Filed: Aug. 19, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 19, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 00-41272 CHARLES DEAN HOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, versus JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (4:99-CV-109) - Before SMITH, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: IT IS ORD
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 19, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 00-41272 CHARLES DEAN HOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, versus JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (4:99-CV-109) - Before SMITH, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: IT IS ORDE..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 19, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 00-41272
CHARLES DEAN HOOD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(4:99-CV-109)
--------------------
Before SMITH, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to expand the district
court’s grant of a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) to cover a
claim of constructive ineffective assistance of counsel is DENIED
for the following reasons.
In his motion, Hood implicates nine issues:
1. Whether the district court misapplied the
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) harmless error
standard
2. Whether the district court erroneously evaluated the Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) errors under the harmless
error standard
3. Whether the trial court’s Ake violation in refusing to
appoint Hood an independent psychiatrist prior to trial and at
trial was harmless error
4. Whether trial counsel’s failure to adequately preserve and
pursue Hood’s rights under Ake was harmless
5. Whether the trial court’s Ake violation in not directing
Dr. Brooks to assist the defense in preparing for trial was
harmless
6. Whether the Ake violation by Dr. Brooks in refusing to
state his opinion in his report regarding Hood’s future
dangerousness was harmless
7. Whether the Ake violation by Dr. Brooks in refusing to
tell the defense his opinion on Hood’s future dangerousness
except from the witness stand was harmless
8. Whether the Ake violation by Dr. Brooks in failing to
delve into mitigation issues and to provide assistance to
prepare a mitigation defense was harmless
9. Whether the trial court, by forcing Hood to elect between
his constitutional rights, created a constructive ineffective
assistance of counsel requiring automatic reversal1
I
Texas prisoner # 000982, Hood was convicted of the 1989
capital murders of Ronald Williamson and Tracie Lynn Wallace under
Texas Penal Code section 19.03(a)(2) and was sentenced to death.
Hood v. State, No. 71, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 24, 1993)
(unpublished). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal.
Prior to his trial, Hood moved for the appointment of an
independent psychiatrist to assist him in preparing a defense at
sentencing, noting that a particular need existed because, in all
likelihood, his present and future mental condition would be an
issue at trial and, further, that the State would have access to
1
Hood does not brief issues 3-8, stating that they are
premised on the contention set forth in Issue 2, that the Ake
errors were structural, requiring automatic reversal.
2
its own expert.2 At the first hearing on the matter, the trial
court ordered defense counsel to submit a list of psychiatrists
from which the court would appoint one. The trial court reserved
decision on whether the prosecution would be able to receive a copy
of the psychiatric report.
The prosecution moved for a rehearing. At a hearing on that
matter held early in June of 1990, the State requested that either
a neutral psychiatrist be appointed and that the report be made
available to both parties or that the prosecution’s psychiatrist,
if it chose to obtain one, have access to Hood. The defense
objected, arguing that if Hood’s psychiatric report were required
to be shared with the State, he would be forced to choose between
his right to appointment of a psychiatrist and his right against
self-incrimination, because sharing the report with the prosecution
would be tantamount to communicating with the State. The trial
court reserved ruling on that issue.
Immediately after the hearing, however, the trial judge met
with counsel for both parties in chambers. The in-chambers
conference was not recorded; however, the docket sheet indicates
that the trial court granted the defense’s motion as follows: “(1)
Psychiatrist appointed —— information shared by both or (2) [two]
2
At the time of Hood’s offense, Texas law provided that
to impose the death penalty, the jury had to make an affirmative
finding that, inter alia, “there [was] a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2003) (Historical and
Statutory Notes). The jury was further instructed that in
answering the special issues, it should consider any evidence that
mitigated against imposition of the death penalty.
3
psychiatrists [appointed], one of each side’s choice; interview
together —— share information.” The docket sheet then listed
three psychiatrists, one of whom was “Dr. Brooks.”
