Filed: Jul. 08, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: GLD-292 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-1845 _ DAVID L. MATHIS, Appellant v. JENNIFER MONZA; CAROL STEELE-SMITH; WILLIAM SCHOPPE; COUNTY OF BEAVER _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-00450) District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Summary: GLD-292 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-1845 _ DAVID L. MATHIS, Appellant v. JENNIFER MONZA; CAROL STEELE-SMITH; WILLIAM SCHOPPE; COUNTY OF BEAVER _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-00450) District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 J..
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GLD-292 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1845
___________
DAVID L. MATHIS,
Appellant
v.
JENNIFER MONZA; CAROL STEELE-SMITH;
WILLIAM SCHOPPE; COUNTY OF BEAVER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-00450)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 20, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 8, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
David Mathis appeals from the District Court‟s orders granting the defendants‟
partial motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment. Because the appeal
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Mathis was transferred to the Beaver County Jail for pretrial detention on February
11, 2011. The United States Marshals advised jail officials that Mathis‟ charges included
escape and that he had previously attempted to escape from a correctional institution.
Monza, the Classification Coordinator, identified Mathis as an escape risk and designated
him to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”).
Approximately a week later, a staff member informed Mathis that only religious
materials were allowed in the RHU. Mathis verified this information by requesting a
Bible from the chaplain, which he received the following day. Mathis also requested a
list of property permitted in the RHU, and the list stated that RHU inmates were allowed,
inter alia, only one book of a religious nature and that any other items not on the list
would be considered contraband and confiscated.
On March 3, 2011, Mathis filed a grievance seeking the same benefits given to
female RHU inmates and other pretrial administrative custody inmates, such as hot
meals. Monza denied his request. Mathis re-filed his grievance the following day. On
March 14, 2011, Steele-Smith granted Mathis access to the law library but denied him all
other requested benefits.
2
A month later, Mathis requested that he be transferred to the Special Needs Unit
(“SNU”) because of the sleep deprivation, mental cruelty, and exhaustion he was
experiencing in the RHU. Steele-Smith denied his request. Mathis then wrote to the
United States Marshals asking to be transferred, and he was removed from the jail on
April 22, 2011.
Mathis filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §, alleging violations of his equal
protection, First Amendment, and due process rights. In January 2012, the District Court
granted the defendants‟ partial motion to dismiss Mathis‟ equal protection and First
Amendment Establishment Clause claims concerning the providing of religious texts and
visits from religious advisers. Subsequently, the District Court granted the defendants‟
motion for summary judgment on Mathis‟ remaining claims. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over the District Court‟s orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
exercise plenary review over both the District Court‟s partial dismissal and its grant of
summary judgment to the defendants. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
2009); Allah v. Seiverling,
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive a motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Summary judgment is
appropriate only when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
3
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record. Murray v.
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
In his complaint, Mathis alleged that the jail violated his First Amendment rights
to freedom of speech and the press by not allowing male RHU inmates to possess reading
material “from any source.” While inmates retain the “protections afforded by the First
Amendment,” O‟Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted),
they “retain[] only those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with [their]
status as [] prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system,” Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). To determine whether a regulation
infringing upon constitutional rights is reasonable, courts apply the four factors set forth
in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987). These factors require courts to consider: (1)
“whether the regulation bears a „valid rational connection‟ to a legitimate and neutral
government objective;” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally;” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.”
