Filed: Jan. 12, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-20310 Summary Calendar _ JUAN SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (H-96-CV-1917) _ December 22, 1998 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Juan Sanchez appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment, dismi
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-20310 Summary Calendar _ JUAN SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (H-96-CV-1917) _ December 22, 1998 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Juan Sanchez appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment, dismis..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________________
No. 98-20310
Summary Calendar
______________________________________
JUAN SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster
General, UNITED STATES POSTAL
SERVICE
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-96-CV-1917)
_____________________________________________
December 22, 1998
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Juan Sanchez appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, dismissing his claim under the
Rehabilitation Act against Defendant-Appellee Marvin Runyon,
Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (the “Postal
Service”).2 Concluding that Sanchez did not timely file his
discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2
William J. Henderson is now Postmaster General and was
substituted for Marvin Runyon pursuant to Fed. R. App. Proc. 43(c).
Commission (“EEOC”) and that the Postal Service is not equitably
estopped from relying on this failure, we affirm the district
court's summary judgment.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In the summer of 1993, Sanchez was employed as a mail carrier
by the United States Postal Service at the Westbrae Station in
Houston, Texas. As a result of a previous knee injury, Sanchez was
on limited duty, sorting mail for delivery. In June 1993, Judy
Mire, the Westbrae station manager, informed Sanchez that she
intended to replace his mail sorter —— a horizontal case —— with a
vertical sorting case. Although Sanchez objected, Mire ordered the
cases switched. Sanchez estimates that his horizontal case was
replaced a few weeks after the initial meeting with Mire.
Sanchez alleges that, because using the vertical case required
him to stand for longer periods of time than did using the
horizontal case, he began to experience problems with his knee.
Sanchez complained to Mire and requested that she allow him to use
a horizontal case. Sanchez asserts that Mire refused to permit him
do so, stating that the Postal Service now mandated that all mail
sorters use vertical cases. Although the exact date is unclear,
the parties agree that this conversation occurred sometime in the
late summer of 1993.
Sanchez was off work from October 1993 to mid-February 1994.3
3
Sanchez alleges that, after Mire refused to replace his
vertical sorting case, his physician “did not want him to return to
work.” The Postal Service asserts that Sanchez left the Westbrae
2
When Sanchez returned to work, he was assigned to the DeMoss
Station, also in Houston. He soon noticed that some of the DeMoss
Station employees were still using horizontal sorting cases.
Sanchez requested that he too be permitted to return to a
horizontal case, but Mire again denied the request. In late March
1994, Sanchez requested an appointment with an EEO counselor. On
April 30, 1994, Sanchez filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming
race, sex, and disability discrimination.
The Postal Service rejected Sanchez’s administrative complaint
on the ground that he had failed to bring the alleged
discriminatory event to the attention of an EEO counselor within
the 45 day period required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Sanchez
appealed the Postal Service’s decision to the EEOC, which
determined that Sanchez had not become aware of the alleged
discrimination in February 1994 when he returned to work at the
DeMoss Station and ordered the Postal Service to process Sanchez’s
administrative complaint as timely filed. When it did so, the EEOC
Administrative Judge found no discrimination.
Sanchez then filed the instant action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).4 He later amended his complaint to
assert a cause of action pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,5 which
Station because he was feeling suicidal and wanted to see his
psychiatrist. No matter what the explanation, while Sanchez was
absent from work, Sanchez’s orthopedic surgeon issued new
restrictions on Sanchez’s work activities and determined that
Sanchez had a 60% disability of the right knee.
4
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
5
29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
3
governs the employment discrimination claims of postal workers.
The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that, by not filing his EEOC complaint within the
specified 45-day period, Sanchez had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Sanchez timely appealed.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court.6
B. Applicable Law
Before an employee can bring suit under the Rehabilitation
Act, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies.7 Under the
EEOC guidelines, an employee must file his complaint with the EEOC
within 45 days of the “discriminatory event.”8 Generally, an
employee’s discrimination suit is barred if he fails to file his
administrative claim in a timely fashion.9 The filing requirement,
however, functions as a statute of limitations, rather than a
6
Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America, 114 F.3d
557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1997).