Later that month, the trial judge signed an order granting
Hood’s motion in part and giving him the option of choosing between
two alternatives. The first alternative ordered the appointment of
Dr. Sidney Brooks to conduct a psychiatric examination to determine
Hood’s future dangerousness and assist the jury in determining the
proper sentence. Under this alternative, Dr. Brooks was ordered to
prepare and file a written report of his findings with the court,
which report would be made available to both parties.
The second alternative ordered that each party designate in
writing one psychiatrist of its choosing before July 13, 1990, for
purposes of conducting a joint interview with Hood. Each
psychiatrist would report only to the party that had designated
him.
This basic order specified that Hood was to file a written
election of one of the two alternatives no later than July 13,
1990, and that if he failed to do so, his motion to appoint an
independent psychiatrist would be denied. The order was signed for
approval by counsel for Hood and for the State.
Although no written election was ever made, Dr. Brooks did
conduct an examination of Hood on July 6, 1990, and submitted his
report to the trial court. Dr. Brooks diagnosed Hood as having
antisocial personality disorder and concluded in relevant part that
Hood “ha[d] demonstrated in the past and [was] likely to
4
demonstrate in the future, particularly when subjected to
provocative circumstances, a propensity to act out his aggressive
instincts upon other persons and/or property.” Dr. Brooks
additionally diagnosed Hood with “[n]europhysiological brain
dysfunction with probable left temporal cortical and deep temporal
limbic brain dysfunction” and offered the opinion that “brain
dysfunctional factors [were] inevitably important and contributory
to Mr. Hood’s personality dysfunction” and “contribute[d] to the
risk of behavioral dysfunction and future dangerousness.”
Dr. Brooks suggested that additional testing would assist
in further evaluating and confirming those clinical findings.
Dr. Brooks was not called to testify at trial, however.
According to the affidavit testimony introduced at Hood’s state
habeas proceeding by his trial co-counsel David Haynes, the defense
had access to Dr. Brooks’s report, but it did not contain the
doctor’s opinion on Hood’s future dangerousness. During the
penalty phase, counsel interviewed Dr. Brooks in a courthouse
witness room in an effort to obtain his position on the issue of
future dangerousness, but Dr. Brooks refused to state his opinion,
except from the witness stand. According to Haynes’ affidavit,
defense counsel elected not to call Dr. Brooks because if he had
testified that Hood was a future danger, it would have been
disastrous to the defense. According to the affidavit testimony of
Hood’s trial co-counsel George Parker, the decision not to call Dr.
Brooks was made “[b]ecause of [his] refusal to provide any
information not contained in his report.”
5
During the penalty phase, the prosecution called two expert
witnesses, both of whom testified that Hood was a sociopath who
would more likely than not be a continuing threat to society.
Immediately before to the close of evidence at the penalty phase,
defense counsel re-urged their pre-trial motion and requested
funding for an independent psychiatrist. Counsel for Hood argued
that the State had the economic ability to hire two experts and
that Hood had been denied such an opportunity, but the trial judge
denied the motion. Based on the jury’s answers to the special
issues, the death penalty was assessed.
Hood filed a state application for post-conviction relief
raising, inter alia,3 the following grounds for relief: (1) The
trial court’s refusal to appoint an independent, confidential
psychiatrist prior to and at trial violated his Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Hood had never
waived his right to such an expert; (2) counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve and pursue Hood’s rights under Ake; and
(3) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
mitigation evidence. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”)
denied the application with written order based on the following
pertinent factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial
court:
1. Hood failed to choose in writing which psychiatric
examination alternative he preferred.
3
Only those claims that he chose to raise in his § 2254
petition are listed.
6
2. Hood agreed to cooperate with Dr. Brooks, even though
counsel had advised him against it.
3. Hood impliedly elected the first option contained in
the trial court’s motion, both by his failure to make a
written election and by cooperating with Dr. Brooks
against the advice of counsel.
4. Before Hood was examined by Dr. Brooks, his legal
rights were explained to him and he appeared to
understand them.
5. Hood waived appellate complaint about not having his
own psychiatrist by failing to exercise the option
offered by the trial judge of being examined by a
psychiatrist of his own choosing.
