Filed: Jun. 01, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1814 MELANIE HIBBITTS; LYNN LOWE; RUBY COFFEY, Plaintiffs – Appellants, v. BUCHANAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; TOMMY P. JUSTUS, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Buchanan County Public Schools; CRAIG STILTNER, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School Board; CLARENCE BROWN, JR., Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County S
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1814 MELANIE HIBBITTS; LYNN LOWE; RUBY COFFEY, Plaintiffs – Appellants, v. BUCHANAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; TOMMY P. JUSTUS, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Buchanan County Public Schools; CRAIG STILTNER, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School Board; CLARENCE BROWN, JR., Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County Sc..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1814
MELANIE HIBBITTS; LYNN LOWE; RUBY COFFEY,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
BUCHANAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; TOMMY P. JUSTUS, Individually
and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the
Buchanan County Public Schools; CRAIG STILTNER, Individually
and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan
County School Board; CLARENCE BROWN, JR., Individually and
in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County
School Board; WAYNE DESKINS, Individually and in his
official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School
Board; WILLIE SULLIVAN, Individually and in his official
capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School Board;
LARRY LOONEY, Individually and in his official capacity as a
member of the Buchanan County School Board; PAUL HAYES,
Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the
Buchanan County School Board,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:09-cv-00073-jpj-pms)
Submitted: May 2, 2011 Decided: June 1, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John P. Fishwick, Jr., Monica L. Mroz, LICHTENSTEIN, FISHWICK &
JOHNSON, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants. William
Bradford Stallard, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Melanie Hibbitts, Lynn Lowe, and Ruby Coffey (“the
Administrators”) appeal the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the Defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006) civil action. This case arose after the Virginia
Department of Education alleged that several students at the
middle school where the Administrators worked had received
inappropriate assistance on the Virginia Grade Level Alternative
Assessment tests. The school superintendent sought to place the
Administrators, who had obtained continuing contract status, on
probation beginning in the 2009–2010 school year. The
Administrators refused to sign the probationary contracts, and
requested a hearing. They then brought suit against the
superintendent, the Buchanan County School Board, and the
individual school board members (“the School Board parties”).
The Administrators alleged that the School Board parties had
violated their property and liberty interests. The
Administrators continued to work and to be paid under the terms
of their 2008-2009 contracts.
After bringing suit in November 2009, the
Administrators signed standard contracts for the 2009-2010
school year. In April 2010, the superintendent wrote letters to
the Administrators informing them that they would be reassigned
to teaching positions for the following year. In light of their
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demotions, the Administrators moved to amend their complaint in
order to add a claim of retaliation and violation of due
process, on the ground that the Superintendent’s letters did not
strictly comply with Virginia law. The district court denied
the Administrators’ motion to amend their complaint and granted
summary judgment in favor of the School Board parties. The
Administrators appealed.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), after
the time for amending a complaint as a matter of course has
expired, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so
requires, id., and should be denied only when the amendment is
offered in bad faith, is prejudicial, or would be futile. IGEN
Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH,
335 F.3d 303, 311 (4th
Cir. 2003).
Virginia law specifically permits a school board to
reassign a tenured administrator to a teaching position with a
salary reduction as long as the administrator receives written
notice and the opportunity to have an informal meeting before
the demotion. Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-294(C), (D) (2006). The
only process guaranteed by the Constitution is notice and a
hearing before termination or deprivation of the protected
property right. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
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532, 542, 546 (1985). Here, the Administrators received written
notice informing them of their demotions and they were given the
opportunity for a meeting prior to their demotions.
Accordingly, because their additional claims were futile, the
Administrators cannot show that the district court erred in
denying their motion to amend their complaint.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549
F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted
only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Conclusory or speculative allegations
do not suffice,” to create such a genuine dispute, “nor does a
mere scintilla of evidence in support of [a] case.” Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment will be
granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We may affirm
a district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the
record. Suter v. United States,
441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.
2006).
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Public employees may have a constitutionally protected
property interest in their employment. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 546 (1985); Andrew v.
Clark,
561 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2009). A Virginia public
school administrator has a protected property right in her
employment once she obtains continuing contract status.
Wooten v. Clifton Forge Sch. Bd.,
655 F.2d 552, 554-55 (4th Cir.
1981). However, although Virginia state law provides certain
procedural safeguards, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
right to property does not guarantee a right to a particular
job, or the right to “perform particular services.” Fields v.
Durham,
909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, because the Administrators cannot point to any
actual government interference with their right to a continuing
contract, they have not shown that their property rights in
their employment status were violated. See Equity in Athletics,
Inc. v. Department of Educ., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 790055, at
*13 (4th Cir. Mar. 8 2011); In re Premier Automotive Servs.,
Inc.,
492 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007); Huang v. Bd. of
Governors of Univ. of N.C.,
902 F.2d 1134, 1141 (4th Cir. 1990).
Further, the Administrators have not shown that their
due process rights were violated because they have not shown
that any state action deprived them of a protected liberty or
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property interest. Equity in Athletics, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, at
*13; Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1990).
We have reviewed the record and find no reversible
error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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