Filed: Jul. 14, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-6882 KORY PUTNEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. R. LIKIN, Correctional Officer; J. PHILIP MORGAN, Warden; S. A. WILSON, Correctional Officer; W. SLATE, Correctional Officer; R. WATSON, Assistant Commissioner; J. MICHAEL STOUFFER, Deputy Secretary, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:13-cv-01837-GLR) Argued: Se
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-6882 KORY PUTNEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. R. LIKIN, Correctional Officer; J. PHILIP MORGAN, Warden; S. A. WILSON, Correctional Officer; W. SLATE, Correctional Officer; R. WATSON, Assistant Commissioner; J. MICHAEL STOUFFER, Deputy Secretary, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:13-cv-01837-GLR) Argued: Sep..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6882
KORY PUTNEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
R. LIKIN, Correctional Officer; J. PHILIP MORGAN, Warden; S.
A. WILSON, Correctional Officer; W. SLATE, Correctional
Officer; R. WATSON, Assistant Commissioner; J. MICHAEL
STOUFFER, Deputy Secretary,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(1:13-cv-01837-GLR)
Argued: September 15, 2015 Decided: July 14, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge
Niemeyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in part, dissenting
in part, and concurring in the judgment.
ARGUED: Ruthanne Mary Deutsch, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dorianne Avery Meloy, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, Matthew J.
Greer, Student Counsel, Utsav Gupta, Student Counsel, Appellate
Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney
General of Maryland, Stephanie Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Kory Putney (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to officials at the Western
Correctional Institution (“WCI”) (collectively, “Appellees”) on
his Eighth Amendment claim. After a “shakedown” in his housing
unit, Appellant’s mattress was removed. Although he was
adjudged not guilty of hiding contraband in the mattress, prison
officials did not return his mattress for more than four months.
Appellant claims the deprivation of his mattress caused lack of
sleep, confusion, headaches, backaches, and other infirmities.
Appellees moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment. Although Appellant requested discovery, the district
court construed the motion as one for summary judgment and
granted it without addressing Appellant’s discovery request.
We hold that the district court failed to conduct a
plenary analysis on the objective prong of Appellant’s Eighth
Amendment claim, and it erred in failing to grant Appellant’s
discovery request. We therefore vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
A.
We view the facts in the light most favorable to
Appellant. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793
3
F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015). At all times relevant to this
appeal, Appellant was in the custody of the Maryland Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services and confined at WCI
in Cumberland, Maryland.
In November 2010, Appellant was placed in a WCI
housing unit designated for disciplinary segregation after he
was found guilty of assaulting a correctional staff member (the
“November 2010 incident”). Appellant claims that from November
2010 to February 2011, correctional officers (“COs”), including
Officer S.A. Wilson, deprived Appellant of a pillow and blanket
“as revenge” for the November 2010 incident. J.A. 136. 1
Then, on June 28, 2011, COs conducted a shakedown in
Appellant’s housing unit. During the shakedown, COs searched
the inmates’ mattresses for contraband, usually cutting or
damaging the mattresses. Appellant’s mattress was damaged and
confiscated. 2 Appellees claim that, pursuant to WCI policy, a
copy of which is absent from this record, each inmate whose
mattress had been removed and/or damaged had to either pay for
the mattress, or receive an infraction “ticket” and resolve the
1Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.
2 It appears that Appellant retained his sheets and blanket.
4
matter via a disciplinary hearing. J.A. 137. Appellant chose
the latter course.
On July 1, 2011, Appellant’s disciplinary hearing was
held. He was adjudged not guilty. Appellees claim that a
search of Appellant’s mattress revealed that his mattress
contained a “fishing line,” made out of state-issued bed sheets,
which inmates often use to pass contraband from cell to cell.
See Appellees’ Br. 7; J.A. 64. However, they claim that because
the infraction ticket listed “someone other than [Appellant] in
error,” Appellant was found not guilty. J.A. 92. Appellant, on
the other hand, claims that he “did nothing to the mattress that
was taken from [him] and destroyed.” Id. at 36. Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, we must proceed
under the assumption that he had no contraband in his mattress.
In any event, it is undisputed that Appellant was adjudged not
guilty of any prison rule violation on July 1.