6. The options set forth in the trial court’s order
satisfied Ake.
7. During the course of trial counsel’s representation,
Hood stopped communicating with them, insisting
on communicating only through counsel’s legal assistant,
Janet Heitmiller.
8. The unsuitability of this arrangement was made clear
to Hood, but to no avail.
9. Counsel met with Hood’s parents to obtain mitigating
evidence; however, counsel’s efforts were hampered by a
lack of cooperation from Hood and members of his family.
10. Hood received effective assistance of counsel.
11. Hood failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that his sentence would have been different but for
counsel’s alleged deficiencies.
Hood subsequently filed the instant § 2254 petition, raising
the following issues: (1) whether his trial court’s refusal to
appoint an independent, confidential psychiatrist to examine Hood
prior to and at trial violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) whether Hood waived his right to
an independent psychiatric expert; (3) whether Hood was denied
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance
7
of counsel at the punishment phase by counsel’s failure to preserve
and pursue Hood’s rights under Ake, by not effectively
communicating with Hood, by failing to request further medical
testing so as to present a mitigation defense, and by allowing Hood
to give a psychiatric interview to Dr. Brooks; (4) whether the
trial court created constructive ineffective assistance of counsel
by forcing Hood to abandon his rights under Ake so as to avoid
self-incrimination; and (5) whether trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance during the punishment phase of trial under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to develop and
present a mitigation defense and by delegating that responsibility
to a legal assistant. The State moved for summary judgment, and
the district court issued a memorandum opinion denying habeas
relief for the following reasons.
Ake Claims
Future Dangerousness
The district court determined that the TCCA’s finding on
direct appeal that Hood had waived his Ake claims by submitting to
an evaluation against the advice of counsel was untenable.4 The
district court found that both the affidavit evidence and Dr.
Brooks’s report supported a finding that counsel misunderstood the
court’s order as requiring Hood to be examined by Dr. Brooks. In
support of this finding, the district court pointed to the fact
4
On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the fact that Hood did not exercise the option afforded him by
the trial court of having a psychiatrist of his own choosing that
would report solely to him meant that he had waived his appellate
complaint that he was denied an independent psychiatrist.
8
that the trial court coordinator had sent a copy of the order to
Hood’s trial counsel and to Dr. Brooks, along with a copy of a
letter to Brooks which stated, “Enclosed is a copy of the Court’s
Order Appointing Psychiatrist to Examine Defendant. Your contact
at the sheriff’s office will be Jim Hamilton, Medical
Officer. . . .” Based on this letter, the district court ventured
that it appeared that the court coordinator mistakenly concluded
that Dr. Brooks had in fact been appointed by the trial court to
examine Hood and, as a result of receiving copies of her letter
with the court’s order, both Hood’s counsel and Dr. Brooks had the
same misunderstanding. The district court found this mistake
understandable, observing that the order was “somewhat ambiguous.”
Based on the affidavit testimony of Janet Heitmiller5
and information in Dr. Brooks’s report, the district court found
that Hood’s counsel believed that he had no right to prevent Hood’s
interview with Dr. Brooks, and that if Hood’s counsel had
understood the order, Brooks would not have gone to the jail to
interview Hood at all, absent an agreement in writing by Hood’s
counsel to the first alternative. The district court further found
that neither the affidavit evidence nor Dr. Brooks’s report
established that Hood was ever informed of his right to refuse to
be interviewed.
In sum, the district court found that Hood’s counsel,
the court coordinator, and Dr. Brooks all mistakenly believed that
5
The district court noted Heitmiller’s attestation that
counsel instructed her to tell Hood not to answer any questions
posed by Dr. Brooks about the crime.
