Filed: Jun. 28, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 28, 2005 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-41286 Summary Calendar ALVIN CHARLES DUNCAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus O. PEREZ, Garza West Unit; BALLARD, Unit Health Administrator, Garza West Unit; WALLACE, Chief of Classification, Garza West Unit, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:04-CV-377 Before
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 28, 2005 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-41286 Summary Calendar ALVIN CHARLES DUNCAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus O. PEREZ, Garza West Unit; BALLARD, Unit Health Administrator, Garza West Unit; WALLACE, Chief of Classification, Garza West Unit, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:04-CV-377 Before G..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 28, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41286
Summary Calendar
ALVIN CHARLES DUNCAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
O. PEREZ, Garza West Unit;
BALLARD, Unit Health Administrator,
Garza West Unit; WALLACE, Chief of
Classification, Garza West Unit,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:04-CV-377
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Alvin Charles Duncan, a prisoner of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against three employees of the facility
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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where he was temporarily incarcerated. Duncan, who is suing the
three defendants in their individual capacities, alleged in his
complaint that his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when he was ordered to surrender a blood
sample for inclusion in a DNA database. The district court, before
the defendants were ever served, adopted the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and sua sponte dismissed
Duncan’s suit with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim. Duncan appeals and we affirm.
Duncan, while on parole from confinement under a prior Texas
felony conviction, was convicted in a Texas court in June 2002 of
burglary of a building on or about September 27, 2001, and was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, and his parole was revoked
and he was returned to the Texas prison system. As part of his
readmission to the Texas prison system, he underwent a mandatory
physical exam, including an ordinary blood test required under
Texas law for the purpose of maintaining a DNA database. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.148(a) (as effective September 1, 2001).
Duncan initially refused to submit to the blood test but relented
when he was told that his blood would be taken by force.
We review a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de
novo under the same standard used for FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Hart
v. Harrison,
343 F.3d 762, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2003). To state a
claim in an individual capacity suit under section 1983, a claimant
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must allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional
right by a person acting under color of law. See, e.g., Saucier v.
Katz,
121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
Duncan has not alleged the violation of any constitutional
right, much less a clearly established one. As a preliminary
matter, to the extent that any constitutional claim exists, it is
solely by way of the Fourteenth Amendment because Duncan has sued
state actors. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver,
114 S. Ct. 807, 832
n. 28 (1994). His Fourth Amendment claim, as incorporated by the
Fourteenth, fails because the collection of blood from prisoners
for a DNA database is constitutional. Groceman v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice,
354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasquez v. Woods,
329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003). His Fifth Amendment claim fails
because it merely duplicates his Fourteenth Amendment claim. His
Eighth Amendment claim, as incorporated by the Fourteenth, fails
because there is no allegation in his complaint that his blood was
extracted as an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Wilson v. Seiter,
111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991) (quotation marks,
citation, and emphasis omitted). Blood tests “involve[s] virtually
no risk, trauma or pain.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989). Finally, his Fourteenth Amendment
claim fails because the allegations of his complaint cannot
plausibly be characterized as anything other than a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, which, as just noted, is not a viable claim.
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The district court’s dismissal constitutes a strike for the
purposes of the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
See generally Adepegba v. Hammons,
103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
Duncan is cautioned that once he accumulates three strikes he will
not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action
or appeal while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility
unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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