Filed: Jan. 05, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-60267 Summary Calendar IGNACIA DE JESUS SALAZAR, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A76 800 834) Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Ignacia de Jesus Salazar, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-60267 Summary Calendar IGNACIA DE JESUS SALAZAR, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A76 800 834) Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Ignacia de Jesus Salazar, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident ..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60267
Summary Calendar
IGNACIA DE JESUS SALAZAR,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(A76 800 834)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ignacia de Jesus Salazar, a Mexican citizen and lawful
permanent resident of the United States since 2001, was charged
under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(1)(E)(i), 8
U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) (2000), as being removable from the United
States for knowingly encouraging, inducing, assisting, abetting, or
aiding an alien to enter the United States illegally. The
Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Salazar removed from the United
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
States, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed without
opinion. Salazar seeks review of the removal order.
On 12 July 2003, Salazar’s vehicle, with her driving, was
stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint; the vehicle contained two
other individuals, a woman and child, who presented false documents
and were determined to be Mexican citizens illegally smuggled into
the United States. Salazar falsely told Border Patrol Agents that
the child was her grandson. Instead, the child was not related to
her but was the smuggled woman’s child; Salazar knew both aliens
were in the United States illegally; Salazar was driving the mother
and child to the woman’s husband and the child’s father in
Colorado; and Salazar was to receive $3000 for doing so.
Arresting Agent Justice completed a Form G-166 report,
characterizing this as an alien-smuggling incident. Agent Edberg
completed a Form I-213 Record of Deportable Alien. This report
outlined Salazar’s conduct and recommended removal. The Agents
testified at Salazar’s hearing in support of removal and elaborated
on the information provided in Forms G-166 and I-213.
Agent Edberg testified that Salazar was charged and convicted
under 8 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false statements (that the child
was her grandson) to a federal officer. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) offered the IJ a facsimile copy of this criminal
conviction; the IJ refused the facsimile copy and continued the
hearing, informing DHS that it needed to provide a certified copy.
At the later hearing on 15 December 2003, after DHS explained it
2
could not locate a certified copy of Salazar’s conviction, the IJ
proceeded but said he would not consider this conviction in making
his decision.
At the 15 December hearing, the IJ found Salazar subject to
removal based on her conduct of smuggling two aliens on 12 July
2003. Salazar appealed this decision to the BIA, which affirmed
without opinion.
Salazar raises two issues: (1) whether substantial evidence
supports her removal under INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(i); and (2) whether
the IJ violated Salazar’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
We normally review only the BIA’s decision, not that of the
IJ. Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS,
322 F.3d 804, 816 (5th Cir. 2002).
Where the BIA summarily affirms the IJ, however, we review the IJ’s
decision. Moin v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2003). We
deny a petition for review “if there is no error of law and if
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record,
considered as a whole, supports the decision’s factual findings”.
Id. Salazar faces a difficult challenge, because “[t]his court
will not reverse a BIA decision unless the petitioner provides
evidence ‘so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could
conclude against it’”.
Id. (quoting Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS,
78
F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996)). Further, the IJ’s witness
credibility determinations are accorded “great deference”. Efe v.
Ashcroft,
293 F.3d 899, 905 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The factfinder has
3
the duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to make
findings accordingly.”).
First, Salazar challenges the evidence used by the IJ to
support his decision that Salazar was removable. Salazar asserts
that inaccuracies in her Form I-213 constitute a violation of the
DHS’ own regulations to her detriment. According to Salazar, these
inaccuracies make it unclear who arrested and interviewed her on 12
July 2003, and therefore this information should not be used in
support of removal.
At Salazar’s removal hearing, where Agents Justice and Edberg
testified and were subject to cross-examination, Salazar received
an opportunity to challenge their testimony and the forms they
created under “[n]ormal circumstances”. The Agents explained how
small inaccuracies may result because the forms are filled out from
templates.
Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s decision; both Agents
Justice and Edberg testified to Salazar’s conduct on 12 July 2003
and the information contained in forms they created, and the IJ
concluded that “the credible testimony presented by the agents
here, as well as the reports created at the [time] of the incident
... are sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that [Salazar] was knowingly assisting two illegal aliens to enter
or to try to enter the United States in violation of law”. Salazar
does not overcome this finding, see
Moin, 335 F.3d at 418,
4
including the conclusion that the Agents provided credible
testimony. See
Efe, 293 F.3d at 905.
Next, Salazar maintains that the IJ violated her Fifth
Amendment due process rights. “Due process challenges to
deportation proceedings require an initial showing of substantial
prejudice.” Anwar v. INS,
116 F.3d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1997).
Salazar appears to challenge the IJ’s decision to admit the
Form I-213 because it prejudiced her. Salazar fails to show how
the admission of this form prejudiced her; absent such a showing,
this claim fails. Id.; see also
Renteria-Gonzalez, 322 F.3d at 817
n.16 (“observ[ing] that [Form I-213] come[s] within the public
records exception to the hearsay rule”, and also that “the hearsay
rules [do not] apply to deportation proceedings in the first
place”).
Salazar then challenges the IJ’s use of a facsimile copy of
her conviction for making false statements under 8 U.S.C. § 1001.
She contends that this prejudiced her, because the IJ cannot
disregard it after seeing a facsimile copy of the document. The
IJ stated he was not using this document in making his decision,
twice stating “I’m not going to consider the judgment”. After
announcing his decision, the IJ again stated that this conviction
was “not ... considered in entering the decision by this Court”.
Without this judgment, the IJ had sufficient evidence of
Salazar’s unlawful conduct through the testimony and documents from
the Agents. Further, a conviction of alien smuggling, and
5
certainly a false-statement conviction, is not necessary for
removal; “the INA requires only a showing of, not a conviction of
... alien smuggling activities”.
Id. at 817 n.15 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(E)(i)); see
id. at 810 n.4 (stating that “Section
1227(a)(1)(E)(i) ... does not requires [sic] a criminal conviction
before an alien may be deported for alien smuggling”). Salazar has
not shown substantial prejudice leading to the IJ’s decision, so
she fails to assert a due process violation.
DENIED
6