9
Dr. Brooks had been appointed to examine Hood and that Hood had to
submit; and, further, that this mistake was caused in part by the
trial court coordinator’s letter to Dr. Brooks and in part by the
ambiguity of the order. The district court further found that
there was no evidence to support the determination that counsel had
waived the Ake claim by failing to elect in writing to pursue the
order’s second alternative, because the terms of the order
contradicted this reasoning. Counsel never made a written election
and, therefore, under the terms of the order, Dr. Brooks should not
have examined Hood.6
Having determined that the state court’s determination was
unreasonable in light of the record, the district court addressed
the merits of Hood’s Ake claim. The court assumed arguendo that
the alternatives set forth in the trial court’s order violated Ake,
6
Although not relevant to the resolution of the instant
motion to expand the COA grant, we nevertheless note that in
interviews with Hood’s habeas counsel, trial counsel stated that
they saw both alternatives offered in the trial court’s order as
constitutionally impermissible and because they did not want to
waive Hood’s Fifth Amendment rights, they made a purposeful
decision to make no election between the options offered by the
trial court. Moreover, defense co-counsel Parker’s affidavit
states, “The options provided by the Court, after being analyzed by
Mr. Haynes and myself, were found to be options that in my opinion
at the time only made Mr. Hood’s situation worse if he were to
exercise either option.” These statements cast serious doubt on
the district court’s factual finding that counsel misread or
misunderstood the order by reading only its first paragraph and,
therefore, erroneously believed that Hood had to submit to an
examination by Brooks. It is further noteworthy that habeas
counsel did not argue that trial counsel (or Dr. Brooks or the
court coordinator) misunderstood the order; counsel instead argued
that Ms. Heitmiller erroneously informed Hood that he had to submit
to the interview because the trial court had so ordered and that,
for purposes of ineffective assistance, her actions were imputable
to trial counsel.
10
and found that Dr. Brooks’s actions violated Ake, insofar as he (1)
disobeyed the court’s order to state in his report his opinion
whether there was a probability that Hood would commit future
criminal acts, and (2) refused to reveal his opinion on Hood’s
future dangerousness except from the witness stand.7
The district court then assessed whether these errors were (1)
structural, requiring automatic reversal, or (2) trial errors,
requiring reversal only if there was a showing of harm. Citing
White v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1998), the district court
held that the errors were trial errors and should therefore be
analyzed under the harmless error standard. Using White as a
guide, the district court determined that the following non-
psychiatric evidence of Hood’s future dangerousness was so strong
that his future dangerousness would have been a foregone conclusion
in the jury’s mind: (1) Hood had a juvenile conviction for
breaking and entering and was jailed for violating probation; (2)
while in jail, Hood attempted to draw attention to himself on three
occasions by deliberately injuring himself or feigning injury; (3)
at age 19, Hood entered into a sexual relationship with a 15-year
old girl; (4) Hood’s father had grabbed him from behind while Hood
was arguing with his girlfriend’s mother,, and Hood struck his
father and threatened to kill him; (5) Hood would force his 15-year
old girlfriend to have sex with him when she would refuse; (6) Hood
7
The district court additionally found that Dr. Brooks had
violated Ake by not delving into mitigation issues and by not
providing assistance to prepare a mitigation defense; however, the
court noted that Hood’s Ake claim did not encompass the mitigation
issue, and therefore refused to address it.
11
took his girlfriend to Texas from Indiana and told her mother that
he would kill her if she refused to allow him to see her daughter;
(7) after working at Taco Bell for only three days Hood was fired
for fighting; (8) shortly before the murders, Hood raped a
different 15-year old girl who was visiting him and threatened to
kill her if she told anyone; and (9) Hood was “written up” for
fighting with another inmate while in prison awaiting trial on the
murder charge. Based on the strength of this non-psychiatric
evidence, the district court determined that any error in not
allowing Hood to have the benefit of an independent, confidential
psychiatric expert on the issue of future dangerousness, or any
lack of help by Dr. Brooks in preparing a defense on this issue,
was harmless.
The district court next addressed Hood’s claim that trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance at the punishment phase.
The district court rejected Hood’s constructive ineffective
assistance argument, in which he contended that the trial court’s
order rendered counsel’s representation ineffective. The district
court held that its conclusion that any Ake error was harmless
precluded a determination that a deficiency in counsel’s
performance precipitated by the court’s order was prejudicial under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court
also rejected Hood’s contention that counsel should have done more
to preserve the right to an independent, confidential psychiatric
expert. The district court found that as counsel had twice moved
12
unsuccessfully for appointment of such an expert, their performance
was not deficient.
