PRADO, Circuit Judge:
Appellant 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc. appeals the district court's denial of its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration of Appellee John Carey's claim. The district court held that the binding arbitration provision relied upon by 24 Hour Fitness is illusory because 24 Hour Fitness "retain[ed] the unilateral right to modify or terminate the arbitration provision" at any time. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
Carey is a former sales representative for 24 Hour Fitness. In January 2005, during Carey's period of employment, 24 Hour Fitness issued an employee handbook (the "Handbook"). One of the sections in the Handbook, entitled "Arbitration of Disputes," provided that all employment-related disputes, whether initiated by an employee or by 24 Hour Fitness, would be "resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration." It specified that disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") were among those subject to the mandatory arbitration policy and provided that disputes cannot be brought as class actions or in representative capacities. The policy also expressly invoked the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") as its governing authority.
Carey signed the Employee Handbook Receipt Acknowledgment (the "Acknowledgment"), indicating that he had received the Handbook. The Acknowledgment reiterated the arbitration policy: "I agree that if there is a dispute arising out of my employment as described in the `Arbitration of Disputes' policy, I will submit it exclusively to binding and final arbitration according to its terms." The Acknowledgment also stated that the terms of the Handbook are subject to change ("Change-in-Terms Clause"):
After Carey's employment ended, he filed this class action against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that it had violated the FLSA by failing to adequately compensate him and other similarly-situated employees for overtime work. 24 Hour Fitness moved the district court to stay its proceedings and to compel arbitration of Carey's claim. In his response to that motion, Carey argued that the arbitration agreement was illusory because 24 Hour Fitness retained the right to unilaterally amend the agreement.
Carey brought a complaint under the FLSA, so the district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This court has appellate jurisdiction under the FAA, specifically 9
This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 253 (5th Cir.2008).
In ruling upon a motion to compel arbitration, the court first determines whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular type of dispute at issue. JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir.2007). Answering this question requires considering two issues: "(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Carey does not argue that his FLSA claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Rather, he challenges the first issue, claiming that the agreement to arbitrate is illusory and invalid.
The FAA reflects a "`liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.'" CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 665, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). However, the "federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties." Morrison, 517 F.3d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the "fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract," AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), to determine whether an agreement to arbitrate is valid, courts apply "ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Morrison, 517 F.3d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). Both parties agree that Texas law applies.
Under Texas law, an arbitration clause is illusory if one party can "avoid its promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it altogether." In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex.2010). Put differently, where one party to an arbitration agreement seeks to invoke arbitration to settle a dispute, if the other party can suddenly change the terms of the agreement to avoid arbitration, then the agreement was illusory from the outset. The crux of this issue is whether 24 Hour Fitness has the power to make changes to its arbitration policy that have retroactive effect, meaning changes to the policy that would strip the right of arbitration from an employee who has already attempted to invoke it. See Torres v. S.G.E. Mgmt., LLC, 397 Fed.Appx. 63, 68 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (summarizing several Texas and Fifth Circuit cases as "suggest[ing] that the lack of a notice window before any elimination of the [arbitration] clause becomes effective and the ability to amend the agreement retroactively so as to avoid any promise to arbitrate are factors indicating that the agreement may be illusory" (emphasis added)).
Our decision in Morrison v. Amway Corp. is instructive. In that case, applying Texas law, we refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that was capable of being retroactively modified. 517 F.3d at 257. Morrison involved a dispute arising out of a distributorship agreement. Id. at 250-51. The distributorship agreement required all distributors to comply with certain "Rules of Conduct" as they were "amended and published from time to time
In reaching this conclusion, we distinguished the facts in Morrison from those in In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex.2002). In that case, a Halliburton employee argued that a mandatory arbitration provision was illusory because Halliburton had retained the right to modify or discontinue the program. Id. at 569. In holding that the arbitration agreement was not illusory, the Texas Supreme Court focused on two key provisions: one stated that "no amendment shall apply to a Dispute of which the Sponsor [Halliburton] had actual notice on the date of amendment"; the other stated that any termination of the arbitration program "shall not be effective until 10 days after reasonable notice of termination is given to Employees or as to Disputes which arose prior to the date of termination." Id. at 569-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because of these provisions, the court held that "Halliburton cannot avoid its promise to arbitrate by amending or terminating it altogether." Id. at 570. It was the absence of such a "Halliburton type savings clause[]" that caused the Morrison court to hold that the arbitration provision at issue was illusory. 517 F.3d at 257; see also In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419, 421, 424 (Tex.2010) (holding that an arbitration clause in a workers' compensation plan was not illusory where, although the employer reserved the right to "amend, modify, or terminate the Plan at any time," it also provided that "no such amendment or termination will alter the arbitration provisions ... with respect to... an Injury occurring prior to the date of such amendment or termination").
