Filed: Feb. 15, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1914 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BOLA PETERS, a/k/a Bola M. Kassim; a/k/a Muti Kassim; a/k/a Rene Copley; a/k/a Elizabeth Brown; Bola Peters, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-14-cr-00012-012) District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 23, 2018 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRA
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1914 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BOLA PETERS, a/k/a Bola M. Kassim; a/k/a Muti Kassim; a/k/a Rene Copley; a/k/a Elizabeth Brown; Bola Peters, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-14-cr-00012-012) District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 23, 2018 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAU..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 17-1914
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BOLA PETERS,
a/k/a Bola M. Kassim;
a/k/a Muti Kassim;
a/k/a Rene Copley;
a/k/a Elizabeth Brown;
Bola Peters,
Appellant
____________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-14-cr-00012-012)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 23, 2018
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, Circuit Judges,
and JONES, District Judge. *
(Opinion filed: February 15, 2018)
*
The Honorable John E. Jones, III, United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
___________
OPINION *
___________
JONES, District Judge.
Bola Peters appeals her judgment of conviction for conspiracy to commit wire
fraud. Ms. Peters argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove her
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. Background
This case involves a years-long scheme of stealing identities, filing false tax
returns with the stolen identities, and fraudulently collecting tax refunds. The IRS
identified more than 1000 false tax returns between 2010 and 2012 alone. The fraudulent
refunds were routed to more than 3600 bank accounts set up at 443 financial institutions
across the United States. Because of the sheer number of false returns and bank accounts,
the FBI subpoenaed bank records from a random sample of 100 bank accounts. Agents
also sought ATM surveillance photos because the cash had been withdrawn from most of
the accounts through ATM transactions. Although the FBI identified several major
players in their investigation, many of the co-conspirators’ roles consisted of opening
bank accounts with stolen identities, withdrawing the refunds from ATMs, keeping a
percentage, and transferring the remaining money to those of higher rank in the
conspiracy. This was the role Ms. Peters played.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
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Ms. Peters’s name appeared on one of the bank accounts in the 100-account
sample, and authorities had identified fraudulent refunds among the deposits. The FBI
obtained a search warrant for Ms. Peters’s home, where they found a total of thirteen
Social Security cards and New York State driver’s licenses in different names in addition
to one blank Social Security card. The FBI also located a notebook and other pages that
had handwritten entries listing stolen identify information. Finally, authorities found a
distinctive, multi-colored shirt that also was seen in ATM surveillance photos. None of
the fraudulent identification documents found in Ms. Peters’s home implicated her
husband. Agents later interviewed Ms. Peters, who admitted that she used false identities
to open bank accounts in 2008. She further said she was instructed to open the accounts
by someone named Lowah, and that she would make cash withdrawals from an ATM,
keep ten percent, and transfer the remainder of the withdrawal to Lowah. Ms. Peters also
knew that others were involved in the scheme, although she did not know their roles or
names.
In May 2015, a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a fifth
superseding indictment accusing Ms. Peters and nearly two dozen others of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The matter went to trial in October
2016. At the close of the Government’s case, Ms. Peters moved for judgment of acquittal
under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing insufficiency of the
evidence, which the District Court denied. Ms. Peters called one witness and rested. On
October 21, 2016, the jury found Ms. Peters guilty. She was sentenced to sixty months in
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prison and a three-year term of supervised release. Ms. Peters now appeals her judgment
of conviction.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction of the underlying matter
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review appeals from all final
decisions of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“[W]e review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Bryant, 655
F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Miller,
527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir.
2008)). Appellants bear a heavy burden. We “will overturn a verdict only ‘if no
reasonable juror could accept evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. (quoting United States v. Anderskow,
88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996)). “Under this particularly deferential standard, we ‘must
be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning
weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.’” United
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez,
726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in the
original) (quoting United States v. Brodie,
403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)).
“Furthermore, ‘we review the evidence as a whole, not in isolation, and ask whether it is
strong enough for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id.
(quoting U.S. v. Boria,
592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)).
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III. Discussion
Ms. Peters was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1349. To prove its case, the Government needed to prove that Peters agreed with
one or more persons to commit wire fraud, which consists of three elements: “(1) the
defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with
the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of . . . interstate wire communications in
furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Antico,
275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)). Ms. Peters argues
that the Government failed to prove the first element. We disagree.
Ms. Peters admitted that she had been instructed to open bank accounts with stolen
identities, had withdrawn the fraudulent tax refunds, and had skimmed her allotted ten
percent and wired the remainder to “Lowah.” She also admitted that she knew there were
other co-conspirators, even if she did not know their names. These admissions alone were
sufficient to prove the first element of wire fraud. Ms. Peters’s suggestion that the
Government needed to produce witnesses who could provide direct evidence of her
knowledge of the scheme is unpersuasive. Ms. Peters amply demonstrated her knowledge
in her voluntary statement to the authorities. Moreover, “finding of guilt in a conspiracy
case does not depend on the government introducing direct evidence that a defendant was
a knowing participant in the conspiracy; circumstantial evidence can carry the day.”
United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2012). In addition to Ms. Peters’s
own admissions, the circumstantial evidence – including the identification documents in
several names, the ledgers of stolen identity information, and the surveillance photos
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showing the same shirt found in her home – clearly provided sufficient evidence from
which a rational juror could infer guilt. The circumstantial evidence was overwhelming
and pointed only to Ms. Peters, not her husband. Therefore, with deference to the jury’s
verdict, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find
the evidence was sufficient and affirm the judgment of conviction.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
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