The district court nevertheless found that trial counsel’s
misreading of the trial court’s order, and the incorrect advice
given Hood based on the misreading, constituted deficient
performance. The court added, however, that even if counsel had
correctly read the order and advised Hood not to submit to Dr.
Brooks’s evaluation, the only remaining options for counsel were
either to have Hood submit to a joint interview by psychiatrists
for the state and defense, or to forgo any expert psychiatric
assistance entirely. Thus, the district court held that because
Hood failed to demonstrate that there was a probability that his
sentencing would have been different but for counsel’s failure to
pursue the remaining alternatives, he failed to establish
Strickland prejudice.
Regarding mitigation evidence, the district court rejected the
contention that counsel’s failure to communicate directly with Hood
resulted in a failure to recognize the need to obtain additional
medical testing and an additional expert and, therefore,
constituted ineffective assistance. The district court found that
the opinion Hood claimed might have been obtained from an
additional expert —— that his mental impairments contributed
to his behavior —— was already contained in Dr. Brooks’s report.
The district court identified the “real problem” as the trial
court’s failure to order Dr. Brooks, and Brooks’s own refusal, to
assist defense counsel in preparing and presenting their case in
13
mitigation. The court reasoned that, because counsel should not
have had to pursue an additional expert, the failure to do so did
not constitute deficient performance.
The district court determined, however, that counsel’s
decision to use his legal assistant, Ms. Heitmiller, to investigate
Hood’s background concerning issues of mitigation was deficient
performance. This was because Ms. Heitmiller was not qualified to
conduct such an investigation, and counsel had readily available
the services of a trained, court-appointed investigator.
The district court noted the following new mitigation evidence that
was gathered post-trial: (1) Hood’s family moved often because of
financial and legal trouble; his father served jail time for theft,
made no financial contribution to the family, and was under
investigation for incest; (2) Hood’s mother was raised in an
abusive home and consequently was unemotional to her children and
denied or tolerated her husband’s abuse of Hood and his siblings;
(3) Hood’s father verbally and physically abused him; (4) Hood’s
parents sent him conflicting signals on moral issues; (5) Hood
suffered brain damage at age three after being hit by a truck,
impairing his intellectual and emotional development; (6) Hood was
ridiculed by classmates because of his intellectual impairment; and
(7) Hood manifested emotional and behavioral problems at a young
age, and they appeared to worsen over time. Although it labeled
this “a close question,” the district court nevertheless determined
that there was not a reasonable probability that a juror would have
voted against the death penalty in Hood’s case and, therefore, that
14
he had not shown Strickland prejudice. The district court based
this determination on a comparison of Hood’s facts with those of
the petitioner in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), finding
that the cases were similar but concluding that Williams’s
demonstration of remorse after his crimes “rendered him more worthy
of mercy” than Hood. The court thus found that there was no
likelihood that Hood’s jury would have been swayed by the
mitigation evidence.
Hood’s final ineffective assistance claim —— that counsel was
ineffective for not presenting the above-mentioned mitigating
evidence to Dr. Brooks —— was also rejected by the district court.
It determined that even if counsel had performed competently by
showing Dr. Brooks the mitigating evidence, there was still no
reasonable probability that the result of the penalty-phase
proceedings would have been different. The court so concluded
because the trial judge’s order did not direct Dr. Brooks to
provide such assistance, and Dr. Brooks acted in conformity with
what he believed the order required, i.e. an impartial psychiatric
evaluation.
Finally, the district court rejected Hood’s contention that
the cumulative effect of his trial errors rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. The district court found that the
combination of the trial court’s Ake error in not ordering Dr.
Brooks to assist the defense on the issue of Hood’s future
dangerousness, and of counsel’s failure to present more extensive
evidence in mitigation, did not have a substantial or injurious
15
effect on the jury’s verdict. The district court based this
determination on “the very strong non-psychiatric evidence of
future dangerousness, the double-edged nature of the mitigating
evidence,8 and Hood’s lack of either remorse or rehabilitation.”
