Filed: Feb. 08, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 8, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-20656 Summary Calendar JACKIE SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, ET AL Defendants, EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; DENNIS HERLONG; LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT NEWAR; SCOTT NEWAR; LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS HERLONG Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:03
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 8, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-20656 Summary Calendar JACKIE SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, ET AL Defendants, EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; DENNIS HERLONG; LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT NEWAR; SCOTT NEWAR; LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS HERLONG Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:03-..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 8, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-20656
Summary Calendar
JACKIE SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, ET AL
Defendants,
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; DENNIS HERLONG; LAW OFFICES OF
SCOTT NEWAR; SCOTT NEWAR; LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS HERLONG
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:03-CV-01952)
Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jackie Sanders appeals the grant of summary judgment by the district court and argues that
she was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to argue her case. For the following reasons, we
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sanders sued her former attorneys, Dennis Herlong, and Scott Newar, each of whom
represented her at different times during litigation against her former employer, Exxon. She alleges
that her attorneys conspired with the company to see that her lawsuit would not succeed. Sanders
also sued Exxon on claims related to her first suit and its alleged conspiracy with Herlong and Newar.
On January 20, 2005, the district court granted Herlong, Newar, and Exxon’s motions for summary
judgment on all claims. Sanders appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court. Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2003).
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
113 F.3d 528, 533
(5th Cir. 1997). The non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts
indicating a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the non-movant “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.”
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322.
This court reviews a district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of
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discretion. Avatar Exploration Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1991).
III. DISCUSSION
There is insufficient evidence in the record that Exxon bribed any of Sanders’ attorneys or
participated in a conspiracy to end her lawsuit. Additionally, there is no evidence that Sanders’
lawyers committed legal malpractice. There is also scant evidence to support Sanders’ multiple claims
against Exxon. The district court adopted the thirty-three page report and recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge which thoroughly discussed and rejected Sanders’ claims. Sanders also does not
challenge the legal conclusion that her claims against Exxon are barred by res judicata and/or
collateral estoppel. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sanders, we
agree with the district court and hold that no reasonable trier of fact could have returned a verdict
in her favor.
We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Sanders’ second
and third motions for leave to amend her complaint. “In exercising its discretion, the district court
may consider a variety of factors: undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Considering the types of claims involved here, applicable defenses,
and the already well-developed record and extensive discovery, it was well within the sound
discretion of the district court to prevent Sanders from asserting new theories.
We also note the district court’s warnings to Sanders regarding the frivolous nature of these
claims and further warn that the continued filing of any actions, complaints, motions or appeals in this
matter may result in sanctions.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED
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