After the disciplinary hearing, having been found not
guilty of any infraction, Appellant asked Wilson for a mattress.
Wilson replied, “[Lt. Rodney] Likin is the reason you don’t have
a mattress and I’m not going to get my ass chewed off for going
against Likin’s orders.” J.A. 137. Appellant claims he also
asked Officer W. Slate for a mattress, and although Slate
“ensured all [other] inmates were provided a mattress,” he
5
“deprived [Appellant of] a mattress as revenge for the November
[2010] incident.” Id.
Despite the fact that Appellant had been adjudged not
guilty, Likin ordered a second infraction ticket to be issued to
Appellant on July 6, 2011. At a hearing on July 11, all charges
underlying that second ticket were also dismissed. During the
July 11 hearing, Slate “spitefully informed [Appellant] that
money [that is, payment for the damaged mattress per the
purported WCI policy] was not the reason [he] was being deprived
[of] a mattress.” J.A. 140. This July 11 second not guilty
verdict was affirmed by Warden J. Phillip Morgan on July 21.
Meanwhile, Appellant “began suffering [from] headaches
from sleeping on cold hard metal.” J.A. 183. He also had lower
back, neck, and hip pain. In a sick-call request form dated
July 11, 2011, Appellant complained, “I am having headaches.
Sound (loud) and bright lights are hurting me. It is worse in
the morning when I wake up. My mind is confused all day.” Id.
at 17. On another sick-call request form dated July 17,
Appellant complained, “[m]y lower back is hurting. My muscles
are tight. My neck is hurting, along my spine . . . .”
Id. at
19. WCI physicians prescribed him Amitriptyline Hydrochloride
(an antidepressant with sedative effects), Ibuprofen, Baclofen
(a muscle relaxer), and Excedrin Migraine. On July 22,
6
Appellant filed yet another sick-call request form, indicating
he was still “suffering from headaches and . . . having trouble
sleeping” and his “neck, back, and head” were in pain. Id. at
23. In a declaration, Appellant later stated that lying on the
“metal [bunk]” made it “hard to sleep,” and when he did sleep,
he did not sleep “well or long.”
Id. at 144-45.
On June 28, 2011, Appellant filed a grievance seeking
the return of his mattress. On July 28 Warden Morgan dismissed
the grievance, explaining, “Your mattress was destroyed as a
result of staff retrieving contraband that you had hidden inside
of it. . . . [Y]ou will be issued a new mattress when
restitution has been made to the institution for destruction of
property.” J.A. 22. Appellant appealed the dismissal of his
grievance, and on October 17, R. Watson, Assistant Commissioner
of Corrections, directed Morgan to give Appellant a mattress,
explaining, “[Appellant’s] appeal has been reviewed and is found
meritorious. The investigation revealed [Appellant was] found
not guilty of the infraction received on 6/28/11 for destruction
of state property and possession of contraband.” Id. at 36
(emphasis supplied).
Appellant received a copy of the order directing
Morgan to give him a mattress, and he presented it to “every
C.O. who would give [him] time”; however, still “none would give
7
[him] a mattress.” J.A. 142. Two Inmate Grievance Officers
visited the facility on November 3 and “made prison officials
give [him] a mattress.” Id. at 11, 142. More than four months
after Appellant was first adjudged not guilty, prison officials
finally complied.
B.
On June 21, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of Maryland.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment. They argued that Appellant was deprived a
mattress only because he refused to pay restitution, he failed
to show any objective injury, and he failed to show that
Appellees had a culpable state of mind. Additionally, Appellees
claimed qualified immunity.