The district court granted the State’s motion for summary
judgment and denied Hood’s petition for habeas relief. Hood filed
a timely notice of appeal and moved to amend the judgment and,
alternatively, for a new trial. He also moved for a COA.
The district court granted Hood a COA on the following issues:
(1) Whether Hood’s counsel’s misreading of the trial court’s order
regarding the psychiatrist examination, and delegating to an
untrained legal assistant the investigation into potential
mitigating evidence, created a reasonable probability that the
result of his punishment hearing would have been different had
counsel’s performance been adequate, and (2) whether the
combination of the violations of Hood’s rights under Ake and his
counsel’s deficient performance had a substantial and injurious
effect on the jury’s decision, thereby depriving him of a fair
trial. COA was denied on all other claims, and the district court
denied Hood’s post-judgment motion.
II
We may not grant a COA unless the applicant makes a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
8
The district court recognized that the mitigating evidence
of Hood’s mental impairment would be a “double-edged sword,”
because, despite reducing his moral culpability, it also would have
increased the probability of his future dangerousness.
16
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “The COA determination under § 2253(c)
requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a
general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.
Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). We look to the district court’s application
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the
petitioner’s constitutional claims and asks whether the district
court’s resolution of those claims was debatable among jurists of
reason.
ISSUE 1: Whether the district court misapplied the Brecht harmless
error standard
Hood argues that in reviewing the harmlessness of the
trial errors, the district court used the wrong standard when
it assessed whether there was a “‘reasonable probability’” that the
result of the punishment phase would have been different but for
the errors. Relying on Brecht and Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017,
1027 (5th Cir. 1996), Hood contends that the district court was
required to ask instead whether there was “‘more than a mere
possibility’” that the error contributed to the verdict. Noting
that the district court found the issue whether the penalty
proceedings would have been different a “‘close question,’” Hood
argues that he is entitled to relief under the “more than a mere
possibility” standard. He further contends that under the “more
than a mere possibility” standard, the cumulative impact of the
trial errors requires a finding of harm.
17
Brecht held that constitutional errors that do not require
automatic reversal would be assessed on collateral review under the
harmless error standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750 (1946). 507 U.S. at 623. Under that standard, the error
must have “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict” for the petitioner to obtain habeas
relief.
Id. In Woods, we reasoned that, under Brecht, a defendant
is not entitled to relief “unless there is more than a mere
reasonable possibility that [the constitutional trial error]
contributed to the
verdict.” 75 F.3d at 1026. We noted further that
the Brecht standard does not require the petitioner to prove by the
more demanding “reasonable probability” standard that, absent the
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id.
at 1027 (citing Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995); see also
Barrientes v. Johnson,
221 F.3d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the “reasonable probability” standard is more demanding than
the Brecht harmless error standard).
Hood asserts that the district court erroneously held him
to the more demanding “reasonable probability” standard when it (1)
evaluated the harmlessness of the Ake errors, (2) evaluated the
prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
and (3) evaluated the effect of the cumulative error. The record,
however, does not support Hood’s assertion that the district court
applied the “reasonable probability” standard when evaluating the
Ake claims. Based on its summary of the non-psychiatric evidence
of Hood’s future dangerousness, the district court held that Hood’s
18
future dangerousness would have been a foregone conclusion in the
mind of the jury, so that any Ake error was harmless. Further, the
district court correctly identified the Brecht standard, and no
where in this portion of its opinion does the court use the words
“reasonable probability.”
Additionally, the Brecht standard was inapplicable to Hood’s
ineffective assistance claims. Instead, the district court was
required to evaluate whether “there [was] a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
(emphasis added). The court thus applied the appropriate standard
when determining whether counsel’s errors were prejudicial. The
district court concluded that there was not a “reasonable
probability” that the result of Hood’s penalty proceeding would
have been different. See also
Barrientes, 221 F.3d at 756 (noting
that “Strickland claims utilize the more demanding ‘reasonable
probability’ standard”).
