheless simultaneous
to [his] chief litigation, where she is being subject to tortuous conduct derivative of [his]
litigation.” (emphasis omitted) He then reiterated that Gatling’s arrest and prosecution
3
were improper and violated her constitutional rights. He also attempted to set forth
several additional claims, stating, among other things, that the attorneys involved in his
and Gatling’s prosecutions have engaged in professional misconduct and other misdeeds,
and that his arrest and trial were fundamentally unfair. Telfair then filed a “response” to
his own motion for reconsideration that seemed to directly challenge his arrest and
prosecution.
On October 10, 2010, the District Court denied Telfair’s motion for
reconsideration, issuing an 84-page opinion that impressively untangles Telfair’s
extensive litigation history. It determined that the “grievance” was not bona fide, that it
had no authority to engage in a disciplinary review over “DEA agents, police officers, jail
officials” and others, as Telfair requested, and that the allegations regarding various
attorneys did not warrant further investigation or an opportunity for Telfair to submit a
viable grievance. The district court also noted that his claims were a mix of civil rights
and habeas challenges that had already been dismissed in other proceedings, and that his
claims regarding his conviction could only be raised in a direct appeal or collateral
proceedings. Further, the district court reiterated that Telfair had no standing to bring
claims on behalf of Gatling.
Finally, the District Court determined that Telfair had abused the legal process by
the volume and content of his filings, which show, among other things, “his apparent
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disregard for judicial decisions.”2 It therefore issued a limited preclusion order pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). As to Telfair’s current actions, the District Court required him to
seek leave from the presiding judge “to make any pro se submission before actually
making such submission.” If he did not comply, the document would be stricken from
the docket and not considered by the court. As to any of Telfair’s already terminated
actions, he was ordered not to make any filing except for a due notice of appeal. With
regard to any new matter that Telfair sought to initiate while acting pro se and proceeding
in forma pauperis, he was required to seek leave from the Clerk to initiate such matter. If
he failed to do so, the District Court would not consider the document, and the matter
would be administratively terminated. The order exempted civil rights complaints in
which Telfair asserts bona fide claims and details facts evincing that he is experiencing
imminent and ongoing danger to his life or health. The order also exempted the
submission of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion made in good faith and not prematurely.
Telfair now appeals.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Telfair’s
timely appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying
judgment for review,” we will review the District Court’s dismissal of the grievance as
well as its denial of the motion for reconsideration. North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). We
2
The District Court noted that, in the District of New Jersey alone, Telfair had filed
2,245 pages of documents while “systematically raising and re-raising the same claims
and . . . filing the same documents many times over.”
5
review an order denying a “motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but we
review the District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and factual
determinations for clear error.” Howard Hess Dental Labs Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc.,
602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of discretion a decision to
impose restrictions upon a plaintiff’s right to commence future litigation. Abdul-Akbar
v. Watson,
901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 1990).
The District Court has the inherent authority to discipline attorneys who appear
before it, and we review decisions regarding the regulation of attorneys for abuse of
process. Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1386 (3d Cir. 1972); D.N.J.
L. Civ. R. 104.1(e)(1) (stating that “attorney[s] authorized to practice law or appearing
before this Court” are subject to the District Court’s disciplinary authority). Further, we
generally give deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules unless the rule
in question is identical in relevant respects to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mills,
634 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 2011).
We will summarily affirm the dismissal of Telfair’s “grievance” and denial of his
motion for reconsideration because his appeal from those matters presents “no substantial
question.” 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The District Court appropriately dismissed
Telfair’s grievance pursuant to Local Civil Rule 104.1(e)(5), as the allegations against the
attorneys involved in his criminal prosecution were meritless on their face and did not
warrant any further investigation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 104.1(e)(2).
Further, as the District Court concluded, this cause of action was an ethics
application in name only, as the majority of Telfair’s allegations challenged the propriety
6
of his (and Gatling’s) arrest and prosecution and/or were litigated previously. As has
repeatedly been explained to Telfair, challenges to his conviction and sentence may only
be brought in a direct appeal or in proper collateral proceedings. Likewise, to the extent
that any civil claims “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence,” they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
Additionally, as the District Court determined, Telfair lacks standing to bring 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims on behalf of Gatling. See Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 162-63
(1990) (explaining limitations of “next friend” standing).
Just as the District Court properly dismissed Telfair’s complaint, it properly
denied his motion for reconsideration. He presented no basis for reconsideration, nor
does he have a meritorious argument on appeal. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-
Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the rationale for a
motion for reconsideration is “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.”).
We also consider the District Court’s decision to restrict Telfair’s right to file
documents and future suits in the District of New Jersey. Orders restricting the filing of
documents from certain litigants are within a district court’s power under the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). A “district court
has authority to require court permission for all subsequent filings once a pattern of
vexatious litigation transcends a particular dispute. ” Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of
Pa.,
882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis omitted). We have, however, held that a
district court must comply with certain procedural requirements before issuing this type
7
of injunction against a pro se litigant. Significantly for purposes of this case, we have
explained that “the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the
proposed injunctive relief should not issue.” Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
We agree with the District Court that Telfair’s litigation practices likely constitute
an abuse of the judicial system, warranting a limitation on his access to the courts.
However, Telfair is entitled to notice before such an injunction is issued so that he may
have an opportunity to show cause why he should not be enjoined. See id. Given the
absence of proper notice here, we will vacate the injunction imposed and remand so that
Telfair can be afforded an opportunity to respond.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s August 9,
2010 order. We will also summarily affirm the order entered October 15, 2010 insofar as
it denied Telfair’s motion for reconsideration. We will vacate that order to the extent that
the District Court imposed restrictions on Telfair’s access to the courts, and remand that
issue only for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Appellant’s pending
motions are denied.
8