Appellant, still proceeding pro se, filed an
opposition along with a declaration seeking discovery before the
entry of judgment. In the opposition, Appellant claimed that he
was deprived of his mattress because of Appellees’ “malicious
behaviors, motivated by revenge” based on the November 2010
incident. J.A. 120, 123. He further urged that prison
officials were “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” to the injuries he
suffered as a result of this deprivation. Id. at 130 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8
The district court construed Appellees’ filing as a
motion for summary judgment and granted it. Treating
Appellant’s claim as an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim, the district court concluded that Appellees
“were aware that [Appellant] was without a mattress long after
he was exonerated of disciplinary charges related to its
destruction.” J.A. 256. Nonetheless, the district court
granted summary judgment, reasoning that Appellant could not
show an objectively significant physical injury:
[Appellant] maintains that he still suffers
from back pain as a result of sleeping in a
cell without a mattress. Medical records
indicate that Plaintiff was prescribed
Baclofen, Amitriptyline, Ibuprofen, and
Excedrin migraine on July 25, 2011. The
same record, however, indicates that
[Appellant] appeared to be in little to no
distress. There are no medical records
documenting any continued problems with pain
or discomfort during the following months
when Plaintiff did not have a mattress.
[Appellant] claims that he continues to
suffer pain from sleeping on a metal bunk
without a mattress. He does not, however,
forecast evidence which would establish the
injury claimed.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). The district court did
not address Appellant’s discovery request or Appellees’
qualified immunity argument.
9
II.
Appellant maintains the district court erred by, inter
alia, failing to consider the risk of harm posed by depriving
him of a mattress for four months, and by failing to grant his
request to pursue discovery before ruling on Appellees’ motion.
Because we agree that the district court erred on both counts,
we vacate and remand.
A.
We first address Appellant’s argument that the
district court erroneously failed to consider the risk of harm
in its Eighth Amendment analysis. We review the district
court’s legal analysis at summary judgment de novo. See Front
Royal & Warren Cty. Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal,
Va., 135 F.3d 275, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversing grant of
summary judgment where “district court’s analysis stopped
short”).
The Eighth Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane
treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). It “prohibits
punishments which, although not physically barbarous, involve
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or are grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v.
10
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
When an inmate raises an Eighth Amendment claim based
on a prisoner’s conditions of confinement, 3 he must first prove
he experienced a “deprivation of a basic human need [that] was
objectively sufficiently serious.” De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708
F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted) (the “Objective Prong”). Second, the
inmate must prove that “subjectively the officials acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Id. (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted) (the “Subjective Prong”).
On the Objective Prong, the district court concluded
the physical injuries actually suffered by Appellant “do[] not
qualify as . . . significant . . . for purposes of a
constitutional claim.” J.A. 256. This conclusion is
incomplete. By focusing only on the injury Appellant actually
suffered, the court erred by ignoring the risk of harm posed by
depriving someone of a mattress for over four months. We have
made clear that a prisoner can satisfy the objective prong of an
3Appellant attempts to cast his cause of action as an
excessive force claim to this court; however, we decline to rule
on the propriety of this characterization at this stage.
Appellant’s arguments on this point may be presented upon
remand.
11
Eighth Amendment claim by showing this “substantial risk of
. . . serious harm.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th
Cir. 1995); see also Raynor v. Pugh,
817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir.
2016);
De’Lonta, 708 F.3d at 525; cf. Helling v. McKinney,
509
U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“We have great difficulty agreeing that
prison authorities . . . may ignore a condition of confinement
that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering the next week or month or year.”). 4
Therefore, on remand, the district court should complete the
analysis and consider the risk of harm posed to Appellant.
B.
Next, Appellant contends the district court improperly
ruled on Appellees’ motion for summary judgment without allowing
Appellant to conduct discovery. We give district courts “wide
latitude in controlling discovery,” and will not disturb a
district court’s discovery order “absent a showing of clear
4
This court has remanded Eighth Amendment actions in two
recent unpublished decisions, directing the district court to
address the risk of harm analysis. See Webb v. Deboo, 423 F.
App’x 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that the
district court erred by only considering actual injury suffered
and not the risk of harm); Thomas v. Younce, 604 F. App’x 325,
326 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Although Thomas may have
suffered a relatively minor injury to his knee, the risk of more
significant harm from a fall down the stairs (or out of an upper
bunk) is obvious.”).
12
abuse of discretion.” Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d
187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also McCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., Md. Transit Admin.,
741
F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014).
In response to a summary judgment motion, the non-
moving party may present an “affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify
its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The court may then
“defer considering the motion or deny it”; “allow time to obtain
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery”; or “issue any
other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1)-(3). Here,
the district court chose the third path, simply ruling on
Appellees’ summary judgment motion without addressing the
discovery request. We find this to be an abuse of discretion.
