USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1101
BERENICE MARY GORCZAKOSKI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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No. 93-1108
BERENICE MARY GORCZAKOSKI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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Berenice Mary Gorczakoski on brief pro se.
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Donald R. Livingston, General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams,
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Associate General Counsel, Lorraine C. Davis, Assistant General
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Counsel, and Jennifer S. Goldstein, Attorney, Equal Employment
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Opportunity Commission, on brief for appellee, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
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August 9, 1993
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Per Curiam. In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff
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Berenice Mary Gorczakoski appeals from two district court
orders dismissing her complaints. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in each instance.
I. No. 93-1101
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In May 1988, plaintiff was terminated from her long-time
position as ticket agent with Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
(Eastern). She thereafter filed charges against Eastern with
both the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD) and the EEOC, alleging discrimination on account of
sex, national origin and handicap. In August 1991, following
an investigation, an MCAD commissioner found a lack of
probable cause to support plaintiff's allegations. That
determination was affirmed on administrative appeal the
following month. Likewise, the EEOC's Boston Area Director
issued a determination letter on May 14, 1992, finding that
plaintiff's allegations were unsupported and advising her of
her right to file a private action against Eastern.
Plaintiff responded by filing the instant suit for
damages, not against Eastern, but against the EEOC itself.1
She alleged that the EEOC handled her charge of
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1. At the district court's direction, plaintiff later filed
an amended complaint naming Eastern as a codefendant.
Eastern then reported that it had filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition in March 1989 and was therefore protected
by the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1). As a
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result, plaintiff's claims against Eastern were not addressed
below.
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discrimination in a deficient manner--particularly by failing
to conduct an independent investigation and failing to
monitor the MCAD. The district court granted the EEOC's
unopposed motion to dismiss, determining that plaintiff had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
This determination was plainly correct.
It is well established that Congress has not authorized-
-either expressly or impliedly, either in Title VII or
elsewhere--"a cause of action directly against the EEOC for
misprocessing of claims asserted against third-party
employers." Scheerer v. Rose State College, 950 F.2d 661,
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662-63 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts have "uniformly"
so held), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2995 (1992); accord, e.g.,
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McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1984);
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Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 312-14 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
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denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984); Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d
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765, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1979). Likewise, we have held that any
mishandling by the EEOC of a Title VII claim does not give
rise to a Bivens implied right of action under the Fifth
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Amendment. See Francis-Sobel v. University of Maine, 597
___ _____________ ____________________
F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979);
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cf. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108-09 (1st Cir.)
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(alleged irregularities in handling of complaint by state
antidiscrimination commission did not implicate due process
interest), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 948 (1992). Instead, the
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ability to pursue de novo judicial proceedings under Title
VII against the party allegedly engaged in discrimination was
intended to be "the all-purpose remedy for charging parties
dissatisfied with the EEOC's handling of their charge." Hall
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v. EEOC, 456 F. Supp. 695, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quoted in
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Ward, 719 F.2d at 314).
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As mentioned, plaintiff has filed claims directly
against Eastern, but they are subject to the automatic stay
arising from Eastern's bankruptcy petition. Absent interim
relief from the bankruptcy court, pursuit of those claims
must await the lifting of the stay.2
II. No. 93-1108
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At the root of this appeal is the denial by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (DPW) in 1991 of
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2. We need not reach, and therefore do not decide, whether
the filing of the complaint against Eastern was itself
violative of the automatic stay. Likewise, we do not decide
whether the pendency of the claims against Eastern renders
the district court order non-final, such that (absent a Rule
54(b) certification) appellate jurisdiction would be lacking.
To the extent that those claims are without legal effect,
see, e.g., Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp., 990 F.2d 905,
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908 (6th Cir. 1993) ("by operation of the automatic stay, the
commencement of plaintiffs' action, whether void or voidable,
did not take place until the stay was lifted"), it would seem
that our jurisdiction would be unaffected. Yet we bypass the
matter, taking refuge in the "familiar principle that where
an appeal presents a difficult jurisdictional issue, yet the
substantive merits underlying the issue are facilely resolved
in favor of the party challenging jurisdiction, the
jurisdictional inquiry may be avoided." Kotler v. American
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Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on
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other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); accord, e.g.,
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Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 8 n.5 (1st
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Cir. 1991).
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plaintiff's application for Medicaid benefits and food
stamps. In rendering that decision, the DPW determined that
plaintiff's assets and income both exceeded the allowable
limits prescribed by state regulations for Medicaid
eligibility. Plaintiff then filed charges with the
Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil
Rights (OCR), alleging that the DPW had withheld such
benefits because of her age, national origin, handicapped
status, and other impermissible factors. The OCR (the agency
responsible for ensuring that recipients of financial
assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services
do not engage in unlawful discrimination) conducted an
investigation. It found that the DPW's decision comported
fully with state and federal law and had not been influenced
by discriminatory considerations.
Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against the OCR,
claiming that it had failed to conduct an adequate
investigation. She subsequently amended her complaint to
include the DPW as a defendant, challenging the propriety of
its decision to deny her benefits. The district court
dismissed the action against both defendants, and plaintiff
has appealed.
The dismissal of the claims against the OCR need not
detain us long. For many of the same reasons discussed above
in connection with the EEOC, as well as those enumerated in
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an earlier appeal brought by plaintiff against the OCR's
counterpart in another federal agency, see Gorczakoski v.
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U.S. Department of Labor, No. 92-2189 (1st Cir. May 4, 1993),
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we find no arguable basis for subjecting the OCR to liability
as a result of any alleged improprieties in its processing of
plaintiff's claim. As there is no reason to believe that
plaintiff could remedy this defect in her complaint against
the OCR "through more specific pleading," Denton v.
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Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992), dismissal thereof as
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frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) was not an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
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325 (1989) (complaint is frivolous "where it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact"); Watson v. Caton,
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984 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir. 1993).
With regard to plaintiff's claims against the DPW, the
district court granted an unopposed motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that any attempt to gain
judicial review of the DPW's denial of benefits must be
pursued in state court under the Massachusetts Administrative
Procedure Act, Mass. G.L. c. 30A, 14. We perceive no error
in the district court's ruling.
The judgments are affirmed.
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