UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IRIS C. PAYNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                   No. 99-2094
NORTH CAROLINA HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CA-98-149-5-BO)

Submitted: March 28, 2000

Decided: April 26, 2000

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Marvin Schiller, David G. Schiller, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Charles L. Steele, IV, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & ELLIS,
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina; Keith D. Burns, FAISON &
GILLESPIE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Iris C. Payne appeals the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency (the "Agency")
and dismissal of her employment discrimination complaint. Payne
claimed that she was passed over for a promotion because of her gen-
der in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). On appeal,
Payne contends that the district court erred by finding that she did not
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and that
she did not rebut the Agency's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
for not offering her the promotion. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. See Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 

, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

, 322 (1986). We must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the affidavits, depositions, and attached
exhibits submitted below in his or her favor. See Evans v. Technolo-
gies Applications & Serv. Co., 

, 958 (4th Cir. 1996).

To meet her burden on summary judgment, Payne proceeded under
the proof scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

, 802 (1973). In order to establish a prima facie case, Payne
had to show that: "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) her
employer had an open position for which she applied; (3) she was
qualified for the position; and (4) she was rejected for the position
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation." Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 

, 230 (4th Cir.

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1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

(U.S. Feb. 28,
2000) (No. 99-1092). If Payne succeeded in establishing a prima facie
case, the Agency had to respond by showing a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for not offering the promotion to Payne. Payne
was then required to rebut the Agency's response by showing that the
proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. See 

.

We will assume for the purpose of this appeal that Payne estab-
lished a prima facie case. However, we agree with the district court
that the Agency offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not
promoting Payne and for promoting a male employee. We further
agree with the district court that Payne did not show that the Agency's
proffered reasons for not promoting her were a pretext for discrimina-
tion.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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