1.
First, despite Appellees’ arguments to the contrary,
Appellant’s request for discovery was procedurally sufficient.
We have explained a non-moving party “cannot complain
that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that
party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds
that more time was needed for discovery.” Evans v. Techs.
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996).
Along these lines, Appellees contend that Appellant failed to
13
comply with the formal substantive requirements of Rule 56(d).
They contend Appellant “failed to specify the reasons why he
could not present facts essential to justify his opposition” and
“failed to specify the facts he wished to discover.” Appellees’
Br. 29-30. Appellees’ argument fails both legally and
factually.
We have not insisted on an affidavit in technical
accordance with Rule 56(d) “if the nonmoving party has
adequately informed the district court that the motion is pre-
mature and that more discovery is necessary.” Harrods Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002);
see also Nader v. Blair,
549 F.3d 953, 961 (4th Cir. 2008).
Harrods explains:
[I]f the nonmoving party’s objections before
the district court served as the functional
equivalent of an affidavit, and if the
nonmoving party was not lax in pursuing
discovery, then we may consider whether the
district court granted summary judgment
prematurely, even though the nonmovant did
not record its concerns in the form of a
Rule 56[(d)] affidavit.
302 F.3d at 244-45 (citation, footnote, and internal quotation
marks omitted). This is especially true where, as here, the
non-moving party is proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf.
14
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) (“What
might be a meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant
unversed in the law should not be defeated without affording the
pleader a reasonable opportunity to articulate his cause of
action.”).
And although Appellant’s declaration may not have
mentioned Rule 56 or been filed in technical accordance with
Rule 56(d), Appellant clearly “made an attempt to oppose the
motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.”
Evans, 80 F.3d at 961. In his opposition to Appellees’ motion,
Appellant specifically stated that he had “not yet had access to
discovery” and that it was “difficult for [him] to get
documentation and declarations[,] especially from prisoners and
prison officials from the[] Cumberland region, and prisoners
who[] have been released.” J.A. 119. Further, Appellant’s
declaration, filed as an exhibit to his opposition, stated, “I
need Discovery to uncover information that is essential to my
suit.”
Id. at 147. The declaration delineates nine pieces of
evidence Appellant needs but cannot obtain in order to mount an
adequate opposition, including:
• The names of “[t]he other inmates who
refused restitution but were given another
mattress”;
15
• “[M]edical” evidence;
• “[C]ircumstances” surrounding the “November
3, 2011” return of his mattress;
• The “WCI policy,” which is referred to but
not provided as part of the record in this
appeal; and
• Information regarding “[t]he July 6, 2011
incidents,” in which Likin allegedly ordered
a second infraction ticket to be issued to
Appellant.
Id. at 147-48. Appellant also gave an explanation as to why he
was not more specific: “I fear de[s]cribing what I need because
it may disap[p]ear.”
Id. at 148. This statement should have
indicated to the district court that much of the evidence
Appellant desired was in the custody of the Appellees, against
which Appellant had already made allegations of maliciousness.
Therefore, Appellees’ argument that Appellant’s
submissions were procedurally insufficient is unfounded.
2.
Second, the district court should have, in its
discretion, determined that Appellant was entitled to discovery
before it ruled on Appellees’ motion. Ruling on a summary
judgment motion before discovery “forces the non-moving party
into a fencing match without a sword or mask.” McCray, 741 F.3d
at 483. This is especially true where the information requested
16
is in the sole possession of the moving party, and where the
district court would be otherwise unable to conduct a proper
summary judgment assessment without the requested evidence.
This court has emphasized, “56(d) motions for more
time to conduct discovery are proper . . . where most of the key
evidence lies in the control of the moving party.” McCray, 741
F.3d at 484; see also
Harrods, 302 F.3d at 246–47. In Ingle ex
rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, for example, we held the
district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 56(d)
request where a mother sought videotape evidence, which the
police allegedly kept pursuant to department policy, of a police
chase that ended in her son’s death. See
439 F.3d 191, 193-94
(4th Cir. 2006). We explained, “courts should hesitate before
denying Rule 56[(d)] motions when the party opposing summary
judgment is attempting to obtain necessary discovery of
information possessed only by her opponent.”