7
Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 304
(5th Cir. 1981).
8
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).
9
Wilson v. Secretary, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
65 F.3d 402,
404 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If an EEOC charge is untimely filed, a suit
based upon the untimely charge should be dismissed.”) (Title VII
case) (quoting Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n,
932 F.2d 473,
476-77 (5th Cir. 1991)); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (incorporating
Title VII’s requirement that employee exhaust administrative
remedies into Rehabilitation Act).
4
jurisdictional prerequisite, and is thus subject to equitable
modification, i.e., equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.10
In Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co.,11 we recognized three
possible bases for tolling: “(1) the pendency of a suit between the
same parties in the wrong forum; (2) plaintiff’s unawareness of the
facts giving rise to the claim because of the defendant’s
intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOC’s misleading the
plaintiff about the nature of [his] rights.”12 In Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools Division,13 we observed that the second of the
grounds enumerated in Chappell —— the grounds on which Sanchez
relies —— is properly treated as an issue of equitable estoppel,
rather than of equitable tolling, as it focuses on the conduct of
the defendant.14 Whether framed as an issue of equitable estoppel
or equitable tolling, however, Sanchez is not excused for failing
to file his EEOC complaint within the applicable time period.
C. Equitable Estoppel or Equitable Tolling
Sanchez argues that the Postal Service is equitably estopped
from arguing that he failed to file his administrative charge
within the 45-day period because Mire misled him as to the reason
for the Postal Service’s refusal to accommodate his disability ——
10
Id.
11
601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979).
12
Wilson, 65 F.3d at 404 (citing
Chappell, 601 F.2d at 1302-
03).
13
927 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1991).
14
Id. at 878-79.
5
that is, Mire claimed that the switch to the vertical cases was
mandated for all mail sorters when actually some sorters were given
the option of using horizontal cases.15 Sanchez contends that he
was, therefore, unaware of the facts giving rise to his claim
because the Postal Service intentionally concealed those facts.
Sanchez’s argument, however, misses the point. Even accepting
as true Sanchez’s characterization of events —— as we must at this
stage —— Mire did not intentionally conceal the facts giving rise
to his claim.16 Sanchez’s discrimination claim is based on the
Postal Service’s failure to accommodate his disability. The
discriminatory event that triggered the 45-day filing period,
therefore, was Mire’s informing Sanchez in the late summer of 1993
that the Postal Service was unwilling to permit him to continue
using a horizontal sorting case after he reported to her that the
horizontal case was aggravating his knee injury. The reason
proffered by Mire in explaining the Postal Service’s refusal to do
so is immaterial. The Postal Service certainly could not escape
its obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to accommodate
Sanchez’s disability by arguing that the switch to vertical cases
15
The Postal Service denies that Mire misled Sanchez, asserting
rather that Sanchez’s confusion resulted from a misunderstanding
regarding the timing and implementation of the new, phased-in
policy.
16
Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Equitable tolling is appropriate when, despite all due diligence,
a plaintiff is unable to discover essential information bearing on
the existence of his claim.”) (emphasis added).
6
was made pursuant to an agency-wide policy.17 The Postal Service’s
allowing some mail sorters to continue to use horizontal cases
rather than mandating a wholesale replacement of such cases with
vertical cases is irrelevant to the Postal Service’s potential
liability under the Rehabilitation Act. It follows that the Postal
Service’s intentional concealment of those exceptions is not
grounds for equitably estopping the Postal Service from relying on
the 45-day filing period.18
The cases Sanchez cites in support of his argument —— Rhodes,19
Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 20 and Coke v. General
17
See Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding in ADA case that request of employee who
could not meet intermediate deadlines in engineering project
because of fatigue caused by renal failure that employer either
transfer him to position with no such deadlines or alter deadline
policy was not unreasonable as a matter of law); 42 U.S.C. §
12111(9) (stating that under ADA term “reasonable accommodation”
may include, inter alia, modifications of policies); 29 U.S.C. §
794(d) (amending Rehabilitation Act to incorporate standards used
under ADA to determine whether employer has “reasonably
accommodated” employee’s disability); Cf. Johnson v. Gambrinus
Co./Spoetzl Brewery,
116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding under
Title III of ADA, which governs public accommodations, that
requiring brewery to alter its “no animals” policy to permit blind
plaintiff to bring his guide dog on tour constituted reasonable
accommodation).
