Filed: Apr. 15, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4084 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT SPRINGSTEAD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00061-MSD-FBS-1) Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: April 15, 2013 Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTT
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4084 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT SPRINGSTEAD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00061-MSD-FBS-1) Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: April 15, 2013 Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTTL..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4084
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT SPRINGSTEAD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:11-cr-00061-MSD-FBS-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: April 15, 2013
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD &
MORECOCK, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil
H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Benjamin L. Hatch,
Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorneys, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a two-day bench trial, Robert Springstead was
convicted of eleven counts of distribution of child pornography,
three counts of receipt of child pornography, one count of
possession of child pornography, two counts of receipt of
obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children,
and one count of possession of obscene visual representations of
the sexual abuse of children. He received a 204-month sentence.
On appeal, Springstead contends that the district court
erroneously admitted expert testimony and evidence of a
fictional story Springstead wrote when he was fourteen years
old. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
On appeal, Springstead first argues that the district
court erred in admitting Special Agent Paul Wolpert’s testimony
regarding his forensic examination of Springstead’s computer.
Specifically, Springstead posits that Wolpert lacked the
requisite knowledge and training to explain how the Forensic
Tool Kit (“FTK”) software used in this case was designed and
functioned and that the Government failed to offer testimony
regarding the reliability, peer review, error rate, and
standards of the industry for the software as required by Fed.
R. Evid. 702.
This court reviews the district court’s decision to
admit expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 for abuse of
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discretion. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 273 (4th
Cir. 2007) (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S.
137, 152 (1999)). Pursuant to Rule 702,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify
in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied
the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The district court must be granted
“considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go
about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.” Wilson, 484 F.3d at 273. If an expert seeks to be
qualified on the basis of experience, the district court must
require that he “explain how his experience leads to the
conclusion reached, why his experience is a sufficient basis for
the opinion, and how his experience is reliably applied to the
facts.” Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The district court heard considerable evidence
regarding Wolpert’s education, experience, expertise, and
personal involvement in this case. The district court qualified
Wolpert as an expert in internet and computer forensics, finding
that Wolpert had “the requisite knowledge and training,
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experience, and because of the certification process, there’s
been a method . . . whereby he’s been tested on his familiarity
and ability to operate the [FTK] that he uses in his computer
forensic investigations.”
Having reviewed the record with the appropriate
standards in mind, we conclude the district court’s decision to
qualify Wolpert as an expert did not constitute an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting the process of forensic data extraction
requires “some specialized knowledge or skill or education that
is not in the possession of the jurors”) (quoting Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich,
232 F.3d 200, 203
(4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also United
States v. Ganier,
468 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding
that testimony that would “require [the witness] to apply
knowledge and familiarity with computers and the particular
forensic software well beyond that of the average layperson”
fell within the scope of Rule 702). To the extent Springstead
challenges the reliability of Wolpert’s testimony on the ground
that the district court inadequately considered factors such as
testing, peer review, error rates, and acceptability in the
relevant scientific community, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993), the test of reliability is
“flexible,” and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither
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necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every
case. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141.
Next, Springstead argues the district court erred in
admitting a two-page fictional story Springstead wrote at the
age of fourteen about the sexual encounters of a six-year-old
girl. Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show” that his action on a particular occasion
conformed to that character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such
evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). Further, “[t]o be admissible under Rule
404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue other than
character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” United States v.
Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Rule 404(b) is . . . an inclusive rule,
admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which
tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States v.
Young,
248 F.3d 260, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must
also satisfy [Fed. R. Evid.] 403 . . . ,” Siegel, 536 F.3d at
319, such that its probative value is not substantially
5
outweighed by its prejudicial value. United States v. Queen,
132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). Under Rule 403, “damage to a
defendant’s case is not a basis for excluding probative
evidence” because “[e]vidence that is highly probative
invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.” United
States v. Grimmond,
137 F.3d 823, 833 (4th Cir. 1998). Rule 403
requires exclusion of evidence only where the trial judge
perceives “a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will be
excited to irrational behavior” disproportionate to the value of
the proffered evidence. United States v. Mohr,
318 F.3d 613,
618 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Assuming, without deciding, that the district court
erred in admitting the letter authored by Springstead at the age
of fourteen, we nevertheless conclude that any error was
harmless and does not warrant reversal. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); United
States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2010)
(erroneous admission of prior bad acts evidence under Rule
404(b) subject to harmless-error analysis). Under the harmless-
error standard, we will not reverse if we can “say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error.” Kotteakos v. United States,
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328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); United States v. Brooks,
111 F.3d 365,
371 (4th Cir. 1997). “This inquiry is not whether, absent the
improperly admitted evidence, sufficient evidence existed to
convict. . . . Rather, the inquiry is whether we can say that we
believe it highly probable that the error did not affect the
judgment.” Lighty, 616 F.3d at 356 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
As noted by Springstead on appeal, the thrust of his
defense at trial was that the Government did not produce a
qualified expert to explain when and how child pornographic
images were placed on the hard drive, particularly in light of
Springstead’s denial of any intentional possession, receipt, or
distribution of child pornography. Springstead further argued
that the Government could not produce a witness to testify that
Springstead ever expressed any interest in child pornography or
anyone to testify that he or she saw it on Springstead’s
computer or otherwise in Springstead’s possession. In light of
this failure, Springstead argues, the admission of the letter
was not only erroneous, but prejudicial, requiring reversal.
Contrary to Springstead’s assertions, the Government introduced
significant evidence implicating him in the possession, receipt,
and distribution of child pornography. Therefore, even if the
district court erred in admitting the letter, which we assume
without deciding, we conclude that any error was harmless.
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Last, Springstead raises a cursory claim that the
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to convict him.
This argument is premised solely on the inadmissibility of
Wolpert’s expert testimony and the letter. Having rejected
Springstead’s arguments as to the admission of Wolpert’s
testimony and concluding sufficient evidence exists to support
the convictions, we determine that this claim is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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