Filed: Aug. 31, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6072 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CHRISTOPHER SHANE COLIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Charles H. Haden II, District Judge. (CR-01-209-5; CA-02-1223-5) Submitted: August 1, 2005 Decided: August 31, 2005 Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tracy Wees
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6072 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CHRISTOPHER SHANE COLIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Charles H. Haden II, District Judge. (CR-01-209-5; CA-02-1223-5) Submitted: August 1, 2005 Decided: August 31, 2005 Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tracy Weese..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-6072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER SHANE COLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Charles H. Haden II,
District Judge. (CR-01-209-5; CA-02-1223-5)
Submitted: August 1, 2005 Decided: August 31, 2005
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tracy Weese, Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey
Warner, United States Attorney, John L. File, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Shane Colin appeals from his conviction and
sentence following a guilty plea to a single count of possession of
a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g), 924 (2000). Finding no plain error in the district
court’s imposition of Colin’s sentence under the sentencing
guidelines, we affirm.
Colin submitted an initial brief pursuant to Anders v.
California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). Following the issuance of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738
(2005), Colin filed supplemental briefs in which he argued the
district court’s imposition of sentence violated his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury.
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
manner in which the federal sentencing guidelines required courts
to impose sentencing enhancements based on facts found by the court
by a preponderance of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment.
See
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746, 750 (Stevens, J., opinion of the
Court). The Court remedied the constitutional violation by
severing two statutory provisions, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2005) (requiring sentencing courts to impose a sentence
within the applicable guideline range), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (setting forth appellate standards of
review for guideline issues), thereby making the guidelines
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advisory. United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.
2005) (citing
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-67 (Breyer, J., opinion of
the Court)).
After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate
guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and impose a sentence. If the district
court imposes a sentence outside the guideline range, it must state
its reasons for doing so.
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. This remedial
scheme applies to any sentence imposed under the mandatory
guidelines, regardless of whether or not the sentence violates the
Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 547 (citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769
(Breyer, J., opinion of the Court)).
Because Colin did not object to the district court’s
imposition of sentence, he must demonstrate that any error in the
court’s application of the guidelines constituted plain error.
Id.
at 547-48. To demonstrate plain error, he must establish that
error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his
substantial rights.
Id. Applying this standard, we conclude that
the district court did not commit reversible error either by
establishing a base offense level of twenty-four on account of
Colin’s two prior felony convictions or by enhancing that offense
level by two points on the ground that the offense involved a
stolen firearm.
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First, the district court’s consideration of Colin’s
prior felony convictions in the calculation of his base offense
level does not run afoul of Booker. See
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756
(reaffirming right of district court to consider prior convictions
in the context of application of guidelines); United States v.
Cheek,
415 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that, under the Sixth
Amendment, the fact of a prior conviction need not be submitted to
the jury or admitted by the defendant for it to serve as a
permissible basis for a sentencing enhancement). Nor did the
district court commit reversible error by enhancing Colin’s offense
level by two points on account of its finding that the offense
involved a stolen firearm. While Booker and Hughes dictate a
conclusion that mandatory application of this sentencing
enhancement by the district court was erroneous1 and that the error
was plain, we decline to recognize the error because it did not
infringe Colin’s Sixth Amendment rights. As noted, Colin’s two
prior convictions required the district court to set a base offense
level of twenty-four. Combined with Colin’s criminal history
category of V, this yielded a sentencing range of 92 to 115 months’
imprisonment. Colin’s sentence of 105 months fell squarely within
1
Just as we noted in
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of
course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the
law and procedure in effect at the time” of Colin’s sentencing.
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this range.2 Accordingly, Colin cannot show that the application
of the judicially determined enhancement for an offense that
involved a stolen firearm violated his rights under the Sixth
Amendment.
We likewise conclude that the district court’s
application of a mandatory guidelines scheme does not amount to
plain error. Our review of the sentencing transcript discloses no
evidence that the district court felt constrained by the guidelines
range or that it wished to sentence Colin below that range. See
United States v. White,
405 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2005)
(declining to presume prejudice in the absence of judicial
statements relating to alternative sentence). Accordingly, Colin
cannot demonstrate plain error on the basis of a mandatory
application of the guidelines scheme.
Finding no meritorious issues upon our review of the
record, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel
inform her client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
2
As in United States v. Evans,
416 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005),
for purposes of determining whether Colin’s Sixth Amendment rights
were infringed by the district court’s error, we compare the
sentence imposed on Colin against the guideline range that was
properly determined before that range was adjusted to account for
the three-point reduction in offense level Colin received for
acceptance of responsibility.
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a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may again move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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