Id. at 196-97; see
also Willis v. Town of Marshall,
426 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir.
2005) (concluding district court wrongly denied Rule 56(d)
request where evidence plaintiff sought was “wholly within the
knowledge of” defendant).
Here, essentially all of the evidence Appellant seeks
is in the possession of WCI officials, including the names of
other inmates who refused restitution but were given mattresses
17
back anyway, and a copy of the WCI policy upon which WCI
officials have relied throughout this litigation. This evidence
is not only controlled by Appellees, but also bears on “fact-
intensive issues, such as intent” of the moving party. Harrods,
302 F.3d at 244.
Moreover, we cannot fathom how Appellant can mount a
successful defense -- nor can we fathom how the district court
could properly assess Appellant’s claims -- without the
discovery Appellant requests. Indeed, requests for discovery
are “broadly favored and should be liberally granted because the
rule is designed to safeguard non-moving parties from summary
judgment motions that they cannot adequately oppose.” Greater
Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013) (en
banc);
Ingle, 439 F.3d at 195 (Rule 56 “requires that summary
judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the
opportunity to discover information that is essential to his
opposition.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
supplied)).
For example, on the Eighth Amendment Objective Prong,
the district court noted “there are no medical records
documenting any continued problems with pain or discomfort
during the [] months [after July 25] when [he] did not have a
18
mattress.” J.A. 256. But Appellant was not able to conduct
discovery to access or present additional records, despite the
fact that he requested it. Thus, Appellant was only able to
present evidence of injury from a limited three-week period
after he was first deprived of his mattress. And disputes of
fact remain regarding the extent of Appellant’s injuries: even
as late as February 2014, Appellant alleged that he “still
suffer[s] pain in [his] lower back.” Id. at 146; cf. Pisano v.
Strach,
743 F.3d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of
discretion where non-moving party’s proposed evidence “would not
create a genuine issue of material fact”). We found similar
error where a district court granted summary judgment for prison
officials, faulting the plaintiff-inmate for “not providing any
evidence, other than his own affidavit, to support his
allegations,” when the court had already stayed his earlier
discovery requests.
Raynor, 817 F.3d at 130 (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
As to the Eighth Amendment Subjective Prong, it is
unclear whether the prison’s policy (which, again, is not in the
record) allows for the return of a mattress after a prisoner is
found “not guilty” for any reason. Drawing a reasonable
inference that it does -- indeed, Assistant Commissioner Watson
himself ordered Appellant’s mattress to be returned because he
19
was “found not guilty of the infraction received on 6/28/11 for
destruction of state property and possession of contraband,”
J.A. 36 -- issues of fact remain as to whether the officials
were abiding by their own policy, or rather, were acting in a
deliberately indifferent or malicious manner. Further discovery
would give Appellant the chance to demonstrate how the
“officers’ account . . . conflicts with” his account. Ingle,
439 F.3d at 196. Moreover, whether the policy was applied
uniformly is duly contested, and “[a] course of conduct that
tends to prove that [a prison regulation] was merely a sham, or
that [prison officials] could ignore it with impunity, provides
equally strong support for the conclusion that they were fully
aware of the wrongful character of their conduct.” Hope v.
Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002).
C.
For these reasons, the district court abused its
discretion in failing to grant Appellant’s discovery request.
“Once discovery . . . is completed, the district court may again
consider [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment” or qualified
immunity, “if it deems that to be the appropriate course,”
Ingle, 439 F.3d at 197, keeping in mind that qualified immunity
questions “should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of
20
a litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6
(1987).
III.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we vacate the
district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
21
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment:
The majority remands this case to the district court for
two nonexclusive purposes: (1) to permit the district court to
“consider the risk of harm posed by depriving [Putney] of a
mattress [but not blankets and pillows] for four months,” and
(2) “to grant [Putney] his request to pursue discovery.”
