Filed: Jan. 17, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-40944 Summary Calendar _ DEBORAH L. BRITTAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus TRANE AMERICAN STANDARD, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No.: 6:01-CV-540 _ January 17, 2003 Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Deborah L. Brittain appeals the dismissal of her action against her employer, Trane American Standard. We AFFIRM. I Bri
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-40944 Summary Calendar _ DEBORAH L. BRITTAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus TRANE AMERICAN STANDARD, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No.: 6:01-CV-540 _ January 17, 2003 Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Deborah L. Brittain appeals the dismissal of her action against her employer, Trane American Standard. We AFFIRM. I Brit..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-40944
Summary Calendar
_____________________
DEBORAH L. BRITTAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TRANE AMERICAN STANDARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No.: 6:01-CV-540
_________________________________________________________________
January 17, 2003
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Deborah L. Brittain appeals the dismissal of her action
against her employer, Trane American Standard. We AFFIRM.
I
Brittain was employed by Trane. After being absent from work
since October 1999, Brittain was discharged by Trane on May 5,
2000.
Brittain, proceeding pro se, filed her complaint using a form
provided by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas entitled “Complaint Under Title VII of the Civil
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Rights Act of 1964.” Paragraph 8 of the complaint form contains
blanks labeled “race,” “color,” “sex,” “religion,” and “national
origin,” for the plaintiff’s use in indicating the basis of the
alleged discrimination. It also contains blanks for the plaintiff
to indicate the adverse employment action taken by the employer.
Brittain checked the blank beside “terminated plaintiff’s
employment,” but did not check any of the blanks for race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. Paragraph 9 of the form
complaint provides space for the plaintiff to describe the
circumstances of the alleged discrimination. Brittain’s
allegations of discrimination consisted of the following:
Invasion of Privacy Act. Taking Information
from Computer Manually Cutting off Benefits
Before Time was up. Not offering FMLA time.
Breaking Department of Labor Laws. Not
excepting Letter of explaination from Dr. and
a release form. Also Not taking An Unknown
date of return on a 44 wk. (S&A) Sickness and
Accident Benifits[.]
Paragraph 11 of the form complaint states that the charges filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “are submitted as
a brief statement of the facts supporting this complaint.”
Included among the documents attached to the complaint was a copy
of Brittain’s EEOC charge, in which she stated that she “was
terminated on May 5, 2000, due to my disability” and that she
believed she had “been discriminated against because of disability
in violation of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, as
ameneded [sic].”
2
Also attached to the complaint was Brittain’s application for
a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In that
application, Brittain stated that her disability began December 23,
1999. The portion of the form completed by her health care
provider stated her diagnosis as “recurrent sinusitis and
bronchitis” and stated further that the date she could return to
work was unknown.
Also attached to the complaint was a copy of a letter dated
July 12, 2000 (over two months after Brittain’s discharge) from
Brittain’s physician to Trane’s Personnel Department. In that
letter, Brittain’s physician stated that Brittain “had been
chronically ill with a hysterectomy in October of [19]99, followed
by persistent chronic sinusitis, very slow to resolve through March
of 2000,” that she had suffered from urinary incontinence on an
ongoing basis. He stated further that the primary reason for
Brittain’s absence from work from March through June 2000 was
psychiatric, as she suffered from anxiety and depression. In
addition, Brittain attached to the complaint a copy of a letter
written by her psychiatrist on June 11, 2001. The psychiatrist
stated in that letter that he had been treating Brittain since
December 27, 2000 for depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder.
Trane moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule
3
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for a more definite
statement. On February 5, 2002, the district court ordered
Brittain to file, within twenty days, an amended complaint stating
a cause of action, and to notify the court of the reason she failed
to timely file suit. The court warned Brittain that failure to
comply with either of those orders would result in the dismissal of
her action. In response, Brittain filed a handwritten document
entitled “Amended Complaint,” in which she stated:
In Response to your letter asking for Amended
Complaint to Civil Action No. 6:01CV540.
Complaint is Title VII the Americans with
disabilities Act. By my calculations your
honor the Right to sue letter was sent on Aug.
23, 2001 So from that day it was to be filed
by Nov. 27, 2001. I filed on Nov. 20, 2001 at
3:53 P.M. that was in the 90 day period of
filing the Civil Action Against Trane American
Standard. I have filed the Alleged Title VII
Act of a disability in this Civil Action to
the best of my knowledge in a appropriate time
frame. I have sent the letters and the
Dismissal Notice of Rights in With All the
other things that was filed on Nov. 20,
2001[.]
A copy of Brittain’s original complaint, including the attachments,
was attached to Brittain’s “Amended Complaint.”
In an order entered on May 16, 2002, the district court noted
that Brittain’s letter adequately addressed the issue of the
timeliness of her suit, but that her letter “wholly fails to comply
with the court’s order that she file an amended complaint stating
a cause of action.” Accordingly, the district court dismissed
4
Brittain’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Brittain filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
On appeal, Brittain is represented by counsel. Relying on the
EEOC charge attached to her original complaint, Brittain argues
that her original complaint stated a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. She also argues that she complied with the
district court’s order to file an amended complaint. Finally,
Brittain argues that, because she was proceeding pro se in the
district court, her complaint should have been construed liberally.
A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
[her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “In analyzing the complaint, we will
accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
2002 WL 31600862, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec.
5
9, 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We will
not, however, accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted
deductions of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk,
291
F.3d 336, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (“conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to
prevent dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”). Although we construe pro
se complaints liberally, such complaints nevertheless “must set
forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.”
Johnson v. Atkins,
999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).
Brittain’s original complaint did not comply with the simple
requirements of Rule 8(a), because it failed to give Trane fair
notice of her claims and the grounds upon which they rest. See
Sorema, 534 U.S. at 514. Brittain’s complaint includes references
to Title VII, the “Invasion of Privacy Act,” “Department of Labor
Laws,” and the “FMLA” (Family Medical Leave Act). In addition, it
contains vague allegations regarding the denial of sickness and
accident benefits. The EEOC charge attached to the complaint
contains only conclusory allegations that Trane terminated
Brittain’s employment in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Other attachments to the complaint seem to
allege violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. It is unclear
what Brittain is attempting to allege in her vague references to
“Taking Information from Computer Manually,” “Cutting off Benefits
6
Before Time was up,” “Not excepting Letter of explaination from Dr.
and a release form,” and “Not taking An Unknown date of return on
a 44 wk. (S&A) Sickness and Accident Benifits[.]” In contrast, the
plaintiff in Sorema alleged that he was discharged because of his
national origin in violation of Title VII and because of his age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 534 U.S. at
514. In addition, “[h]is complaint detailed the events leading to
his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and
nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved
with his termination.”
Id.
Despite the district court’s warning to Brittain that her
complaint would be dismissed unless she filed an amended complaint
stating a cause of action, she merely attached a copy of her
original complaint to a handwritten letter to the district court
entitled “Amended Complaint.” Neither the original complaint nor
Brittain’s letter to the district court contain coherent
allegations giving Trane fair notice of the basis for her claims.
Brittain does not contend that the district court should have
allowed her another opportunity to amend her complaint prior to
dismissing it with prejudice. In any event, although Brittain is
represented by counsel on appeal, her appellate brief contains no
indication that she could prove any set of facts in support of her
claim that would entitle her to relief, even if she were given
another opportunity to amend her complaint.
7
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court
did not commit reversible error in dismissing Brittain’s complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The judgment of the district court is, therefore,
A F F I R M E D.
8