18
See Pacheco, 966 F.2d at 906 (holding that Hispanic plaintiff
who was terminated for sexually harassing co-workers and who
alleged he was fired because of his race was not entitled to
tolling of statue of limitations despite learning after deadline
that allegedly similarly situated Anglo employee had received
different treatment because relevant “discriminatory event” was his
firing, a decision of which he was given notice at time it was
made).
19
927 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1991).
20
516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
7
Adjustment Bureau21 —— afford him no aid, as each is distinguishable
from the instant suit. In Rhodes, a 56-year-old plaintiff, who had
been discharged, did not file his administrative complaint within
the applicable filing period because his employer told him that (1)
he was being fired because the company was undergoing a reduction-
in-force and (2) he would not be replaced.22 Later, the plaintiff
learned that, in fact, he had been replaced by a younger worker at
a lower salary.23 We concluded that, because the plaintiff had no
reason to suspect that his employer was guilty of age
discrimination until the employer hired a replacement outside the
protected age group, his age discrimination suit was not barred as
untimely.24
Similarly, we held in Reeb that the plaintiff was entitled to
equitable tolling when she delayed filing her administrative
complaint beyond the filing deadline because her employer told her
that the company had terminated her position because of a
“limitation of funds.”25 Approximately six months later she
discovered not only that her employer had not eliminated her
position altogether as it had previously informed her, but that it
had also hired “an allegedly less qualified male employee” to
replace her, thereby providing her with the factual support needed
21
640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1991).
22
Rhodes, 927 F.2d at 880.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 880-881.
25
Reeb, 516 F.2d at 925-26.
8
to allege a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of
sex.26
Finally, in Coke, we held that the defendant employer was not
entitled to summary judgment even though the plaintiff employee had
not filed his age discrimination suit within the statutory period
because the plaintiff had proffered credible evidence that (1) the
defendant employer had repeatedly assured the employee that he
would be reinstated to his former position, and (2) the employee
had reasonably relied on those assurances.27
These distinguishable cases are thus inapposite. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Reeb and Rhodes, Sanchez cannot claim that he learned
of the facts that formed the basis of his charge of an unlawful
employment practice until after the applicable filing period had
passed. As explained above, as soon as Mire informed Sanchez that
the Postal Service was unwilling to accommodate his disability in
the late summer of 1993, he was in the position to file his
administrative charge of disability discrimination, regardless of
the excuse advanced for the failure to accommodate his disability.
He did not do so until April 30, 1994, after approximately eight
months had passed.
Similarly, in contrast to the plaintiff in Coke, Sanchez
cannot assert that he justifiably delayed in filing his complaint
with the EEOC because the Postal Service misled him into believing
that it was on the verge of remedying its allegedly improper
26
Id. at 926.
27
Coke, 640 F.2d at 586, 595-96.
9
employment decision. To the contrary, Mire never stated or implied
that an accommodation was in the offing, consistently rejecting
Sanchez’s requests to use a horizontal sorting case.
In sum, Sanchez is not excused from failing to file his
administrative charge within the applicable 45-day period or from
his resultant failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Once the
Postal Service informed him that he would not be permitted to use
a horizontal case despite the problems it was allegedly causing his
knee, he was aware that the accommodation would be made. This was
the “essential information bearing on the existence of his claim.”28
As the Postal Service’s alleged misrepresentation of its reason for
denying Sanchez’s request is irrelevant to its potential liability
for failure to accommodate Sanchez’s disability, such
misrepresentation cannot serve as grounds for estopping the Postal
Service from asserting the untimeliness of Sanchez’s administrative
complaint.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
28
Pacheco, 966 F.2d at 906-07.
10