While those purposes may become relevant -- and I do not
disagree with the majority’s discussion given in connection with
them -- they jump over two other essential determinations that
the district court must make before reaching the subjects
identified by the majority. First, the district court must, at
the outset, address the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity,
because such immunity is designed to protect the defendants from
both discovery and trial. Second, the court must, in connection
with the Eighth Amendment claim, determine whether Putney was
deprived of a basic human need, which is a condition precedent
under the Eighth Amendment to conducting an inquiry into the
risk of injury. I will address these two points, in reverse
order, to provide the district court with further guidance when
it reconsiders this case.
22
I
On his conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth
Amendment, Putney contends that, in depriving him of a mattress
(but not blankets and pillows) for a four-month period, prison
officials knowingly failed to provide him with a basic human
need, causing him harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
“cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has construed this clause
to require prison officials to “provide humane conditions of
confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Thus, “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.’”
Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984)). But the Court has noted that “the Constitution does
not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S.
337, 349 (1981). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim that a
prisoner was not provided humane conditions of confinement, the
prisoner must prove “(1) that the deprivation of [a] basic human
need was objectively sufficiently serious, and (2) that
subjectively the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.” De’Lonta v. Angelone,
330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th
23
Cir. 2003) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal
quotations marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also
Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834 (explaining that, to violate the Eighth
Amendment, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in
the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities’” (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347)).
In this case, Putney has so far failed to explain how the
denial of a mattress was anything more than a discomfort, and
the Constitution, of course, does not afford him the right to a
“comfortable” prison. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349; see also
Trammell v. Keane,
338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have no
doubt that Trammell was made uncomfortable by the deprivation of
his clothing, but there is simply no factual dispute regarding
whether the temperature in his cell posed a threat to his
‘health or safety’ of the sort that would disallow summary
judgment in defendants’ favor”). Indeed, when children or young
adults participate in sleepovers or “crash” at each other’s
apartments, sleeping on the floor and using only blankets and
pillows, they do not deprive themselves of a basic human need.
Neither do soldiers on a mission away from their barracks, nor
hikers on the trail. In fact, people have slept without
mattresses from time immemorial, and do so routinely even today,
24
using only blankets and some form of headrest to serve as a
pillow.
Understandably, Putney has not yet advanced any precedent
to support his position that a mattress, on its own, qualifies
as an indisputable life necessity, but this is a matter that
must be explored by the district court on remand. Failing such
support for his claim, Putney would fail, as a matter of law, to
satisfy the objective prong of the test that governs such claims
-- the prong requiring that he show that he suffered an extreme
deprivation of a basic human need. See Strickler, 989 F.2d at
1379 (“Because we conclude that Strickler has not established
the serious deprivation of a basic human need required to
survive summary judgment on his claim of an Eighth Amendment
violation, we need not consider whether Sheriff Waters acted
with an intent sufficient to satisfy the Amendment’s state-of-
mind requirement” (emphasis added)).
II
Even before addressing whether the first prong of an Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim has been satisfied,
however, the district court will have to address the defendants’
claim of qualified immunity, the analysis for which includes
25
whether Putney demonstrated a “clearly established” Eighth
Amendment violation.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(emphasis added) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). The doctrine thus involves two steps: (1) whether
a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at
the relevant time. See Plumhoff v. Rickard,
134 S. Ct. 2012,
2020 (2014). A district court has discretion as to which step
to address first.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability,” and it is therefore “effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Indeed, the “driving force”
behind the doctrine is the “desire to ensure that ‘insubstantial
claims against government officials [will] be resolved prior to
discovery.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)).
26
The Supreme Court has accordingly “repeatedly . . . stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage in litigation.” Id. at 232 (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)).
The majority recognizes that the district court did not
originally address qualified immunity, and it properly indicates
that it be addressed on remand. I only add that, to protect the
defendants from both discovery and suit, it should be addressed
at the outset as a gateway issue.
In addressing the immunity issue, the district court will
have to determine whether Putney demonstrated that prison
officials violated clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable official would have known. See Pearson, 555
U.S. at 231. And to determine whether a constitutional right
was clearly established, he would have to show a violation of
the right that is “particularized” to the circumstances of his
case, such that a reasonable prison official “would understand
that [confiscating Putney’s mattress] violate[d] that right.”
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. “[T]he unlawfulness must be
apparent.”
Id.
Of course, if the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, it would not be necessary for the district court to
reach the Eighth Amendment claim on the merits.
27
