Filed: Mar. 12, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT LEONARD AUSTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF VIRGINIA, No. 00-2359 INCORPORATED, t/a Reston Hospital Center, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-00-303-A) Submitted: February 9, 2001 Decided: March 12, 2001 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublishe
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT LEONARD AUSTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF VIRGINIA, No. 00-2359 INCORPORATED, t/a Reston Hospital Center, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-00-303-A) Submitted: February 9, 2001 Decided: March 12, 2001 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
LEONARD AUSTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF VIRGINIA, No. 00-2359
INCORPORATED, t/a Reston Hospital
Center,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-00-303-A)
Submitted: February 9, 2001
Decided: March 12, 2001
Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL
Annette Kay Rubin, Christopher M. Dove, Leesburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. John J. Michaels, Jr., Ronda L. Brown, MCGUIRE
WOODS, L.L.P., McLean Virginia; Mark E. Edwards, Jeanne
Casstevens Thomas, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
2 AUSTEN v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF VIRGINIA
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Leonard Austen was terminated from employment at Reston Hos-
pital Center ("Hospital") after twelve years of service. He claims his
discharge was discriminatory based on gender, that he suffered sexual
harassment due to a hostile work environment, and that his discharge
was retaliatory and a breach of contract. The Hospital counters Aus-
ten was discharged for making repeated crude, sexual, and racial com-
ments at the workplace. The district court granted Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as to the sexual discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation claims. The court dismissed the breach of contract
claim without prejudice, electing not to exercise pendent jurisdiction,
and Austen appealed. We review grants of summary judgment de
novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
863 F.2d 1162,
1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.
Austen was warned that use of crude, sexual, and racial comments
were not appropriate for the workplace. Despite the warnings, Austen
participated in a party for a departing co-worker at the hospital during
which "gag" gifts of a sexual nature were given. Upon learning of this
event, Austen’s supervisor summarily fired him. The female employ-
ees involved in the incident were not terminated.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII,
Austen must prove: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he
was performing satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) similarly situated employees received more favorable
treatment. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 506-10
(1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973); Carter v. Ball,
33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994).
Austen claims he was discriminated against in his termination
because he was male, when the female employees attending the same
AUSTEN v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF VIRGINIA 3
party and bearing more significant responsibility for the gifts were not
terminated. Austen, however, was not similarly situated to these
female employees. He had both more supervisory authority than the
female employees and a record of disciplinary warnings. In addition,
Austen may not bring a claim for sexual harassment because it was
not included in his EEOC charge. See Evans v. Technologies Applica-
tions & Serv. Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Tay-
lor v. Virginia Union Univ.,
193 F.3d 219, 228, 239 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
120 S. Ct. 1243,
68 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S.
Feb. 28, 2000). Additionally, although Austen’s breach of contract
claim is appealable as a final order, see Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar
Workers’ Local Union 392,
10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993),
the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claim.
We therefore affirm summary judgment in favor of the hospital on the
reasoning of the district court. See Austen v. HCA Health Servs., No.
CA-00-303-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2000). We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.
AFFIRMED