Finally, the district court reviewed Hood’s claim of
cumulative error under the Brecht standard and determined that
counsel’s failure to introduce the psychiatric and the mitigating
evidence would not have substantially or injuriously influenced the
verdict. There is no support in the record for Hood’s contention
that the district court applied the “reasonable probability”
standard to this claim.
19
Based on the foregoing arguments, Hood has not demonstrated
that the district court’s resolution of these constitutional claims
was debatable.
ISSUE 2: Whether the district court erroneously evaluated the Ake
errors under the harmless error standard
Hood insists that the district court erroneously classified
the Ake errors as “trial” errors (which are properly evaluated
under the harmless error standard), when the errors were in fact
“structural” and, therefore, required automatic reversal. Relying
on our decision in White, Hood contends that a defendant who makes
a showing that his mental condition could have been a significant
mitigating factor and then suffers an Ake error has suffered a
structural error. He further notes that the TCCA has held that Ake
error is not subject to a harmless error analysis and, further,
that in Ake, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded without
conducting a harmless error analysis.
Whether a constitutional error is reviewed for harmless error
depends on whether the error is characterized as “trial error”
or “structural error.” White, 153 F.3d at 201. “Trial error”
occurs during the presentation of the case and is subject to a
harmless error analysis because “it ‘may . . . be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order
to determine [the effect it had on the trial].’”
Id. (quoting
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629). “Structural error,” however, “‘affect[s]
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply
20
an error in the trial process itself’” and is therefore not subject
to the harmless error analysis. Id. at 201-02 (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).
In Ake, the Supreme Court held in relevant part that when the
state presents psychiatric evidence on the issue of a capital
defendant’s future dangerousness for purposes of establishing an
aggravating factor to be considered at sentencing, due process
requires that the defendant be afforded access to a psychiatric
examination on relevant issues, to psychiatric testimony, and
to assistance in preparation at the penalty phase. 470 U.S. at 83-
84. After determining that Ake suffered due process violations
when he was denied the assistance of a psychiatrist, the Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 86-87.
The Court has never held definitively, however, that Ake error
is structural. See Briseno v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 204, 210-11 (5th
Cir. 2001) (recognizing same). Indeed, in Tuggle v. Netherland,
516 U.S. 10, 14 (1995), the Court remanded for a determination
“whether, or by what procedures, the sentence might be sustained or
reimposed” in light of an Ake error, specifically noting that
neither the state court nor the Court of Appeals had addressed the
applicability of the harmless error analysis.
A federal habeas petitioner must establish that he is
entitled to relief under “clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 381.
Consequently, the absence of Supreme Court authority on this issue,
21
in addition to the fact that the district court’s use of the
harmless error analysis was not inconsistent with other Supreme
Court precedent, precludes a finding that the district court’s
resolution of the constitutional claim was debatable. Cf. Ledford
v. Thomas, 275 F.3d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 2001) (absence of Supreme
Court precedent on point precluded finding that state court’s
adjudication involved an unreasonable application of federal law),
cert. denied,
536 U.S. 927 (2002).
Furthermore, because relief must be established under federal
law, Hood’s contention based on Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 346
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that Ake error cannot be evaluated
for harm), that the TCCA has held Ake error to be structural, is
irrelevant. Citing the absence of an explicit statement from the
Supreme Court on this issue, we have concluded that Rey’s holding
has been overruled by Cain v. State,
947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997),9 which held that “[e]xcept for certain federal
constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as
‘structural,’ no error . . . is categorically immune to a harmless
error analysis.”
Briseno, 274 F.3d at 210-11 (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting
Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264) (emphasis added).
