Filed: Feb. 09, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-1521 _ ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian ad litem for R.B. and T.B.; BENJAMIN FRYE; R.B.; T.B. v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN DOES I-II; JOHN DOES III-X; CITY OF CAMDEN; POLICE CHIEF JOHN SCOTT THOMPSON ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian ad litem for R.B. and T.B.; and BENJAMIN FRYE, Appellants _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. C. No. 1-12-cv-00494) Di
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-1521 _ ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian ad litem for R.B. and T.B.; BENJAMIN FRYE; R.B.; T.B. v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN DOES I-II; JOHN DOES III-X; CITY OF CAMDEN; POLICE CHIEF JOHN SCOTT THOMPSON ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian ad litem for R.B. and T.B.; and BENJAMIN FRYE, Appellants _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. C. No. 1-12-cv-00494) Dis..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 15-1521
________________
ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian
ad litem for R.B. and T.B.; BENJAMIN FRYE;
R.B.; T.B.
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN DOES I-II;
JOHN DOES III-X; CITY OF CAMDEN;
POLICE CHIEF JOHN SCOTT THOMPSON
ELLA BAKER, individually and as guardian ad litem
for R.B. and T.B.; and BENJAMIN FRYE,
Appellants
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 1-12-cv-00494)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on October 29, 2015
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 9, 2016)
________________
OPINION*
________________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Appellants Ella Baker and Benjamin Frye appeal three decisions by the District
Court, seeking reversal of (1) the District Court’s grant of summary judgment; (2) the
District Court’s denial of leave to file a third amended complaint; and (3) the District
Court’s rejection of the testimony proffered by appellants’ expert. Appellants have failed
to provide any factual basis to support their claims and have also failed to show that the
District Court abused its discretion in denying leave or in rejecting the expert testimony.
Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to all issues.
I.
In November 2010, members of the United States Marshals Service and the
Camden Police Department SWAT Team searched appellants’ home in an effort to arrest
Anthony Fontanez. Law enforcement sought Fontanez as a prime suspect in an incident
during which a house was shot into using a high-powered rifle; Fontanez also had several
outstanding warrants for aggravated assault, attempted murder, kidnapping, robbery and
possession of weapons. Fontanez had previously been in a relationship with Baker’s
daughter Tawana Baker, and Fontanez is the father of Tawana Baker’s children.
Baker alleges that on November 24, 2010, officers arrived at her home with their
guns drawn and forced her to wait outside for 45 minutes while they searched her
residence. Once inside, the officers allegedly pointed a gun at Baker’s 9-year-old
nephew, R.B., and threatened to shoot him if he did not stop moving. Baker’s 12-year-
old daughter, T.B., begged the officers not to shoot R.B., stating that he had ADHD and
could not keep still. R.B., T.B. and Baker’s husband Benjamin Frye were brought
2
downstairs and detained while the officers searched the home. Frye alleges that he was
restrained using zip ties and forced to lie on the living room floor for an extended period
of time. Baker, Frye, T.B. and R.B. (hereinafter Plaintiffs) allege that they have suffered
psychological injuries, such as nightmares and nervousness around police, as a result of
the search. There is no evidence that any member of Baker’s household sought medical
treatment in connection with these injuries.
In January 2012, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, which named the United States
Department of Justice, the United States Marshals Service, and John Does I-II as
defendants. In November 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming the
United States of America, the City of Camden, Chief of Police John Scott Thompson and
John Does I-X as defendants. All claims against the United States were dismissed by the
District Court. In February 2013, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint, which
contained nine counts, five of which named only fictitious defendants (John Does). In
June 2014, Plaintiffs again moved for leave to amend the complaint in order to add Sgt.
Pasquale Giannini, a part-time leader of the Camden Police SWAT Team, as a defendant.
The District Court denied leave, pointing out that Plaintiffs had been aware of Giannini’s
relevance for months prior to the September 2013 deadline to amend pleadings, and
therefore that Plaintiffs did not have good cause for failing to timely amend their
complaint. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, which the District Court
granted.
II.
3
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to, inter alia,
the Federal Tort Claims Act1 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.2 We evaluate the District Court’s denial of
leave to amend the complaint and rejection of Plaintiffs’ expert for abuse of discretion.3
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”4
The court must view any evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and extend any
reasonable favorable inferences to that party.5 Plaintiffs claimed that the City of Camden
was negligent in failing to adequately supervise or monitor the actions of law
enforcement personnel involved in searching Baker’s residence. Such a claim is barred
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which provides that damages shall not be
awarded against a public entity for pain and suffering, unless the victim has suffered
“permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where
the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.”6 In the present case,
Plaintiffs have alleged no permanent injuries, nor have they offered any evidence that
they sought medical treatment as a result of the incident in question. Thus, the District
1
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
2
Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015).
