Filed: Feb. 28, 2006
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1840 RICHARD E. SUTTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CREE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CA-03-897-1) Submitted: February 23, 2006 Decided: February 28, 2006 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard E. Sutton, Appellant Pr
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1840 RICHARD E. SUTTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CREE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CA-03-897-1) Submitted: February 23, 2006 Decided: February 28, 2006 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard E. Sutton, Appellant Pro..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1840
RICHARD E. SUTTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CREE, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CA-03-897-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2006 Decided: February 28, 2006
Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard E. Sutton, Appellant Pro Se. Kimberly Jo Korando, Zebulon
Dyer Anderson, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT, MITCHELL &
JERNIGAN, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Richard E. Sutton appeals from the district court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of Cree, Inc. and dismissing his
employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2000), Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2000). Sutton alleges that Cree unlawfully
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, age, and gender
when he was not promoted to a position as a Production Supervisor
in the Crystal Growth Department.
Our review of the record and the district court's opinion
discloses that this appeal is without merit. The familiar burden-
shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Sutton’s claims.
We find the district court properly determined that Sutton failed
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he was
not qualified for the position at issue. See Evans v. Technologies
Applications & Serv., Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996).
Specifically, affidavits and supporting documentation established
that a minimum requirement for the position at issue was a Bachelor
of Science in Engineering or other technical degree, which Sutton
did not possess. While Sutton contends he nonetheless was
qualified for the position, his perception of himself, without
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evidence to support it, is not relevant, Smith v. Flax,
618 F.2d
1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980), rather, it is the perception of the
decision maker that is relevant to the determination of whether
discrimination in the selection process occurred. Evans, 80 F.3d
at 960-61. Because Sutton failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, we find that the district court did not
improvidently grant summary judgment to Cree.*
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting Cree’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Sutton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, raised
on appeal, does not provide a basis for appellate relief from a
civil judgment. See Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv.,
785
F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986).
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