Carey argues that the arbitration clause in the Handbook is illusory because the Change-in-Terms Clause would allow 24 Hour Fitness to unilaterally avoid its promise to arbitrate by modifying the Handbook. The Acknowledgment gives 24 Hour Fitness the "right to revise, delete, and add to the employee handbook" in which the arbitration provision is located. As in Morrison, there is no "Halliburton type savings clause" in the Acknowledgment that limits 24 Hour Fitness's ability to make retroactive modifications to the arbitration provision. If a 24 Hour Fitness employee sought to invoke arbitration with the company pursuant to the agreement, nothing would prevent 24 Hour Fitness from changing the agreement and making those changes applicable to that pending dispute if it determined that arbitration was no longer in its interest. In effect, the agreement allows 24 Hour Fitness to hold its employees to the promise to arbitrate while reserving its own escape hatch.
24 Hour Fitness argues that its Acknowledgment should not be read to allow retroactive changes in its arbitration policy when it does not expressly provide for retroactivity. This argument ignores this court's holdings in Torres, 397 Fed.Appx. at 68, and Morrison, 517 F.3d at 257, in which silence about the possible retroactive application of amendments to the arbitration
24 Hour Fitness also argues that the Change-in-Terms Clause does not allow it to unilaterally modify the Handbook. Because the Change-in-Terms Clause contains a provision relating to notice ("Any... revisions to the handbook will be communicated through official written notices approved by the President and CEO of 24 Hour Fitness ..."), 24 Hour Fitness argues that any change would not become binding upon Carey until he (1) received notice of that change and (2) accepted the change by continuing his employment. It concludes that it therefore lacks the power to unilaterally modify the arbitration clause without obtaining Carey's assent.
Although 24 Hour Fitness is correct that it is necessary for an employer seeking to change the terms of an employment contract to prove notice and acceptance of those changes, it does not follow that these two steps are sufficient to make a contract non-illusory. Halliburton makes this clear. In that case, the court discussed the proposition that an employer must give notice and obtain its employees' acceptance of any changes to the terms of employment. 80 S.W.3d at 568. It also held that Halliburton had satisfied these requirements and that the plaintiff had accepted its imposition of a dispute resolution program as a matter of law. Id. at 569. If notice and acceptance were all that were required to make an arbitration agreement non-illusory, the court could have answered the question of illusoriness at once upon finding that Halliburton had satisfied those requirements. Instead, later in the opinion, the court embarked upon a completely separate discussion of whether the arbitration agreement was illusory. Id. at 569-70. Nowhere in that discussion did the court suggest that its earlier holding—that notice and acceptance of the change had occurred—was sufficient to answer that question, or even that it factored into the inquiry at all. Id. Instead, the court's analysis of whether the agreement was illusory dealt exclusively with the savings clause preventing any changes from having retroactive effect. Id. 24 Hour Fitness has not argued that the notice and acceptance requirements would prevent it from retroactively eliminating its arbitration policy, which is the critical inquiry for determining whether an agreement is illusory.
24 Hour Fitness cites several cases in support of its argument that an arbitration agreement is not illusory so long as the party reserving the right to change its terms must provide notice of any changes. See, e.g., Zamora v. Swift Transp. Corp., 319 Fed.Appx. 333, 334 (5th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming in a one-page opinion the district court's holding that an arbitration agreement was illusory because the employer "reserved the right to revoke or modify the agreements at any time without notice"); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229-31 (Tex.2003) (suggesting that if an employer's reservation of the right to unilaterally modify any personnel policy without notice applied to its arbitration agreement that the agreement would be rendered illusory). However, both Torres and Morrison hold that notice is insufficient when retroactive amendment is possible. In Torres, we considered an arbitration provision to which amendments would become binding "upon notice" "or by publication." 397 Fed.Appx. at 66. Despite the fact that notice was being provided, we held that because amendments became effective immediately and because there was no savings clause excepting pending disputes from amendment, the agreement was illusory. Id. at 68. Similarly, in Morrison, amendments to the arbitration provision were to be "published... in official Amway literature." 517 F.3d at 254. Despite this provision for
Our conclusion that notice and acceptance are not sufficient to render an arbitration provision non-illusory is bolstered by Weekley Homes, LP v. Rao, 336 S.W.3d 413 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). In that case, an employer sought to compel arbitration of an employee's lawsuit based upon an arbitration provision contained within the employee handbook. Id. at 415. The employee argued that the arbitration provision was illusory because the handbook stated that the policies contained therein were "not to be interpreted as a promise by the Company that any particular situation will be handled in the express manner set forth in the text." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted the proposition that a "party asserting a change to an at-will employment contract must prove two things: (1) notice of the change, and (2) acceptance of the change." Id. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also stated that "by continuing to work for an employer after receiving the notice, or past the effective date of the arbitration policy if one is provided, an employee accepts the agreement to arbitrate as a matter of law." Id. at 418-19. In addition, the employee conceded that he had received the handbook and an email "confirm[ing] that [he] underst[oo]d and agree[d] to abide by the policies and procedures" contained in the handbook. Id. at 417. Despite the evidence of notice and acceptance, the court nevertheless held that the agreement to arbitrate was illusory. Id. at 421. The court stated:
Id. (internal citations omitted).
We find the reasoning in Weekley Homes compelling,
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the arbitration agreement contained in the 24 Hour Fitness employee handbook was illusory. Therefore, Carey is not bound by the provision and 24 Hour Fitness cannot compel arbitration to go forward. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.