3
Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC,
305 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2002) (denial
of leave to amend); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co.,
234 F.3d 136, 156 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejection
of expert testimony).
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
5
Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
6
N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).
4
Court was correct in granting summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim
against the City of Camden.
Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is similarly unsupported by
evidence. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Camden
and the law enforcement officers “knowingly and willfully conspire[d] . . . to oppress,
threaten, intimidate or otherwise deprive [Plaintiffs] in the free exercise and enjoyment of
their rights.” Plaintiffs provide no evidence of such a conspiracy, or of any agreement
between any of the Defendants for anything but coordination and support during the
execution of a lawful arrest warrant. In opposing Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [their]
pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”7 In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to do so, the District Court was correct in granting
summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleges that the law enforcement officers’ use of excessive
force was the likely and obvious consequence of maintaining an active SWAT Team
without proper training. As respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach
against a municipal defendant,8 the City of Camden cannot be held liable under § 1983
unless Plaintiffs prove the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.9 Here,
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based solely on the City of Camden’s alleged failure to train its
SWAT Team; therefore Plaintiffs are required to show that this failure amounted to
7
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
8
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
9
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 128 (1988).
5
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees will come
into contact.”10 The only evidence offered by Plaintiffs to support the inference that
Camden failed to train its SWAT Team was the report and testimony of Plaintiffs’
proffered expert, Mark Weber, who concluded that a “lack of resource[s] led to poor
training by the Swat Team at the time and caused them not to establish or properly follow
protocols dealing with certain operations such as entry and searches of residential
properties while occupied.” In evaluating the admissibility of expert opinions, the district
court must consider an expert’s qualifications, reliability and fit.11 In order for an
expert’s testimony to be reliable, it must be based on the “methods and procedures of
science,” rather than on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”12 The District
Court found Weber’s opinions as to Camden’s alleged failure to train its SWAT Team to
be unreliable, as he could provide no basis for his opinion regarding a lack of training
beyond the conduct of the officers giving rise to this litigation. Indeed, in his deposition,
Weber admitted that he did not review any materials regarding the training of the
Camden SWAT Team and conceded that, in fact, he did not know what training the
Camden SWAT Team received in the years preceding the incident at issue. Given these
admissions, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the testimony
offered by Weber. As Plaintiffs offered no other evidence to support their allegations
that Camden had failed to train the law enforcement officers, the District Court properly
dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.
10
Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).
11
Schneider ex. rel. Estate of Schneider v. Fried,
320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003).
12
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
6
The remainder of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is comprised of claims against unnamed
defendants. While courts may initially allow claims based upon unnamed defendants
because they may be found and named later through the discovery process,13 courts must
eventually dismiss unnamed parties if discovery yields no identities.14 While discovery
in the present case did yield the identity of one of the law enforcement officers – Sgt.
Pasquale Giannini – Plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint to include Sgt.
Giannini nine months after the deadline to amend proceedings set by the District Court.
In its decision to deny leave to amend the complaint, the District Court found that
Plaintiffs had failed to show good cause as to why they waited until September 2014 to
amend their complaint when Giannini was identified as a relevant witness in Camden’s
April 2013 Rule 26 disclosures. Plaintiffs were clearly aware that Giannini was
important because he was a focus of Plaintiffs’ interrogatories, the answers to which
Giannini certified in August 2013. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the District Court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant leave to further amend their complaint, and
therefore we affirm the District Court’s decision. Without Giannini as a defendant, the
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims exist only against unnamed defendants. The case law is clear
that “an action cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants.”15 We therefore also
13
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004).
14
Hindes v. F.D.I.C.,
137 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1998).
15
Id. See also Breslin v. Philadelphia,
92 F.R.D. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Because
unnamed parties cannot be served process or otherwise participate in their defense, a
court cannot, consistent with due process, permit a matter to go to trial against parties
who have not been identified).
7
affirm the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment as to the claims against
unnamed defendants.
III.
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence, other than inadmissible expert testimony to
support their claims. Further, they have failed to show that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend or in rejecting the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects.
8