Id. at 89-90; see also
Fraise v. Terhune,
283 F.3d 506, 513-14 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
4
As an initial matter, Mathis was permitted to have a religious text as well as legal
mail and personal correspondence, except for magazines and books. Nevertheless, we
agree with the District Court that the jail‟s policy prohibiting RHU inmates from
possessing non-religious reading material satisfies Turner. The record reflects that the
jail‟s policy furthers its interest in promoting the modification of RHU inmates‟ behavior
so that they have incentive to follow jail rules and regulations. See Beard v. Banks, 548
U.S. 521, 530-31 (2006) (determining that policy prohibiting Long Term Segregation
Unit inmates from possessing newspapers and magazines served to motivate better
behavior). To avoid equal protection problems, the jail cannot distinguish between
inmates placed in the RHU for disciplinary infractions and inmates placed there on
administrative segregation status. Furthermore, although RHU inmates have no
alternative to exercise their right, their right has not been completely eliminated, as
Mathis himself was advised that he could be moved to a less restrictive unit allowing
leisure reading materials if he resolved his escape risk designation with the Marshals.
See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; see also
Beard, 548 U.S. at 532. Finally, the record
reflects that without the policy, more prison resources would be expended in an attempt
to modify inmates‟ behavior, and that there is no alternative method that would
accommodate this right at de minimis cost to the jail‟s penological interests. See
Turner,
482 U.S. at 90-91. Accordingly, summary judgment was warranted for the defendants on
Mathis‟ claim that his rights to freedom of speech and the press were violated.
5
Mathis also claimed that the jail‟s policy of allowing RHU inmates to possess
religious texts while prohibiting them from possessing non-religious texts and allowing
RHU inmates to receive visits from religious advisers violates the First Amendment‟s
Establishment Clause and his equal protection rights. However, it appears that Mathis is
not raising a true Establishment Clause claim, as he does not take issue with the jail‟s
allowance of religious texts and visitors and does not allege that he is in any way
religious or non-religious. Rather, he believes that RHU inmates should be allowed to
possess both religious and non-religious reading material and should be allowed to
receive extra visits from individuals who are not religious advisers. “Turner is equally
applicable” to Mathis‟ claims. DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000). An
inmate “cannot obtain relief if the difference between the defendants‟ treatment of him
and their treatment of [inmates of another religion] is „reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.‟”
Id. However, as we noted above, the jail‟s policy prohibiting
RHU inmates from possessing non-religious reading material and from receiving extra
visits serves the penological purpose of promoting the modification of behavior. See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; see also
Beard, 548 U.S. at 530-31. Accordingly, the District
Court properly determined that Mathis‟ claims were meritless.
According to Mathis, the defendants violated his equal protection rights by serving
hot meals to female RHU inmates while only serving bagged meals to male RHU
inmates. The record contains evidence that male RHU inmates used to receive hot meals,
6
but that they began to use the trays and utensils as weapons. The jail did not experience
the same problems with female RHU inmates. For safety purposes, the jail began serving
bagged meals only to male RHU inmates. Accordingly, we agree that this difference in
treatment bears a “„valid rational connection‟ to a legitimate and neutral government
objective.”1 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Finally, we agree that Mathis‟ pretrial confinement in the RHU did not violate his
substantive due process rights, as nothing in the record suggests that this placement was
punitive. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Given Mathis‟ classification as
an escape risk, his detention in the RHU was reasonably related to the jail‟s legitimate
interest in maintaining security. See Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984);
Stevenson v. Carroll,
495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). Likewise, Mathis‟ claim that the
defendants violated his equal protection rights is meritless, as the record is devoid of any
evidence that the defendants purposefully discriminated against Mathis by placing him
the RHU.2 See Andrews v. City of Phila.,
895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990).
IV.
1
While prisoners must receive a nutritionally adequate diet, see Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980), Mathis has no constitutional right to hot meals, see
Brown-El v. Delo,
969 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding frivolous prisoner‟s claim
that his constitutional rights were violated when he was served cold food).
2
We further agree that Mathis failed to establish that the inmate convicted of escape was
similarly situated to him. The other inmate walked away while working outside of the
jail as part of the Community Work Program. He was found guilty of a disciplinary
violation and was sent to the RHU. After serving his time in the RHU, he was transferred
to the general population unit. Unlike this inmate, however, Mathis was designated as an
escape risk upon arrival at the jail and had an admitted history of attempted escape.
7
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
8