Finally, we have squarely addressed this issue and have held
that Ake errors are subject to harmless error review. White, 153
F.3d at 201 (“Three other circuits have expressly concluded that
Ake error is subject to harmless-error analysis, and we now join
9
Cain was superseded by statute on other grounds by Aguirre-
Mata v. State, 992 S.W.2d 495, 497-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
22
them.”). Hood urges that White limited the application of harmless
error review to cases in which a defendant failed to make a showing
that his mental condition could have been a significant mitigating
factor, leaving unanswered the question whether a defendant who
makes a proper showing and then suffers an Ake violation has
suffered a “trial” or “structural” error. Hood reads White too
narrowly; but even assuming arguendo that White did not foreclose
a determination that Ake error is structural when a defendant has
established to the state trial court that his mental condition
could have been a significant mitigating factor, Hood failed to
make such a showing. Like White, Hood argued that he was entitled
to the appointment of a psychiatrist only because the State
intended to present its own psychiatric testimony; he made no
showing that he was entitled to a psychiatrist on any other basis.
White, 153 F.3d at 204. White held such a showing insufficient to
establish that any purported Ake error was structural. See
White,
153 F.3d at 203-04 (holding that showing of an entitlement to
psychiatric assistance on the sole basis that the State intended to
present expert testimony was subject only to harmless error
review.).
In light of the foregoing, Hood has not demonstrated an
entitlement to a COA on this issue.
23
ISSUES 3-8: Whether the specified Ake errors require
automatic reversal
Hood does not brief issues three through eight; he instead
states that each is premised on his contention that the district
court erroneously evaluated the Ake error under the harmless error
standard. As just noted, however, Hood has not demonstrated that
the propriety of the district court’s application of the harmless
error standard is debatable. Therefore, he has also failed to
demonstrate entitlement to a COA on issues three through eight.
ISSUE 9: Whether the trial court, by forcing Hood to elect between
his constitutional rights, created a constructive
ineffective assistance of counsel requiring automatic
reversal
Hood contends that the state trial court’s order appointing
a psychiatrist assured that defense counsel’s assistance would
be ineffective. He argues that the alternatives provided defeated
the adversarial nature of the proceedings, inasmuch as the common
thread to each alternative was that the State would receive
full disclosure. Hood asserts that the district court’s
determination that he established no Strickland prejudice as a
result of this error was based on the court’s erroneous
determination that the Ake errors were harmless trial errors rather
than structural errors and, therefore, that he is necessarily
entitled to a COA on this issue as well.
As a prefatory matter, we note that the issue whether Hood
exhausted his “constructive” ineffective assistance claim was
24
raised in the district court. In his § 2254 petition, Hood
contended that “the facts and argument set forth in this Claim were
presented to the State habeas court as part of Claims 1 and 2.”
The State argues, however, that Hood presented this claim for the
first time in his federal habeas proceedings and that it was
therefore procedurally barred. The district court did not address
the State’s procedural bar contention, instead disposing of the
claim on its merits.
A review of the state habeas application reveals that
this “constructive” ineffective assistance claim was not raised and
therefore was not exhausted. See Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409,
420 (5th Cir. 1997) (exhaustion requirement is not met merely
because the facts necessary to support the federal claim were
before the state court). When a claim is unexhausted and therefore
procedurally barred, however, it may nevertheless be denied on the
merits. Smith v. Cockrell,
311 F.3d 661, 684 (5th Cir. 2002).
Hood would be precluded from raising his “constructive” ineffective
assistance claim in the state courts under Texas’s abuse of the
writ doctrine, because he has cited no cause for his failure to
raise this claim in his state habeas application. It is therefore
procedurally barred. See
Nobles, 127 F.3d at 423.
Notwithstanding the applicability of procedural bar, however,
we find that this claim fails on its merits, because it hinges on
Hood’s contention that he is entitled to a COA on the issue whether
Ake errors are structural. As previously discussed, in the absence
of clearly established Supreme Court law holding that Ake errors
25
are structural, Hood cannot demonstrate an entitlement to a COA on
that issue. Therefore, he is not entitled to a COA on his
constructive ineffective assistance claim. In addition, White
supports the district court’s determination that, because the Ake
error was harmless, Hood was precluded from establishing Strickland
prejudice. See 153 F.3d at 208; R. 2, 499.
III
Hood has not established an entitlement to a COA on any of the
issues raised herein, and, therefore, his motion to expand the COA
grant is
DENIED.
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